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7A number of UN conventions and declarations (on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressi-
ons and the World Heritage Conventions) can be understood as instruments of 
international governance to promote democracy and social justice worldwide. 
In Indonesia (as in many other countries), these international agreements have 
encouraged the self-assertion of communities that had been oppressed and de-
prived of their land, especially during the New Order regime (1966-1998).  More 
than 2,000 communities in Indonesia who define themselves as masyarakat adat 
or “indigenous peoples” had already joined the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of 
the Archipelago” (AMAN) by 2013. In their efforts to gain recognition and self-
determination, these communities are supported by international donors and 
international as well as national NGOs by means of development programmes.
In the definition of masyarakat adat, “culture” or adat plays an important role 
in the communities’ self-definition. Based on particular characteristics of their 
adat, the asset of their culture, they try to distinguish themselves from others in 
order to substantiate their claims for the restitution of their traditional rights and 
property (namely land and other natural resources) from the state. The authors 
of this volume investigate how differently structured communities - socially, po-
litically and religiously - and associations reposition themselves vis-à-vis others, 
especially the state, not only by drawing on adat for achieving particular goals, 
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This volume presents the results of five years’ research on the processes of the 
propertisation of culture that have been carried out by the Research Unit 772 on The 
Constitution of Cultural Property (speaker: Regina Bendix), sponsored by the German 
Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).1 Our research focused on the 
certification and heritisation of culture (nominations and listing of tangible and 
intangible UNESCO World Heritages) during the first three years. Since 2011, we have 
been investigating how “culture”, or more specifically adat (concepts of traditional 
ways of life and values), is shaped and deployed by various actors in Indonesia to 
define their identities, reclaim rights and property, and reposition themselves in the 
multi-ethnic state of Indonesia since the fall of the Suharto regime (1998). 
 
A workshop entitled “Adat between state governance and self-determined indigeneity 
in Indonesia” was held at Göttingen University in October 2011. The preliminary 
results of the most recent anthropological research on adat or rather on “indigeneity” 
in Indonesia were presented by scholars at this workshop, including our much-valued 
research fellow from Jakarta, Fadjar Ibnu Thufail, from the Göttingen projects, and 
also by a scholar from Bonn University. Since the struggles for recognition of a special 
adat particularly of “indigenous groups” in Indonesia can only be understood against 
                                                        
1 The research on which the chapter by Steinebach is based was carried out during a project within 
the Collaborative Research Centre 990, “Ecological and Socioeconomic Functions of Tropical 
Lowland Rainforest Transformation Systems (Sumatra, Indonesia)”, also based at Göttingen 
University. 
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the background of international conventions and aid programmes for the promotion 
of indigenous peoples, two scholars from the International Law Department of 
Göttingen University (Katja Göcke and Maria Victoria Cabrera Ormaza) were invited, 
as well as the well-known Indonesian lawyer and indigenous peoples activist, Sandra 
Moniaga, to present their perspective on the issue of indigeneity.  
 
The present volume mirrors this anthropological-international law co-operation and 
exchange of views on indigeneity. We are grateful that two lawyers from Indonesia, 
Yance Arizona and Erasmus Cahyadi, wrote an insightful paper on the current state of 
affairs on a special law on indigenous peoples in Indonesia. 
 
Francesca Merlan, the renowned anthropologist from the National University in 
Canberra and an expert on “indigeneity”, spent a month as a Fellow of the Research 
Unit at Göttingen in June 2013. We all benefitted tremendously from her lectures, the 
comments she gave on earlier versions of several chapters and her insights. She has 
written an Epilogue to the volume from an encompassing, comparative perspective. I 
would like to thank her for writing this important chapter, for her commitment and 
the fruitful discussions we had in a very friendly and relaxed atmosphere. 
 
This research only took place with the great help of our research partners in Indonesia: 
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta as a counterpart, and especially 
the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples (AMAN) and its General Secretary, Abdon 
Nababan, the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), particularly the Samdhana 
Institute and several other NGOs and their representatives, as well as the many adat 
communities in different provinces in Indonesia. All of these allowed and helped the 
anthropologists to carry out their research. We would like to express our gratitude to 
all of them. Terima kasih banyak! 
 
All this work would not have been possible without the sponsors. I would like to thank 
first and foremost the German Research Council for generously sponsoring all the 
research projects mentioned, the Volkswagen Foundation (Volkswagen Stiftung), 
Hannover, for supporting the workshop in 2012, and also the Volkswagen Stiftung and 
the Ministry for Science and Culture of the Federal State of Lower Saxony and 
Göttingen University for the research professorship (Niedersachsenprofessur) they 
granted me. It is thanks to this professorship and its endowment that many 
complementary journeys, additional research, meetings, the temporary employment of 
additional research staff and assistants, as well as this publication became possible.  
 




The Power of  Indigeneity:  
Reparation, Readjustments and Repositioning 
 
Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin 
This volume analyses the way in which the legal category of “ indigenous peoples” and, 
consequently, the notion of indigeneity as propagated by international conventions are 
understood, deployed and implemented by different actors – national as well as 
regional and local – in Indonesia. The first two chapters, therefore, discuss the 
formation of the several different conventions dealing with “indigenous” or “tribal” 
peoples and the recognition of their legal status as “peoples”, with its inherent right to 
self-determination, from the perspective of international law. The third chapter, also 
written from a legal and activist perspective, examines how Indonesia has classified its 
citizens into different categories; among them, what could be translated as 
“indigenous” too, but with a derogatory connotation, subsumed as communities which 
were considered primitive and resistant to development. Only recently has this 
situation changed, and a new bill on the recognition and protection of the rights of 
indigenous peoples is now being passed through parliament. The following chapters 
present case-studies from different parts of Indonesia. They show how international 
discourses, often transmitted through NGOs or the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of 
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the Archipelago (AMAN), a nationwide organisation with more than 2,000 member 
communities, have been adapted and implemented. The communities benefitting from 
the recognition of being or becoming “indigenous” or, at least, “having” a special adat 
(traditions, customs, regulations, and values) ranges from marginalised peoples who 
fight for the restitution of their rights, especially control over natural resources from 
which they had been expropriated, to stratified societies and even noble houses, who 
claim the restitution of their rights and recognition. By deploying indigeneity, each of 
these actor groups attempts to reposition itself within their particular historical, social 
and political setting in the multi-ethnic state and to achieve recognition. 
In this introduction, I would like to highlight a couple of encompassing issues 
which arise in several of the subsequent case-studies; I consider them as fundamental 
for the understanding of how “indigeneity” has been conceived and is nowadays 
deployed by a wide range of actors in Indonesia. All of the chapters presenting case-
studies are written by “Indonesianists”. However, this book also aims at a readership 
that is interested in Indonesian indigeneity issues from a comparative viewpoint; it is, 
therefore, initially necessary to provide some basic information. The last chapter of the 
book, the Epilogue, written by Francesca Merlan, then takes up some of the topics 
briefly presented here. She elaborates on them from a higher, more comprehensive 
anthropological perspective by both characterizing the particular “Indonesian” quality 
of the cases presented, as well as linking them to general  questions and concerns 
expressed in other indigeneity discussions and movements in other regions of the 
world.  
The introduction, therefore, outlines firstly the historical background of the 
category of indigeneity in Indonesia and the way in which international conventions 
have interacted with nationwide movements fighting for recognition and the 
restitution of rights. It is against this background that the translation of the Indonesian 
term adat as “indigenous” has to be understood. In a further paragraph, the question is 
raised to what extent the interactions between international conventions and the way in 
which they are implemented through aid programmes also serve the (often hidden) 
goals of the donors. In most discussions on “indigenous peoples” in Indonesia, and 
even in the chapters of this book, the oppression or marginalisation of adat 
communities is traced back to colonial and post-colonial regimes of domination. In the 
last paragraph, I want to complement these explanations by showing that these more 
or less recent processes of marginalisation and exclusion were, at least in some parts of 
Indonesia, preceded by pre-colonial social and political conditions that were just as 
little free from power relations as those during the 20th and 21st centuries. However, 
these relations were not based on principles of worldwide capitalistic exploitation. 
Historical Retrospective 
AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), adopted the militant slogan, “If the state 
does not recognise us, we will not recognise the state” at its first congress in Jakarta in 
1999 (Moniaga 2004, 2007). This highlights the political situation of what, according to 
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internationalist definitions, are called indigenous peoples in Indonesia at the end of the 
New Order regime: 
They had suffered marginalisation, discrimination and dispossession over decades 
and were classified as inferior to “mainstream” Indonesians, who were following the 
nationalistic path to progress and development as decreed by the government. Their 
systematic discrimination, dispossession and displacement were not an invention of the 
New Order regime (1965-1998); their genealogy can be traced back to the Dutch 
colonial policy, as many publications and several chapters of this volume document. 
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the subsequent onset of the reform era 
(reformasi), which promoted decentralisation and aimed at democratisation, have 
offered the opportunity to the indigenous peoples (masyarakat adat) and to the 
government to recover the injustices and dispossessions which these people had 
suffered.  
 
Reformasi, whose major pillars are regional autonomy and democratisation, has opened 
up the chance of negotiations for many indigenous peoples to recapture what they 
have lost: dignity, recognition, rights, and possessions, namely land. However, the 
decades in which several laws, especially those concerning agriculture (Basic Agrarian 
Law, BAL, No. 5/1960), forestry (Forestry Law, BFL, no.5/1967) and mining (Mining 
Law no. 11/1967), had been enacted have left their enduring traces which are difficult 
to eliminate (Bakker and Moniaga 2010; Moniaga 2007; see the chapter by Arizona and 
Cahyadi in this volume). These laws formed the basis for the expropriation of 
indigenous peoples and the exploitation of natural resources to the profit only of the 
central state. 
These laws are one aspect of the repressive government’s legacy; the administrative 
structure, for example the division of land management – land is the most hotly 
disputed issue between the indigenous peoples and the government – into two 
ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Forestry, each of them with 
its own tasks and goals, is another. A third legacy of the decades of the New Order 
regime is the bureaucratic authoritarianism (Bakker and Moniaga 2010:200) and the 
corresponding habitus of many civil servants that has not (yet) really changed.  
Since these reformation processes started in Indonesia after 1998, the masyarakat adat 
in almost all provinces, the Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago, 
which in 2013 noted about 2,000 member communities, national and transnational 
NGOs and, of course, the administration and the government on all its levels (local, 
regional, provincial, and national) have been engaged in negotiations and even battles 
over these issues. 
 
A first milestone in the fight of indigenous communities to get back their rights and 
especially their adat land (see chapters by Steinebach and Grumblies in this volume), 
seems to have been set with the Constitutional Court’s decision in May 2013. It 
decreed the elimination of  
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“the word ‘state’ from Article 1(f) of the 1999 Law on Forestry, which 
previously declared that ‘customary forests are state forests located in the areas 
of custom-based communities’. Also revised was Article 5 of the law, which 
stated that state forests include customary forests”. 
 (Jakarta Globe 18.05.2013) 
 
With this decision, the state formally loses millions of hectares of forest land, most of 
them granted as concessions to natural resource industries (private as well as state-
owned companies), especially mining, logging and agriculture. The concession holders 
will be obliged in the future to directly negotiate with the local communities and no 
longer only with representatives of the national government. The impact of this change 
and to what extent the state is forced to return all this land (which, by no means, is still 
all covered with what is usually understood by “forests”) or how this will be 
implemented in practice is difficult to anticipate. This case illustrates that the 
indigenous communities and the state not “only” negotiate about ancestral forests, but 
about fundamental means of production with considerable yields that have, so far, 
officially gone into the treasury and contributed substantially to the national budget. 
Interaction with the International Moves 
The developments in Indonesia and the increasing voicing of indigenous peoples’ 
claims for recognition and rights since the early 1990s and the international support 
they receive, cannot be considered independently from the international stage and its 
worldwide campaigns and organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNESCO. The first “International 
Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples”, launched by the UN General Assembly, 
lasted from 1995 to 2004, and the second Indigenous Peoples’ Decade lasts from 2005 
to 2014. These decades have drawn worldwide attention to the issue of marginalised 
and oppressed peoples and made these peoples also aware that the time was ripe for 
their requests to be heard and enforced. 
 
In the aftermath of the World War II and in wake of decolonization, a few 
conventions and declarations were issued that all display similar ideas about society and 
humanity. They anticipated universal values, such as the separation of powers, rule of 
law, social justice, equality of the citizens before the law, and freedom of the individual. 
Such values are embodied in the UN Human Rights Convention (1948), the ILO 169 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989, entry into force 1991; not ratified by 
Indonesia) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007; 
adopted by Indonesia in 2007, but characteristically not by the four settler states 
U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). These conventions and declarations (for 
a detailed discussion, see the chapter by Göcke in this volume) all emphasise the 
importance of “tribal” or “indigenous people” and the recognition and restitution of 
the rights they deserve after decades of dispossession and oppression. All of these 
international regulations, however, bear the mark of the problems settler states had 
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(the relationship between the “white” or in any case dominant settlers and the 
indigenous peoples) (see Merlan 2009). These regulations, therefore, seem to aim at 
recognising the original inhabitants and at least partly restoring their rights in the states 
established by the former colonizers. The special rights the decrees endow indigenous 
peoples with, however, apply to the indigenous communities in all states, at least to 
those who have signed these agreements. However, the formulation of special rights 
for indigenous peoples in these agreements only marginally reflects the situation in 
countries such as Indonesia with thousands of self-identified indigenous communities.  
UNESCO complemented these UN human rights regulations with conventions 
that have their focus somewhere else, but can clearly be identified as accompanying 
measures to the UN decrees: The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (2003) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005, in force since 2007; accession by Indonesia in 
2012). These conventions focus on “culture”, and underline that “culture” can be 
protected and promoted only if human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
guaranteed. They also emphasise the role “culture” plays as a vehicle of identity and 
how, in particular, indigenous peoples have acted as preservers and safeguards of 
cultural heritage. Here, apart from the characterisation of indigenous peoples as social 
groups that have suffered historical injustices in many ways, cultural values and 
practices are in the foreground. In fact, “culture” lies at the core of what in Indonesia 
is called adat.1 Indigenous peoples in Indonesia, apart from their history of oppression 
and dispossession, ultimately argue with their particular localized “culture” that 
distinguishes them from others; a specific definition of their cultural particularity is, 
therefore, required to fill the “tribal slot” (Li 2000; and see below). Undoubtedly, the 
way in which “culture” as a distinctive mark of indigenous peoples that others do not 
possess is used in international and national or local discourses implies a “politicization 
of culture and its treatment as property” (Greene 2004:212).  
From Adat to “Indigenous” 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, illustrates that 
indigenous peoples are described as a distinct socio-cultural category and deserve 
special promotion, protection – and rights. As the chapters by Göcke, Cabrera and 
Arizona/Cahyadi (in this volume) explain, the category of “indigenous peoples” is only 
loosely defined in the international decrees; no definite criteria are given that would 
allow their unequivocal identification. An emphasis lies on the self-identification of 
being “indigenous”. The self-identification as “indigenous” opens up a wide range of 
possibilities for communities for a repositioning vis-à-vis the state. Tyson emphasised 
that adat can be portrayed “as imaginative and adaptive, serving as a living and evolving 
                                                        
1 Adat, though a complex concept, can be briefly described as customary localised ways of life, 
regulations and beliefs (for a detailed discussion of adat, its significance and use in present-day 
Indonesia, see Davidson and Henley 2007). “Culture” is usually translated with budaya in Indonesia. 
However, budaya refers to specific cultural expressions and arts rather than describing encompassing 
ways of life and world-views. 
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body of agreements, rights and rules” (2011:655). The translation AMAN made of 
masyarakat adat, which literally means “customary communities”2, as “indigenous 
peoples” has to be understood as a possibility to interlink with the transnational 
indigeneity movements, as one of my interlocutors in Bali pointed out (see the chapter 
by Hauser-Schäublin in this volume).3 In short, the translation as “indigenous peoples” 
is also a strategic positioning within the globe. The networking with transnational 
indigeneity movements and with sponsor organisations is crucial for the funding of 
AMAN and its projects, as well as for negotiations with the government. Without this 
international ideational and financial support, AMAN would not be such a strong and 
influential organisation as it is at present (see the chapter by Sanmukri in this volume). 
 
In any case, “indigenous peoples” is a relational term in several ways (see also Merlan 
2009). In a socio-political respect, this term refers to the relationship of a smaller, less 
powerful society to a more powerful majority or dominant society or nation-state, and 
implies the marginalisation and discrimination they experienced due to their culture. 
Thus, what was once the reason for the suffering of all the injustices, their culture in 
the widest sense, has become an asset in the meantime.  
According to the new law on indigenous peoples4 that is currently (2013) being 
discussed in parliament in Indonesia, masyarakat adat needs to display five features for 
official recognition as masyarakat hukum adat, customary law community: to have a 
shared history, to own customary land, to have adat law, to possess specific property 
relations and inheritance/or adat artefacts, and to have a customary governance system 
(see the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in this volume).5 Indigenous peoples or rather 
customary law communities are to be granted a special status and corresponding rights 
and entitlements.6 The international conventions, especially those from the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, emphasise that self-identification is the major 
factor of determining which community is “indigenous” or not (Gausset, Kenrick and 
Gibb 2011:137). In the Draft Law on the Recognition and the Protection of the 
Indigenous Peoples (RUU PPHMHA) in Indonesia, self-identification is a key criterion 
for the communities’ self-determination. However, this is only a first, though 
significant, step in the process of full official recognition and acceptance. The 
                                                        
2 During the New Order, one derogatory term to denote indigenous peoples was komunitas adat 
terpencil, literally remote adat communities. This expression was derogatory in meaning in a similar way 
that the colonial terms “the native”, as well as “indigenous”, “primitive” or “tribal people”, had in 
anthropology before the transnational indigeneity movement gave “indigenous peoples” a positive 
connotation (see Kuper 2003). 
3 Merlan calls “indigeneity” an “internationalist category”, which is associated with some universalist 
moral frames, and presupposes that relationships between peoples and their “Others” can be 
generalised (2009:306). 
4 The Draft Law on the Recognition and the Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (RUU 
PPHMHA); see the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in this volume. 
5 These criteria are more or less identical with those established by AMAN (see also Tyson 2011). 
6 This special status is anchored in adat and legitimizes claims based on descent, or jus sanguinis, which 
other citizens of the nation state whose equal rights are based only on jus solis do not enjoy; in fact, 
they are excluded (see Tyson 2011). 
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acknowledging of this status needs to be carried out in further steps by political bodies 
(see the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in this volume).  
Indigenous Peoples and their Missions 
Since the international community has put the “indigenous peoples” on their agenda, a 
number of inter- and transnational organisations, such as the World Bank, and also 
state-funded development organisations and a large number of NGOs have put up 
special education and “capacity building” programmes and funds for indigenous 
peoples in all parts of the world, Indonesia included (see the chapter by Sanmukri in 
this volume). Among the special education programmes are also those which teach 
people about Human Rights and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Rights! Training 
Manual 2010; ILO 2009). Here, (“community training”) processes with multiple 
translations (with continuous reinterpretations) in both directions between 
international and national organisations and the local people take place; they influence 
the way in which these rights are finally understood and adopted by local communities. 
As Merry has pointed out, intermediaries or facilitators play a crucial role in the way 
they translate up and down (2013:214; see also Rottenburg 2002). The individual 
cultural systems of particular values, rules and practices of this multitude of these 
customary communities (“diversity” in its literal sense as spelled out by the national 
motto7) are only marginally taken into account by the agents of inter- and transnational 
organisations when they transfer such universally conceived rights from the 
international through the national and, finally, to the regional and local level. Nor do 
they seem to bother how the relationship between a (historically and culturally shaped) 
nation state and – in the case of Indonesia – its thousands of indigenous communities 
can be configured in a fair way for all parties. Thus, the situation of legal pluralism, 
with all its inherent contradictions and competing goals, that arises from this situation 
is a challenge to all stakeholders (see Benda-Beckmann 2010), especially policy-makers. 
Moreover, in practice, national law and indigenous regulations are not separate 
domains with regard to the actors: There are no clear-cut boundaries between the state 
administration and its staff, as well as local deputies and political office holders, on the 
one side, and actors who argue and act on behalf of adat on the other (see the chapter 
by Müller in this volume). This creates a broad grey area for ambitious actors to make 
use of both domains and their powers and combine them to reach their own goals or 
those of their parties, depending on the particular circumstances and goals (see the 
chapters by Grumblies and Müller in this volume). 
The engagement of inter- and transnational institutions, that often hire NGOs to 
transmit and implement programmes and money from industrialized nations to 
countries of the south, often have a specific goal in mind that encompasses the 
endeavour to assist indigenous peoples to achieve equality and a full enjoyment of 
citizens’ rights (see the chapter by Sanmukri). Environmental issues are fundamental in 
indigenous peoples’ claims for the restitution of their ancestral land. Yet, 
                                                        
7 The motto of Indonesia is “Unity in diversity” (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). 
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environmental issues – the topic of forest conservation – are also dominant in many 
international programmes destined for indigenous peoples. These programmes (and 
the organisations) often have a particular concept of the “indigenous” that is 
reminiscent of the noble savage of earlier times (see Greene 2004). Indigenous peoples 
are assumed to be more or less the timeless guardians of the forest who have been 
living in balance and harmony with nature for centuries at least. They are imagined by 
experts as holders of communal land rights and, therefore, ascribed as the ideal 
performers of “community-based forest management” (Li 2010:388). They are 
considered to be destined to be the promoters and preservers of the forests and 
biodiversity. At the same time, they are seen as those actors who, through their way 
and life and world-view, will be able to counterbalance the CO2 emissions. They 
should perform the role of the saviours from global warming (see also Benda-
Beckmann 1997).  
 
As Li (2010) has already mentioned and as the chapters by Steinebach and Grumblies 
(in this volume) show, “the indigenous peoples” or masyarakat adat cover a wider range 
of peoples with different livelihood systems. Most of them are no longer nomads 
roaming through the forests and living only from what nature offers them as the term 
in its original and romanticizing sense suggests. Most of them today lead a sedentary 
life as small-scale farmers and practice cultivation; they also engage in cash crop 
production, such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, or even palm oil. There is a gap between the 
local practices of indigenous peoples and the assessment by and the expectations of 
outsiders.  
Li has convincingly shown that the earlier practices of dispossession by the 
(colonial) government of indigenous peoples from their land and natural resources are 
now followed by procedures, implemented by transnational organisations (including 
the World Bank), to fix indigenous peoples in place by conferring on them the task 
and responsibility of safeguarding the forests – for global benefits. Li relates the 
seemingly opposed mechanisms of dispossession which the indigenous peoples 
suffered to the procedures of the “communal fix” (by advocating communal land 
rights and, consequently, the community-based forest management they should carry 
out) they are now supposed to undergo. She explains this as the dynamics of 
capitalism, which she understands as “an assemblage of disparate elements, practices, 
and processes each with its own history of violence, law, hope, and struggle” 
(2010:400). Both the mechanism of dispossession and possession are, as Rata 
comments, in the “interest of capitalism’s market forces”. Indigeneity is used as an 
ideology of management of people to land (2010:406). 
“Indigenous Peoples” and Earlier Systems of Domination  
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that before capitalism entered countries 
like Indonesia, relationships existed based on equality between complex societies and 
the smaller rather dispersed communities in forested or mountainous areas. Neither 
were (and are) societies which nowadays claim to be indigenous or masyarakat adat 
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egalitarian, such as the Toraja (see the chapter by Klenke in this volume) or Bali (see 
the chapter by Hauser-Schäublin in this volume). Kingdoms and sultanates with a 
ruling elite and subjects of different types, many of whom were slaves, existed in many 
parts of the archipelago. In brief, social order in Indonesia was seldom egalitarian, 
either within society or between societies (Henley and Davidson 2007:4-5). The 
relationship between the dominant, mostly stratified, agrarian or trading societies (such 
as the early kingdoms and later, the sultanates) and communities living away from the 
centre and practicing a different form of livelihood was multi-facetted. Apart from 
different forms of exchange and patron-client relationships, many of these 
communities were regarded as inferior and treated in a derogatory way. They were also 
the subject of encroachments by the dominant lowland societies or states which also 
partly resulted in colonization, in human trafficking (as slaves, such as the Papuans 
sent to the Chinese court; Papuan people had been raided and brought as slaves to 
Java already since the 10th century, see Penders 2002:116) and even extinction (see, for 
example, Hauser-Schäublin and Ardika 2008).  
There is, however, a substantial difference between the pre-colonial and the 
colonial and post-colonial, mainly the New Order era, which I can only briefly outline 
here: The idea (and practice) of a territorial state, the nation-state, was imported and 
implemented with colonialism. As is well known, the early Southeast Asian states were 
not territorial states but geographically shifting polities lacking strict borders, especially 
the idea of definite geographic borders. They have been characterised as mandala, 
galactic or segmentary states (for an overview, see Day 2002), and the rulers’ power 
was indicated by the number of his people rather than the extent of the territory. 
Accordingly, expansionist attacks on neighbouring regions were not carried out to gain 
land but rather manpower or goods (such as commodities brought by foreign 
merchants or sacred regalia). The dominant societies, therefore, were not aiming at 
evicting the communities living in fringe areas from their land. Exchange and trading 
relations constituted a kind of division of labour and both parties needed and relied on 
the knowledge and goods, the other was able to provide. Thus, there was no reason to 
expel those who provided the dominant society with goods it otherwise, without the 
knowledge of the providers, would not have received. The people had to remain in 
place if their partners wanted to benefit from them. 
 
Here, a fundamental difference from the system that started in Indonesia with 
colonization becomes apparent: The different mode of production, capitalism, and the 
role land plays as a means of production in this system. The production did not aim at 
providing, first and foremost, the colonizers with what they needed for their daily 
living. Instead, it was the production of commodities (or the raw material needed for 
their manufacturing) for an international or global market. For this purpose, land was 
the major resource and labourers (not peasants) could be transferred from any other 
part of the colony to the location of production to carry out the work required. The 
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local people were an obstacle rather than an important partner with unique knowledge. 
The processes of dispossession and marginalisation and expulsion started.8  
Li has impressively shown (2010) how these processes of dispossession were indeed 
linked to capitalism and its need and use of land as a means of production to launch 
plantations, systematic logging, selling concessions to companies for various purposes, 
and establishing mines or settlements. The dispossessed became characterised against 
the backdrop of this “modern” and modernising capitalistic ideology: the backward, 
the animistic, those who practiced a kind of primitive communism (communally 
owned land) and had not yet completed the evolutionary step to a civilised way of life, 
open to development. They were the “indigenous”, or as they were called under the 
New Order, “suku terasing” (isolated tribes), komunitas adat terpencil (remote adat 
communities) and the like. It was, therefore, the land on which these people were 
living that the colonisers wanted to get hold of for their own commercial goals. It was 
primarily for these reasons that they had to be evicted, dispossessed and resettled. 
As Li suggested (2010), today’s self-identification as indigenous peoples (and even 
the concept as such) may be understood as a defensive response to the dispossession 
that has been taking place in the many guises of capitalism, through ascribing the role 
to them as forest preservers or through indebtedness (mortgages, especially of small-
scale farmers). The use of adat – and along with it the revival of adat (or perhaps also 
the other way round) – is also a means of achieving a reconfiguration of power 
relationships which has become a potent instrument in Indonesia (Tyson 2011, 2010). 
Adat as a general term is not only restricted to “indigenous peoples”, but also refers to 
traditions and inherited values in a general way (see Davidson and Henley 2007). In 
masyarakat adat, the meaning of “indigenous” overlaps and merges with 
“autochthonous”. Gausset et al. state that “indigenous” implies people who have 
already been marginalised, while autochthonous may be “reserved for people who are 
dominant in a given area but fear future marginalisation” (2011:139) or, one could add, 
as in the case of Bali (see the chapter by Hauser-Schäublin in this volume), who had 
formerly suffered marginalisation which, however, has come to an end.  
 
The indigenous peoples are not the only ones who were deprived of their rights and 
possessions, land and power during colonisation. They do not claim to be “tribes” or 
specific ethnic groups, but the former traditional elite, the nobility, the kings and 
sultans, has its particular adat as well (Klinken 2007). It comes, therefore, as no surprise 
that these people also refer to their particular adat (the courtly culture with its refined 
arts) and reclaim recognition, rights and especially land. They have formed associations 
as well and enter into networks with royal families elsewhere. Since many of these 
aristocratic families were able to keep their symbolic capital (leading roles in rituals, 
entitlement to awarding noble titles, etc.) or also managed to make accommodations 
                                                        
8 Despite all the flaws anthropological and legal studies carried out under colonialism might have, 
such as the Adatrechtsbundels of the van Vollenhoven school, these and other publications are 
important documents for many of today’s masyarakat adat, since they provide evidence of ancestral 
rights and properties, especially land.  
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with the ruling party during the New Order regime, several of them gained recognition 
in the field of politics (see the chapter by Thufail in this volume).  
Conclusion 
All these manifold issues which are linked-up in the notion and use of adat, which 
means so many different things to each of the actors, reveal the heterogeneity of 
stakeholders and goals. As several chapters of this volume show, “the indigenous” as 
imagined by international conventions and transnational organisations rarely exists. 
There is a wider range of different actors who identify themselves as masyarakat adat. 
Grown out of particular historical circumstances of oppression – colonial as well as 
post-colonial – all these actors hope to (re-)gain dignity, recognition, rights, and 
property. They share the effort to achieve a repositioning vis-à-vis the state, which 
implies, though indirectly, also a repositioning vis-à-vis their “mainstream” Indonesian 
co-citizens. They all aim at accomplishing a social, political and economic 
reconfiguration – an advantage, so to say, without spelling out or considering at whose 
expense. The strategy and power of these movements draw largely on international 
conventions, all of them inspired by particular humanistic idealistic concepts of society, 
social equality and participation. The implementation of these idealistic concepts 
through the funding of international agencies, as well as national, regional and local 
actors, however, are more pragmatically oriented and often have their own goals in 













The subject of indigenous peoples in international law is an area of continuous 
development with many new and decisive developments having taken place over the 
past 30-40 years. One of the most prominent of these developments is the recognition 
of indigenous peoples as “peoples” and – as a result – the recognition of their inherent 
right to self-determination. The nature, scope and content of this right, however, 
remain highly disputed. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview and analysis of the current and 
historic legal status of indigenous peoples in international law. To this end, the paper 
will be structured as follows: Firstly, the issue of a definition of the term “indigenous 
peoples” in international law will be discussed. Subsequently, an overview of the 
historical development of the rights and status of indigenous peoples and the current 
legal situation will be given. Ultimately, an appraisal of the position of indigenous 
peoples in international law will be offered. 
                                                        
1 This publication expands upon the author’s previous work (Göcke 2010).  




There is no universally accepted definition of the term “indigenous peoples”. Since 
several international rights and corresponding duties of states are directly linked to the 
status of indigeneity, the definition of the term is highly contentious, and international 
legal instruments concerning indigenous peoples generally do not define the term. The 
most widely accepted definition seems to be the one by UN Special Rapporteur on 
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, Martínez Cobo, from 1983, who 
defines indigenous peoples as follows: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed 
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal 
systems.2  
 
(Martínez Cobo 1986:para. 379) 
Although Cobo mentions several objective criteria, he stresses that, ultimately, self-
identification is the key criteria (Cobo 1986:para. 369). The importance of self-
identification has also been stressed in several subsequent international legal 
instruments regarding indigenous peoples and has been advocated by indigenous 
peoples themselves, who fear that a definition of the term would be used by states to 
exclude certain groups (Simpson 1997:22-23). Accordingly, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in Art. 1 (2) of its Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 169) mentions that “[s]elf-
identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply”.3 Similarly, 
the World Bank recognises in its Operational Policy 4.10 that one universal definition 
of the term “indigenous peoples” could not grasp the diversity of indigenous peoples 
(World Bank 2005:para. 3).4 The statement made by Chairperson-Rapporteur of the 
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Erica-Irene A. Daes, points in the 
same direction. She stated that “the concept of ‘indigenous’ is not capable of a precise, 
                                                        
2 The United Nations Economic and Social Council mandated the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1971 to prepare a study on the discrimination of 
indigenous groups and appropriate measures to remedy this discrimination (UN Economic and Social 
Council Res. 1589 (L), May 21, 1971). The study was published in 1986 (Martínez Cobo 1986). 
3 Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (adopted June 
27, 1989, entered into force September 5, 1991) 1650 UNTS 383. 
4 “Because of the varied and changing contexts in which Indigenous Peoples live and because there is 
no universally accepted definition of ‘Indigenous Peoples’.” 
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inclusive definition which can be applied in the same manner to all regions of the 
world” (Daes 1996:para. 34). The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)5 of 2007 also refrains from defining “indigenous 
peoples”, but instead places emphasis on the criterion of self-identification (see also 
Cole 2009:201-205). 
To counter absurd claims by groups for indigenous status, international 
instruments generally list certain objective criteria which indigenous peoples typically 
possess, in addition to the subjective criterion of self-identification (Cobo 1986:paras. 
379-380; Daes 1996; World Bank 2005:para. 4; International Law Association 2005:2-3; 
see also Kingsbury 1998:453-455). However, there is only one objective criterion 
which has repeatedly been mentioned to be essential in order for a group to be 
regarded as indigenous: the special and spiritual connection to ancestral lands 
(International Law Association 2005:3;6 ACommHPR7 2005:898). This connection, 
which is also reflected etymologically in the original Latin word indigena – a fusion of 
the words indu (in, within) and the root of gignere (to beget) (Barnhart 2003:521) – is 
what defines indigenous peoples and distinguishes them from minorities. 
Whereas in Europe, the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand the question of 
who is indigenous is largely resolved, the situation is different in Asia and Africa, 
where several states claim that the entire population has to be regarded as indigenous 
since they were all already there at the time of colonisation (World Bank 1999:49; 
Kingsbury 1998:416-418; Sanders 1999:8-10). Colonisation, however, is not an 
essential prerequisite for a people to be regarded as indigenous. Hence, there can also 
be indigenous peoples in Africa and Asia, and several states in these regions which 
have in the past repeatedly denied the existence of indigenous peoples within their 
borders now begin to recognise their existence, such as, for example, Japan in respect 
of the Ainu. 
According to estimations there are about 300-500 million individuals of indigenous 
origin living in approximately 3,000-5,000 different indigenous communities in more 
than 70 states. Hence, indigenous peoples represent approximately 5% of the world 
population (Cole 2009:194; Koivurova 2008:21; European Commission 1998; 
European Parliament 1994:A).9 
  
                                                        
5 UNGA Res. 61/295 (September 13, 2007). 
6 “Only two of the listed criteria are to be considered as essential for a community to be considered 
as an indigenous people; these two criteria are self-identification – which should also be regarded as 
an essential element of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples – and its special 
relationship with its ancestral lands.” 
7 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
8 “A key characteristic for most of them is that the survival of their particular way of life depends on 
access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources thereon.” 
9 However, the numbers vary; for instance, Alfredsson (1995:946) estimates the number of 
indigenous persons at 100-200 million, and Broms (1992:304) speaks of 250 million indigenous 
individuals. 
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Historic Overview and Current Legal Status 
For many indigenous peoples, the preservation of their identity and culture is at stake, 
and indigenous peoples all over the world have to fight for their physical and cultural 
survival. Indigenous communities generally belong to the poorest and most 
marginalised groups in the world and generally have the least income, education, 
health, and life expectancy and the highest rate of infant mortality, alcoholism and 
crime within a society. Therefore, indigenous communities have been labelled “The 
Fourth World”10 or “The Third World in the First” (Young 1995).11 
History of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Movement 
The cause of the indigenous peoples’ desolate situation is that for centuries, indigenous 
peoples have been dispossessed, disenfranchised and marginalised. Indigenous peoples 
were not only robbed of their ancestral lands but they were also regarded as backward 
societies, which for their own good, had to be assimilated into the mainstream society, 
hence cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic particularities of indigenous groups were 
suppressed. This process, which started during colonisation in the 16th century, lasted 
well into the 20th century. Indigenous peoples were prohibited from speaking their 
own language, holding their rituals or wearing their traditional clothing.12 Up until the 
1970s, indigenous children were taken out of their communities against their parents’ 
will and put into institutions far away to prevent the transmission of traditions to the 
next generation.13 Accordingly, the ILO Convention 107 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Populations of 1957 (ILO Convention 107),14 the first international instrument 
for the protection of indigenous peoples, still aims at protection and development of 
indigenous peoples through assimilation and integration into mainstream society.15 
                                                        
10 The term “Fourth World” was coined by George Manuel and Michael Posluns (Manuel and 
Posluns 1974) and has increasingly been used since then to describe the situation of indigenous 
peoples; see also Iorns 1992:201-202. 
11 See also with regard to the Inuit in Canada, Légaré 2008:350-361, and with regard to the Aboriginal 
Australians, Hocking/Hocking 1999:210-213. 
12 See e.g. with regard to Canada, An Act Further to Amend “The Indian Act, 1880” S.C. 1884 
(47 Vict.), c. 27, sec. 3, which banned the potlatch, a ritual festival practiced by Indian tribes of 
the Pacific Northwest Coast. 
13 With regard to Australia, see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 1997, and 
with regard to Canada, see Milloy 2004; see also Buti 1999. 
14 Convention 107 concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (adopted June 26, 1957, entered into 
force June 2, 1959) 328 UNTS 247. 
15 See, in particular, Arts. 2 and 3 ILO Convention 1957. 
Art. 2 
(1) Governments shall have the primary responsibility for developing co-ordinated and systematic 
action for the protection of the populations concerned and their progressive integration into the life 
of their respective countries. 
(2) […] 
(3) The primary objective of all such action shall be the fostering of individual dignity, and the 
advancement of individual usefulness and initiative. 
Art. 3 
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Indigenous peoples have resisted this integration for centuries and have tried to draw 
attention to their desperate situation and to establish a fair cooperation between the 
indigenous and non-indigenous population. However, their rights and interests were 
ignored for a very long time – not only on the national but also on the international 
level. Since the treatment of indigenous peoples was regarded as an internal affair 
(domaine resérvé) of the respective state, and indigenous peoples were not regarded as 
sovereign, the international community was of the opinion that, due to state 
sovereignty, no interference was allowed.16 
Nevertheless, this began to change in the 1960s. In the course of decolonisation, 
the civil rights movement and the growing importance of human rights, a new 
generation of indigenous men and women, educated according to Western standards, 
began to use the mechanisms of the system forced upon them, and several national 
indigenous organisations were formed, particularly in Australia, Canada and the US 
(Anaya 2004a:56; Thornberry 2002:21). 
A starting point of the international mobilisation of indigenous peoples was the 
1977 UN Conference concerning the Discrimination of Indigenous Communities held 
in Geneva,17 which took place under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social 
Council and attracted more than 150 representatives of indigenous groups. This 
conference not only helped to form a common indigenous identity, but also laid the 
foundations for future close cooperation between indigenous peoples as regards the 
stipulation and claiming of their rights (Anaya 2004a:57). Through the establishment of 
contacts with indigenous communities and organisations in other countries, a 
worldwide network was established which allowed indigenous peoples to present their 
demands to a broad and international public, to lobby internationally for their rights, 
and to put pressure on their respective home states. As a result, their demands were 
increasingly taken up by the international community, and several international 
organisations began to advocate indigenous interests. 
In this context, ILO Convention 169 of 1989 needs to be mentioned as the first 
international convention which abandoned the assimilation approach and, instead, 
established the protection of indigenous cultures as its objective (see e.g. Art. 5 ILO 
Convention 169; see also Anaya 2004a:58-59, with further references; Xanthaki 
                                                                                                                                       
(1) So long as the social, economic and cultural conditions of the populations concerned prevent 
them from enjoying the benefits of the general laws of the country to which they belong, special 
measures shall be adopted for the protection of the institutions, persons, property and labour of 
these populations. 
(2) Care shall be taken to ensure that such special measures of protection 
(a) are not used as a means of creating or prolonging a state of segregation; and 
(b) will be continued only so long as there is need for special protection and only to the extent 
that such protection is necessary. 
 See also Anaya 2004a:55-56. 
16 For example, Chief Deskaheh, spokesman of the Iroquois Confederacy, failed in his attempt to 
persuade the League of Nations regarding the matter of Iroquois independence and sovereignty in 
1923 (Anaya 2004a:57, with further references; Garrow 2008:341-342; Niezen 2003:31-36; Sanders 
1998:73-74). 
17 International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations – 1977 – in the 
Americas: Proposals Made by the Indigenous Participants, printed in Cobo 1981:Annex 4. 
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2007:67-70). ILO Convention 169 was meant to replace ILO Convention 107. 
Although ILO Convention 107 remains in force for the time being for those 17 states 
which have ratified it, it has been closed for ratification since the adoption of ILO 
Convention 169.18 Besides the outdated ILO Convention 107, ILO Convention 169 
remains the only binding international instrument regarding indigenous peoples to the 
present day. 
However, only 22 states have ratified it so far; hence, it is directly binding only for 
these 22 states.19 Yet, its relevance goes beyond the mere number of ratifications. It is 
a strong statement of international law since it was adopted without a dissentient 
vote,20 and many national and international organisations and courts refer to the 
Convention when interpreting duties of states towards indigenous peoples, even if the 
respective state has not ratified the Convention (Anaya 2004b:40). This indicates that 
at least its central provisions nowadays constitute customary international law and are, 
therefore, binding even for those states that have not ratified the Convention (Anaya 
2004a:61; Anaya 2004b:40). 
ILO Convention 169 lays down several important rights of indigenous peoples, 
such as the right to culture (Arts. 4 and 23), preservation of language (Art. 28) and the 
right to ancestral lands and resources (Arts. 13-19). It also refers to indigenous peoples 
as “peoples” whereas before, indigenous peoples were referred to as “indigenous 
populations”. States generally refrain from labelling a group of individuals as “people” 
because – as a general principle of international law – all peoples have the right to self-
determination. This is firmly entrenched in the UN Charter21 and in the two 
International Covenants on Human Rights,22 which together form the International 
Bill of Human Rights. Hence, out of fear for their territorial integrity, states have 
always been very reluctant to refer to indigenous peoples as “peoples”. Therefore 
changing “populations” to “peoples” seems like a big step. However, Art. 1 (3) of the 
ILO Conventions expressly states that “[t]he use of the term peoples in this 
Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights 
which may attach to the term under international law”, which was meant to deny 
indigenous peoples their right to self-determination (Iorns 1992:263-264). This and the 
fact that indigenous peoples had not been invited to participate in the elaboration of 
the Convention has been heavily criticised by indigenous representatives (Anaya 
2004a:59, 64; Xanthaki 2007:68). 
                                                        
18 In the case where a state has ratified ILO Convention 107 as well as ILO Convention 169, ILO 
Convention 107 is completely replaced by ILO Convention 169. 
19 The list of member states is available on http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?(C169) 
<December 15, 2012>. Indonesia has not yet signed the Convention. 
20 State representatives of 92 states have voted in favour of the adoption of the Convention with 20 
abstentions (Anaya 2004a:64). 
21 See Arts. 1 (2) and 55 UN Charter (adopted June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945) 1 
UNTS 16. 
22 See Art. 1 (1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted December 16, 1966, 
entered into force March 23, 1976) 999 UNTS 171; Art. 1 (1) International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (adopted December 16, 1966, entered into force January 3, 1976) 993 
UNTS 3. 
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Therefore, indigenous peoples pressed for the elaboration of another international 
legal instrument – this time in collaboration with indigenous peoples – and they 
insisted on the inclusion of the express recognition of their inherent right to self-
determination. 
States’ Attitude towards Indigenous Peoples’ Sovereignty and Self-
Determination during the Age of Colonisation 
In this context, it needs to be mentioned that the idea that indigenous peoples are not 
“peoples” and, therefore, do not have a right to self-determination is a relatively recent 
one. For centuries, indigenous peoples had been regarded as subjects of international 
law and holders of sovereignty. In the early days of colonisation, there was a general 
consensus that indigenous peoples had sovereignty over their territories since, from 
the point of view of the colonial powers, indigenous peoples fulfilled all aspects 
necessary for the recognition of sovereignty: some form of political organisation, a 
certain territory and independence (McNeil 2000:11). Hence, according to state 
practice, indigenous peoples’ territories could only be placed under one’s own 
sovereignty through conquest or voluntary subjection – not, however, via mere 
discovery and occupation (Lindley 1926:43-44). This is proven by the existence of 
countless “treaties” – defined as international agreements between two or more 
sovereigns – that were concluded between the colonial powers and indigenous peoples 
in the 16th-20th centuries. The US alone concluded more that 800 treaties with Indian 
tribes between 1776 and 1871 (Wiessner 1995:575, note 39). Contents of these treaties 
were the cession of territorial sovereignty and the transfer of ownership of land, 
extradition agreements, pledges of peace and amity, and agreements relating to the 
crossing of Indian lands. The ratification of these treaties was carried out in the same 
manner as the ratification of treaties with other states (Goldberg 2008:14). There were 
also more than 80 such treaties concluded with Indian tribes within Canada (Reiter 
1996:Chapter V). The recognition of indigenous peoples’ sovereignty as regards the 
Maori of New Zealand is particularly evident. The British Colonial Secretary stated in a 
letter to the Governor of New Zealand in 1839 that the British Crown 
“acknowledge[s] New Zealand as a sovereign and independent state”,23 and in 
1840, the British Crown concluded a treaty with more than 540 Maori chiefs – the 
Treaty of Waitangi – in which the Maori expressly ceded sovereignty over New 
Zealand to the Crown.  
  
                                                        
23 From the Marquis of Normanby to Captain Hobson (August 14, 1839) British Parliamentary 
Papers 1840 [238] vol. XXXIII, 37, pp. 38-39. 
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The respective article in the English version reads: 
The Chiefs […] cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and 
without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which [they] 
exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their 
respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.24 
 
(Art. 1 Treaty of Waitangi, 1840) 
At the beginning of the 18th century, however, the attitude of the colonial powers 
began to change. They then increasingly took the view that indigenous peoples were 
too primitive to hold sovereignty. In addition, since the number of indigenous 
inhabitants had steadily decreased due to diseases being introduced, whereas the 
number of settlers had steadily grown, and since the territorial claims between the 
colonial powers had largely been settled, indigenous peoples were not considered 
serious military opponents or useful allies any more. Instead, they were increasingly 
regarded as obstacles to the modernisation and prosperity of the country. 
Consequently, especially with many indigenous peoples that were colonised later, no 
treaties were concluded and no acts of conquest took place. Instead, the existence of 
indigenous peoples was utterly ignored and their lands taken according to the so-called 
terra nullius doctrine. This was the case, for example, in Australia, the Northwest coast 
of North America, Alaska, the northern regions of Canada, and in Greenland. 
Furthermore, existing treaties were also no longer regarded as binding, on the grounds 
that indigenous peoples had never been subjects of international law and, therefore, 
had not had the legal capacity to conclude treaties (Gilbert 2006:47-48, with further 
references).25 
The concept that lands inhabited by indigenous peoples were terrae nullius – i.e. no 
man’s land – was approved by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933 in 
its decision regarding Eastern Greenland.26 The case was brought before the Court by 
Denmark and Norway, who had a dispute over the question which of these two states 
held territorial sovereignty over Greenland. The Court decided that Denmark held 
sovereignty because it had peacefully and continuously exercised public authority 
                                                        
24 The Treaty of Waitangi was drafted in English and Maori. However, the English and Maori 
versions differ significantly. The Maori version of the Treaty translated the term “sovereignty” as 
kawanatanga. The exact translation of this term is disputed (Tiemann 1999:26-27). It seems to be 
predominantly translated as “governorship” or “government” (Kawharu 1989:319-321; Walker 
1989:263). Yet, the vast majority of scholars agree that kawanatanga means less than full sovereignty 
(Tiemann 1999:26-27). See also Waitangi Tribunal 1985:111: “In the Maori text the chiefs ceded to 
the Queen ‘kawanatanga’. We think this is something less than the sovereignty (or absolute authority) 
ceded in the English text”; Waitangi Tribunal 1987:para. 11.11.4 (a): “In the Maori text the chiefs 
ceded to the Queen ‘kawanatanga’. This is less than the sovereignty ceded in the English text, and 
means the authority to make laws for the good order and security of the country but subject to the 
protection of Maori interests.” 
25 See also Wi Parata v. The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 N.Z.Jur. (N.S.) 72, in which Chief Justice 
Prendergast refers to the Treaty of Waitangi as “a simple nullity” (78). 
26 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53:22. 
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during the last years by undertaking explorations, mapping the region and formulating 
fishing laws.27 That the Inuit had in fact lived in Greenland for thousands of years and 
had their own traditional hunting and fishing laws was not taken into consideration by 
the Court, which thus impliedly stated that indigenous peoples were not subjects of 
international law and could not hold territorial sovereignty. So, whereas indigenous 
peoples’ sovereignty was taken for granted in the early days of colonisation, it was not 
until quite recently that their status as subjects of international law has been 
disregarded. 
Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination under the 
Current International Legal Regime 
This attitude began to change once again in the 1970s in the course of the indigenous 
peoples’ international mobilisation. In 1975, the International Court of Justice 
expressly rejected the decision of its predecessor in the Eastern Greenland Case when it 
decided that the region of the Western Sahara, which at the time of colonisation was 
inhabited by nomadic people, could not be regarded as terra nullius because, despite 
their nomadic lifestyle, the tribes were socially and politically organised and thus held 
sovereignty over their lands.28 
The terra nullius doctrine was also rejected by more and more national courts. The 
decision of the High Court of Australia in the Mabo Case in 1992, in which the Court 
decided that the idea that Australia at the time of colonisation was no man’s land and 
open to occupation, was “false in fact and unacceptable in [the Australian] society”29 is 
generally regarded as the fall of the last fortress of the terra nullius doctrine (Gilbert 
2006:29). 
However, these decisions only recognised that indigenous peoples once held 
sovereignty and thus legal personality. They did not, however, state that they still held 
sovereignty as a people, and thus, had an inherent right to self-determination. Instead, 
many states continued to deny the existence of indigenous peoples’ parallel sovereignty 
within the state’s territory, and thus, of an inherent right to self-determination. 
Despite the fierce opposition by many states, indigenous peoples celebrated their 
biggest success so far in the protection and enforcement of their rights when the UN 
General Assembly on September 13, 2007, after more than 20 years of preparatory 
work, adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with only four 
dissenting votes.30 All of the objectors have in the meanwhile reversed their decision 
and declared their support for the UNDRIP (UN News Centre 2010). Indigenous 
peoples were able to decisively participate in the elaboration of this Declaration (Barelli 
2009:970; Charters 2007:122) and, after years of negotiations, they ultimately managed 
                                                        
27 Ibid.:62-64. 
28 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (1975) I.C.J. Reports 1975 12:paras 80-82. 
29 High Court of Australia, Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1:para. 39. 
30 In the General Assembly, 143 states voted in favour and four against the UNDRIP and 11 states 
abstained. Thirty-four states did not participate in the vote. The four states voting against were 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA. 
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to have the one provision included in the document which they regarded as its key 
provision – Art. 3, which states: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.  
 
(Art. 3 UNDRIP) 
As a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration is not per se binding but merely 
constitutes “soft law” (Arts. 10 and 11 UN Charter). The adoption of a General 
Assembly resolution is neither evidence of existing legal rules, nor does it immediately 
create new customary international law (Voyiakis 2011:209-223). However, the fact 
that the Declaration is one of the most discussed texts in the history of the UN (Barelli 
2009:969-970) and has been supported by a broad majority of states indicates that 
many of the aspects laid down in the Declaration have now to be considered as 
customary international law (Barelli 2009:966-967; Charters 2007:123). 
The assumption that indigenous peoples have an inherent right to self-
determination under international law is supported by the fact that several UN 
institutions, such as the Human Rights Committee31 and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights32 – the treaty monitoring bodies of the International 
Covenants on Human Rights – as well as regional human rights courts, such as the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights,33 have, in the meantime, also expressly 
recognised indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-determination as a peremptory 
norm of customary international law. 
Based on this inherent right to self-determination, indigenous peoples can claim 
many other rights as inherent to their status as peoples, e.g. the rights to own and live 
on their ancestral lands, to use their own language and to live according to their own 
traditions. States are no longer regarded as rights-granting entities that transfer 
                                                        
31 See e.g. Concluding Observations on Canada (1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105:para. 8; 
Concluding Observations on Mexico (1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.109:para. 19; Concluding 
Observations on Norway (1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112:para. 17; Concluding Observations 
on Australia (2000) UN Doc. CCPR/CO/69/AUS:para. 10; Concluding Observations on Denmark 
(2000) UN Doc. CCPR/CO/70/DNK:para. 11; Concluding Observations on Sweden (2002) UN 
Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE:para. 15; Concluding Observations on Canada (2006) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5:paras. 8-9; Concluding Observations on Chile (2009) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5/Add.1:para. 19; Concluding Observations on Sweden (2009) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6:para. 21. 
32 See e.g. Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation (2003) UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.94:para. 11; Concluding Observations on Argentina (2011) UN Doc. 
E/C.12/ARG/CO/3:para. 10. 
33 See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
(Ogoni Case) (2001) Comm. No. 155 /1996:para. 58; Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group International on Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya (2010) Comm. No. 
276/2003:paras. 252-298. 
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derivative rights to indigenous peoples out of goodwill, but are now viewed as being 
obliged to recognise and protect the inherent rights of indigenous peoples. 
States have tried to install a safeguard to protect their territorial integrity by insisting on 
the inclusion of Art. 46, which states: 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any 
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. 
 
 (Art. 46 UNDRIP) 
However, since the right to self-determination is an inherent right that belongs to 
indigenous peoples in their capacity as peoples, states cannot restrict it. The UNDRIP 
does not create the right, but merely recognises its existence. Hence, under the same 
condition as other peoples may claim a right to secession, indigenous peoples also have 
a right to external self-determination. Nevertheless, only on very rare occasions does 
the right to self-determination encompass a right to secession, since secession runs 
counter to the principle of territorial integrity – a fundamental principle of the 
international legal regime (see Art. 2 No. 4 UN Charter). Therefore, although the right 
to self-determination generally consists of an internal/defensive and an 
external/offensive element, its entire range is not applicable in every situation (Cole 
2009:347-349). Instead, in most cases, the right to self-determination will be limited to 
a right to internal self-determination. A right to external self-determination is only 
permissible in absolutely exceptional cases, in particular when there are widespread and 
systematic human rights violations or a total exclusion of a certain group from the 
decision-making process (Cole 2009:125, with further references; Tomuschat 1993:9).34 
The treatment of indigenous peoples from the 16th to the mid-20th centuries would 
– without any doubt – have exceeded this threshold. Indigenous peoples were 
disenfranchised; they were without justification killed by soldiers in great numbers or 
not protected against violent attacks by third parties; they were denied essential basic 
services, such as sufficient food, health services and education; indigenous children 
were taken away from their communities without their parents’ consent; indigenous 
persons were barred from exercising their culture; and they were completely excluded 
from the political decision-making process. Since the states’ actions back then would 
have constituted genocide according to Art. II of the Genocide Convention,35 such 
actions would – if they took place today – give indigenous peoples a right to secede. 
                                                        
34 See also Supreme Court of Canada, Case concerning Certain Questions relating to Secession of Quebec from 
Canada (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217:paras. 111-139. 
35 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted December 9, 
1948, entered into force January 12, 1951) 78 UNTS 277. 
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However, in recent years, states have increasingly tried to improve the situation of 
indigenous peoples and to reconcile past injustices. Assimilation of indigenous peoples 
into the majority society no longer constitutes a goal of government actions. Instead, 
states recognise that indigenous cultures should be preserved for their own sake. Land 
restitutions also constitute decisive concessions from states towards indigenous 
peoples. Furthermore, indigenous peoples have access to national and international 
courts and tribunals to enforce their rights against the respective governments. It is 
true that many of the concessions continue to be insufficient, and indigenous peoples 
are still discriminated against. Nevertheless, positive trends are clearly discernible. 
Since, in practice, secession is only accepted as ultima ratio, i.e. after all available 
national and international mechanisms have been exhausted, and usually only following 
long and violent conflicts (Titanji 2009:63; Skaale 2004:161), it must be assumed that 
indigenous peoples do not generally have a right to external self-determination. 
However, there are hardly any indigenous peoples that want external self-
determination in the form of secession. What most indigenous peoples want is internal 
self-determination, i.e. the right to determine their own political status and their 
economic, social and cultural development within existing state borders.36 
In recent years, such a right to inherent self-determination has been increasingly 
recognised and implemented by several states. Canada, for example, adopted an 
Inherent Right of Self-Government Policy in 1995 and created the Inuit-governed 
Nunavut Territory, which came into being in 1999 with the splitting of the Northwest 
Territories into two separate units. In the US, under the heading of “tribal 
sovereignty”, Indian tribes may – to a certain degree – formulate their own civil and 
criminal laws, establish their own courts and government institutions, and enjoy special 
rights on reservations (e.g. tax benefits and exemptions or the right to run casinos). In 
Greenland, which forms an integral part of the Danish Realm but has enjoyed home 
rule since 1979,37 a successful referendum was held in November 2008, which led to 
the enactment of the Act on Greenland Self-Government in 200938 establishing a new 
form of self-government. Under the new legal regime, the Inuit may expand their 
competences to almost all areas that are usually under state jurisdiction.39 Furthermore, 
the Act on Greenland Self-Government expressly recognises the people of Greenland 
as a people40 and even stipulates their right to secede from Denmark and form an 
independent state.41 
                                                        
36 Secession was, however, the goal of the indigenous peoples of East Timor and is strived for by the 
indigenous people of Western Sahara. 
37 See Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No. 577 (enacted November 29, 1978, entered into force May 
1, 1979). 
38 Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act No. 473 (enacted June 12, 2009, entered into force June 
21, 2009). 
39 See Arts. 2-4 Act on Greenland Self-Government. Only the areas constitution, Supreme Court, 
defence and security policy, nationality, monetary policy and exchange rates, as well as foreign affairs, 
remain within the competence of the Danish government, with Greenland having a say in certain 
areas of foreign affairs (Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission 2008:5). 
40 Preamble to the Act on Greenland Self-Government. 
41 Art. 21 Act on Greenland Self-Government. 




The new developments in international law and state practice show that states are 
becoming increasingly aware of their historic responsibilities towards indigenous 
peoples. The current state practice, along with international court decisions and 
statements by the UN and other international organisations, indicate that the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination and – attached to this right, their rights to 
land, resources and the maintenance of their culture – are, nowadays, widely 
recognised on the national and international level, and can be classified as customary 
international law. This recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, 
and thus, the recognition of their – partial – sovereignty and international legal 
subjectivity constitutes, however, not a new development in international law, but a 
return to a previous state of affairs. The recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination has to be regarded as the reinstatement of a status of which 
indigenous peoples have unlawfully been deprived of a long time ago and denied for 
centuries.42 Therefore, the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination cannot be 
classified as derivative right given to them by states out of goodwill, but it constitutes 
an inherent right held by them in their capacity as peoples. Under the international law 
doctrine of reversion, the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination has never 
been extinguished, but has only lain dormant awaiting restoration (Cassidy 1998:69). 
Hence, the right to self-determination, which cannot be restricted or interfered with by 
states, enables indigenous peoples, who have always regarded themselves as sovereign 
nations and holders of a right to self-determination, to recapture their previous 




                                                        
42 Regarding the illegality of the disenfranchisement of indigenous peoples under international 





From Protection to Participation?  
Shifting Perceptions towards Indigenous Peoples 




Maria Victoria Cabrera Ormaza  
Introduction  
“Indigenous Peoples”, as a legal category (Kingsbury 2001:189, 244), has both human 
rights and functional considerations. The two international conventions on indigenous 
peoples’ rights (ILO Convention No. 107 and ILO Convention No. 169) depict 
indigenous peoples as vulnerable societal groups to whom special protection must be 
afforded. In legal literature, in addition, the definition of indigenous peoples heightens 
indigenous peoples’ past and on-going situation of oppression, disenfranchisement and 
exploitation (cf., for example, Daes 1996:22 or Kingsbury 1998:414, 455). Based on 
this conception, the focus of the initial work of international organisations with regard 
to indigenous issues was placed on the protection of indigenous peoples against 
cultural assimilation and dislocation (Oguamanam 2004:348, 362). However, some 
international organisations are progressively leaving this human rights-based approach 
aside and are favouring a “functional approach” based on the contribution of 
indigenous peoples to the realisation of a certain set of common aims (Cabrera 
2012:263, 281-289). Under this “functional approach”, indigenous peoples are 
regarded as equal partners in international governance with special participatory rights. 
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Some indigenous representatives have already subscribed to this new legal discourse in 
order to advance their claims for their own legal status and self-determination both at 
the national and international level. Against this backdrop, this paper analyses the 
implications of both the human rights-based and the “functional approach” on the 
understanding of indigenous peoples by international law. In doing so, this paper 
argues that the use of a “functional approach” implies the recognition of indigenous 
peoples as emerging subjects of international law with special participatory rights. 
Furthermore, this approach calls for a re-examination of the − for a long time 
paternalistic – relationship between indigenous peoples and states.1  
This paper has been divided into three parts.  The first part explains the traditional 
human rights-based approach to indigenous peoples under international law and some 
of its limitations. The second part elaborates on the “functional approach” to 
indigenous peoples. It analyses the different ways in which indigenous peoples are 
expected to contribute to the achievement of certain aims. The third part examines the 
manner in which the “functional approach” is reflected in the work of international 
organisations concerning indigenous issues and the legal implications involved.  
Human Rights-Based Approach 
From a human rights point of view, indigenous peoples are represented as a 
historically disenfranchised and vulnerable group, which is in need of special 
protection (Cabrera 2012:266). This portrayal was incorporated into the first 
international convention concerning indigenous peoples, namely ILO Convention No. 
107. This document situates indigenous peoples in a “less advanced stage” of 
development and promotes their integration into non-indigenous society (Preamble, 
Para. 2; Art. 1, Para. 1 (a), Art. 2, Para. 1).2 This perspective was criticised by some 
indigenous peoples’ advocates to be “assimilationist” as it threatens the preservation of 
the indigenous identity (Barsh 1987:756; Anaya 2004a:55). This emphasis on 
indigenous peoples’ integration and development was abandoned in the late-1980s. 
                                                        
1 In May 2012, the UN Deputy Secretary General opened the 11th session of the Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues inspiring indigenous delegates converged at the meeting to move towards the 
day when indigenous peoples are heard, listened to and empowered (UN News Service 2012). Similar 
wording was used some years ago by the Executive Director of the International Fund on 
Agricultural Development, who pointed out that that the empowerment of indigenous peoples 
mattered deeply to the organisation she represented (IFAD 2008). 
2 This understanding has its roots in the Berlin Conference of 1885 (also called the Kongokonferenz). 
This conference established the duty of some European countries exercising, at that time, colonial 
domination or other forms of political control in Africa to “civilise” and protect the Aborigines. 
Article 6 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference reads, “All the Powers exercising sovereign 
rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the 
native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-
being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without 
distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and 
undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and 
bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.”  
From Protection to Participation? 33 
 
 
Instead, respect for indigenous peoples’ own way of living became the central focus of 
the second international convention on indigenous peoples’ rights (ILO Convention 
No. 169, Preamble, Para. 4 and Art. 5 (b)) and other non-binding human rights 
instruments addressing indigenous peoples’ rights (e.g. Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 23 1994; Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 23 1997). The need to repair the 
vulnerable situation of indigenous peoples still remains in the current human rights 
discourse, but the means of achieving this aim shall be respectful of indigenous 
peoples’ cultural integrity. This implies an understanding of the human right to culture 
as a right with a collective dimension.  
This human rights-based understanding is also reflected in the classical definitions 
of indigenous peoples in international law, as the one elaborated by UN Special 
Rapporteur José Martínez Cobo in 1982. The definition reads:  
 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion societies that developed on territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing 
on those territories, or parts of them. They form at the present non-dominant 
sectors of the society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to 
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the 
basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.  
 
(Martínez Cobo 1983:Paras. 379, 380) 
 
Some of the criteria laid down in this definition have human rights implications. The 
criterion of historical precedence, for example, advocates the acknowledgment of 
indigenous peoples as first nations entitled with self-determination (Engle 2010:96). 
The non-dominant situation of indigenous peoples speaks for an obligation of the 
international community to protect indigenous peoples against racial or legal 
discrimination (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation No. 23, Para. 4 (b)). The criterion of cultural distinctiveness is 
associated with the obligation to respect indigenous peoples’ traditional lifestyles 
(Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, Para. 7).  
The human rights-based approach to indigenous peoples has some limitations. 
One of these limitations lies in the use of historical arguments to justify the recognition 
of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.3 Originally, the term “indigenous” 
was shaped within the context of colonialism in America and Australasia. It was used 
to define those who inhabited the country before colonialism (de Vitoria 1917:116). 
Today, there is an increasing number of ethnic groups from Asia, Africa and even 
from Europe who do not fit within this classical understanding of “indigenous”, but 
                                                        
3 This has been the position of North American indigenous groups to claim both internal and 
external forms of self-determination (Engle 2010:77). 
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seem to face similar cultural or racial discrimination within their countries.4 
Accordingly, the scope of application of this seemingly human rights-based definition 
of indigenous peoples is temporally and geographically limited. 
A second limitation of the human rights-based approach is its foundation on an 
absolute understanding of indigenous peoples as a non-dominant sector of the society. 
There are, however, several situations in which indigenous peoples, in fact, represent 
the majority of the population and have greater access to power than other non-
indigenous groups (see the chapter by Hauser-Schäublin).5 Within the indigenous 
sector itself, politically powerful indigenous organisations appear to be privileged over 
minority indigenous associations (see the chapter by Müller).6 For this reason, it is 
essential to critique the label “indigenous” and, thus, its connotation of “repression”. 
Despite its aforementioned limitations, the human rights-based approach to 
indigenous peoples is reflected in some provisions of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The preamble of the Declaration recalls the “historical 
injustices”, “colonization” and the on-going situation of dispossession suffered by 
indigenous peoples (Paras. 5, 6 and 9).  
Functional Approach  
While indigenous peoples are subjects of special protection in the human rights 
discourse, in other fields of international law (international environmental law, 
international law of culture, law of development cooperation, etc.) indigenous peoples 
play a more active role. This approach, which is understood as a “functional 
approach”, centres upon the potential contribution of indigenous peoples to the 
attainment of certain international goals. These include, among others, environmental 
protection, food security, human health, economic development cooperation, and 
promotion of cultural diversity. The following paragraphs provide an examination of 
these different contributions of indigenous peoples through a “functional” perspective.  
Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Protection 
The first contribution of indigenous peoples relates to environmental protection. 
Indigenous peoples have often been regarded as good role models of environmentally 
sustainable living, particularly due to their close attachment to the land (Richardson 
2009:338, 340; Tenant 1994:20). The Rio Declaration on Environment and 
                                                        
4 Critical perspectives on the use of historical arguments as the justification for indigenous peoples’ 
rights can be found in Aukerman (2000:1011); see also Cabrera (2012:273-278). Self-identified 
African indigenous communities have argued that they have felt “invisible” to the United Nations 
(Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2006).  
5 This is, for example, the case of some indigenous peoples in Fiji (Minority Rights Groups 
International 2012:169). 
6 A political and sociological analysis on the division within the indigenous sector in Bolivia, as well as 
on the differential treatment given by the government of Evo Morales (who is well-known as the first 
indigenous president in Bolivia) to different indigenous organisations can be found in Schilling-
Vacaflor (2010). 
From Protection to Participation? 35 
 
 
Development (principle 22) proclaims indigenous peoples as vital actors in the 
achievement of sustainable development (see chapters by Sanmukri and Steinebach). 
Similarly, the Convention on Biological Diversity underscores the important role of 
indigenous peoples in the use and conservation of biological and genetic resources 
(Art. 8(j)). This understanding is also reflected in the “Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future” (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987). It states that indigenous and 
tribal peoples are, 
 
repositories of vast accumulation of traditional knowledge and experience that 
links humanity with its ancient origin. Their disappearance is a loss for their 
larger society, which could learn a great deal from their traditional skills in 
sustainably managing very complex ecological systems.  
 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987:114, 115) 
 
Some scholars criticise the way indigenous peoples have been included in the 
ecological discourse. Arturo Escobar, for example, notes: 
 
ethnic and peasant communities living in tropical rain-forest areas of the world 
are finally being recognized as owners of their territories (…), but only to the 
extent they accept to treat it – and themselves – as reservoirs of capital.  
 
(Escobar 2012:203)   
 
In fact, in many instances, it is indigenous peoples themselves who use this 
environmental discourse as a means to bolster their classical claims for self-
determination, participation and autonomy (Morgan 2004:481-491). The UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues7 now supports the engagement of indigenous 
peoples in the achievement of environmental objectives of the United Nations (UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2008, Para. 4). Furthermore, it has called 
upon the United Nations (UN) to create mechanisms for indigenous peoples’ 
participation in relevant negotiations concerning climate change (UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues 2008, Para.30).  
                                                        
7 The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was created in 2000 by the UN Economic and 
Social Council as one of its advisory bodies on indigenous issues. It is composed of indigenous 
representatives of different regions of the world. For more information on the role and competences 
of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, see ECOSOC Res. 2000/22.  
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Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Knowledge 
The second contribution of indigenous peoples lies in the use of their traditional 
knowledge. From a legal perspective, traditional knowledge encompasses all individual 
or collective innovations and practices for the conservation of biodiversity, traditional 
medicine and expressions of folklore, among others, developed by indigenous peoples 
and carrying a socio-economic value.8 It has been internationally recognised that the 
traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples is of enormous significance in the 
conservation, use and evolution of biodiversity, as well as in the management of 
climate change (Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, Para. 12; The Nagoya 
Protocol, Preamble, Para. 20; Andean Community of Nations, Decision 391, Preamble, 
Para. 5; Ottawa Declaration, Preamble, Para. 6) (see Groth 2007). The Arctic Council,9 
for instance, has underscored the importance of the use of Arctic indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge in the planning and implementation of climate change 
adaptation measures (Nuuk Declaration 2011:6).  
The use of traditional knowledge is also considered as fundamental in meeting the 
demands of food security and human health. The International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture underlines the major role of indigenous 
farmer communities in assuring food and agriculture production through their use of 
traditional practices (Art. 9, Para. 1). Similarly, the World Health Organisation stresses 
the importance of facilitating access to traditional medicines of indigenous and local 
communities on behalf of the global population (2002). This explains the scientific 
community’s push towards the creation of an international legal regime for access to 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge involving indigenous communities (Chege 
Kamau et al. 2010:246, 254).  
In light of this, indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge has become a cross-
cutting issue. This has motivated the international community, in general, and 
international organisations, in particular, to invest time and resources towards the 
establishment of partnerships with indigenous communities, both at the local and 
international level (see Sanmukri in this volume).10 In fact, as will later be explained, 
traditional knowledge has been, in many cases, the springboard used by indigenous 
peoples to gain access to international forums (UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues 2008, Para. 30).   
Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Diversity  
Another functionality of indigenous peoples is the promotion of cultural diversity. The 
international community affirmed in the Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
                                                        
8 Further elaboration on the concept of traditional knowledge can be found in WIPO (2002).  
9 The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum composed of eight countries located in the 
northern hemisphere. It has the aim of protecting the Arctic environment (Ottawa Declaration, 
Preamble, Paras. 1 and 4).  
10 Evidence of this is the framing of the so-called “UN-REDD” (UN Collaborative Initiative on 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), which attempts to create 
collaborative partnerships between states and indigenous communities to reduce CO2 emissions. 
More information on this programme can be found in: UN REDD Programme Strategy (2011-2015).  
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of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions that “the protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions presuppose the recognition of equal dignity of and 
respect of all cultures, including the culture of persons belonging to minorities and 
indigenous peoples” (Art. 2, Para. 3). This has also been reflected in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Preamble, Para. 3), the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (Preamble, Para. 13; see also General Assembly 
Resolution 1993, Para. 6), the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity (Art. 4), 
among many others.  
Indigenous peoples have been very often portrayed as groups existing outside 
modernity (Allen 2006:315, 318). They have been depicted either as “pre-modern 
societies” in need of civilisation (Rajapogal 2003:29) (as was in the case in ILO 
Convention No. 107) or as the “victims of progress” (Tenant 1994:1, 17) (as occurred 
in ILO Convention No. 169). Whether from one perspective or the other, recognition 
of “indigenous peoples” as subjects of special rights appears to depend on the 
maintenance of a particular distinct culture or orientation towards the world and nature 
(Borrows 2009:408). Such an understanding would play against those indigenous 
individuals or communities which have progressively started to integrate into 
mainstream society. On the other hand, representation of indigenous peoples as 
“backward societies” could also lead one to the problematic conclusion that certain 
indigenous groups or individuals might still be regarded as “incapable” of representing 
themselves before states and the international community, but could do so only 
through NGOs.11 At this point, one should take into consideration that even long-
standing indigenous groups are undergoing a voluntary or probably inevitable process 
of integration with the so-called “modern world”.12 This raises the question, what will 
the future of this culturally-based construction of “indigenous peoples” be?  
Indigenous Peoples and Economic Development Cooperation   
Finally, the last contribution of indigenous peoples refers to the fundamental role they 
play in ensuring successful economic development cooperation. A number of 
international financial institutions, including regional development banks, have 
designed operational policies on indigenous peoples to assure their participation in the 
preparation and implementation of development programmes and projects. This is, for 
example, the case with the World Bank (2005), the Inter-American Development Bank 
(2006), the Asian Development Bank (1998), and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (2008). Although one could, at first sight, argue that 
these policies are to a large extent based on a human rights-based approach, there is, 
nevertheless, an implication of a new function of indigenous peoples, that is, their 
                                                        
11 One of Survival International’s general aims is to “support legal work to ensure that tribes are 
expertly represented” (http://www.survivalinternational.org/info).   
12 An example of the integration of certain indigenous groups with the “modern world” is the case of 
the Native American groups in Nevada (Ahmad 2006).  
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collaboration in the successful implementation of economic development projects 
within their territories.13   
In the case of the World Bank, indigenous peoples seem to be regarded as 
potential backers of World Bank-financed projects (Cabrera 2012:289). The World 
Bank’s latest operational policy on indigenous peoples attempts to 
 
make the development process more inclusive of indigenous peoples by 
incorporating their perspectives in the design of development programmes and 
poverty reduction strategies, and providing them with opportunities to benefit 
more fully from development programs.  
 
(World Bank 2005:Para. 22(b))  
 
Furthermore, one of the objectives of this policy is to enhance the capacity of the said 
communities in implementing, monitoring and evaluating development programmes 
(World Bank 2005, Para. 22(f)). This may have a historical explanation behind it. 
During the 1980s, the World Bank was harshly criticised for the negative consequences 
of its development projects in territories occupied by indigenous peoples (Kingsbury 
1999:323, 324). It, thus, became clear that these projects would only be successful if 
supported by such affected populations (Cabrera 2012:288).14  
Functional Approach Entwined with Participation 
The functional approach to indigenous peoples has been captured by the preamble of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Preamble, Paras. 3 and 11). 
Based on this approach, the Declaration (Preamble, Para. 15) and other UN 
documents have made use of words such as “cooperation” or “partnership” to 
describe how the relationship between states and indigenous peoples should be. Even 
before the adoption of the Declaration, the UN and other intergovernmental bodies 
started to create special mechanisms to enhance the participation of indigenous 
peoples in international negotiations concerning the environment, culture and 
development. The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is a good example in 
this regard.15 Furthermore, voluntary funding mechanisms have been established to 
                                                        
13 For further analysis on the functional approach to indigenous peoples in the context of 
international development cooperation, see Cabrera (2012:281-289). 
14 The apparently human rights-based approach of the World Bank policy on indigenous peoples is 
obscured by the long-standing refusal of the Bank to recognise the right of indigenous peoples to 
free, prior and informed consent in relation to the implementation of economic development 
projects (Mackay 2010:316). 
15 The Permanent Forum aims to enhance cooperation among states, the UN and indigenous 
organisations in issues of mutual interest (ECOSOC Res. 2000/22). 
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facilitate participation of indigenous and local communities in international debates 
concerning indigenous issues.16  
Indigenous peoples have been granted special participatory rights particularly in 
international environmental forums. The Agenda 2117 requires states to include 
indigenous peoples in the decision-making, planning and implementation of 
sustainable development strategies (Section III, Para. 26). Based on this, indigenous 
peoples are, today, one of the nine major groups participating in negotiations within 
the UN Sustainable Development Division (UN Sustainable Development Platform 
Knowledge). In a similar manner, the Arctic Council has conferred the status of 
permanent participants upon indigenous arctic organisations (Declaration on the 
Establishment of the Arctic Council, Para. 2). 
Indigenous peoples are also taking part in international negotiations concerning 
traditional knowledge. Indigenous delegates participate in the meetings of the 
“Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore” in the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(Secretariat of WIPO 2011). In addition, the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity has involved indigenous organisations in 
negotiations related to traditional knowledge (COP Decision VII/16, section G, Para. 
10).   
The remainder of this section identifies some complexities and challenges ahead in 
the recognition of indigenous peoples’ legal status and participation in the international 
realm.  
Emergence of new “Indigenous Peoples” 
Since the idea of partnership between international organisations and indigenous 
peoples sounds compelling, more and more indigenous organisations are coming into 
existence in order to catch   the attention of international organisations. For many 
years, the international indigenous peoples’ movement comprised basically 
organisations from North-America, Latin-America and Australasia which resorted to 
the “first-people argument” to assert their claims for self-determination (Engle 
2010:46-66). However, as early as when the United Nations decided to include 
indigenous organisations in the drafting process of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (ECOSOC Res. 1982/34), emerging Asian and African indigenous 
groups began to appear on the international scene. To justify their “indigeneity”, these 
organisations have resorted to both human rights and functional arguments (Erueti 
2011:93, 115). This is, for example, the case of the Indonesian indigenous alliance 
Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN), which highlights the “capacity of 
Indigenous Peoples to maintain and expand their traditional wisdom in protecting the 
earth, water, and all natural wealth contained within nature” (see the chapters by 
Arizona/Cahyadi, Müller, Steinebach, Grumblies, Klenke, and Hauser-Schäublin in 
                                                        
16 One of these mechanisms is the UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Peoples (GA Res. 40/131, 
December 13, 1985).  
17 Agenda 21 is a voluntarily implemented action plan with regard to sustainable development which 
resulted from the UN Conference on Environment and Development of 1992.   
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this volume).18 Since there is no universal definition of indigenous peoples under 
international law, one could argue that none of these groups should be denied the right 
to label themselves as “indigenous”. Thus, today, new indigenous organisations have 
emerged, such as the Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact, comprising indigenous groups 
from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia, among others (AIPP 2012). 
Yet, at the national level, some of these self-identified indigenous communities from 
Asia and Africa are regarded by their national governments merely as minorities or 
tribal populations (Cabrera 2012:276).  
Some other culturally distinct groups such as Afro-descendant communities – not 
considered as “indigenous” in the classical sense − are searching for recognition of 
their own collective rights (Cabrera 2012:280). In doing so, they have already initiated a 
campaign for the recognition of their own identity and own collective rights as 
independent from the indigenous identity (Marchesi 2011). Others have rather 
preferred to construct their own indigenous identity (Cabrera 2012:280). This second 
option has prevailed in some Latin-American countries where indigenous peoples have 
achieved political recognition and have been assured access to governmental structures 
(Cabrera 2012:278-281).  
 
Problems concerning Participation  
It is important to reflect more on the ways and means through which indigenous 
organisations are meant to exercise participation in international forums. Some 
indigenous organisations contend that their participation in international negotiations 
is ineffective and limited (Joint Statement of the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou 
Istchee) et al. 2011, Para. 7; Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) 2011, Para. 
74). Moreover, they claim that participation of indigenous peoples in global 
governmental structures should be full and effective based on their recognition as self-
determined groups under international law in accordance with the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Joint Statement of the Grand Council of the Crees 
(Eeyou Istchee) et al. 2011, Para. 9). 
In fact, in many cases, indigenous groups which are afforded the opportunity to 
participate in international law and decision-making processes only hold “observer 
status” (Conference of the Parties to the CBD, Decision IV/9, Para. 2; Secretariat of 
WIPO 2011:2). Moreover, indigenous organisations are often assimilated into non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Human Rights Council 2012, Para. 10-12). 
However, this paper submits that more participation necessarily depends on the 
answer to the following long-standing controversial question: Who has the right to 
represent the interests of indigenous peoples at the international level? Due to the 
                                                        
18 See statement of the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) on the official website of the 
Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact (AIPP), 
 http://ccmin.aippnet.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=8. 
However, the creation of new targeted categories for the identification of certain vulnerable groups in 
the international realm has been regarded by some as unsustainable (Kymlicka 2007:8). 
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complexity of this issue, possible answers to this question have to be left for further 
research.   
Conclusions 
International Law has looked at indigenous peoples through two different lenses: a 
“human rights-based approach” and a “functional approach”. The first approach 
emphasises “protection”, whereas the other centres upon “participation”. A human 
rights-based approach falls short of capturing the current dynamics of some 
indigenous groups. On the contrary, from a purely “functional perspective”, it would 
not make any difference whether a group is indigenous in its classical sense or not. 
What matters in this case is how a particular community can contribute to the 
achievement of environmental protection, sustainable land-use and cultural diversity, 
among others.     
It has been demonstrated throughout this paper that the functional approach is 
intrinsically entwined with the recognition of indigenous peoples’ participatory rights 
in international law and policy-making. This has been specially boosted by international 
organisations. In this context, participation of indigenous peoples in international 
negotiations emerges as a practical necessity, rather than as a legal duty.   
The number of policies and mechanisms enhancing participation of indigenous 
peoples at the international level has increased significantly within the last two decades. 
This seems to be parallel to the emergence of new indigenous peoples in the 
international arena seeking international legal recognition. Nevertheless, the 
participation recognised to indigenous peoples in international forums seems to be 
limited.   
This paper argued that the use of a functional approach has benefited indigenous 
peoples in the sense that they have started to be regarded as actors of international 
governance, rather than mere recipients of norms and policies affecting them. At the 
same time, the paper recognised the danger of absolutism in the use of a functional 
approach. There is a possibility, within this approach, of ignoring the indigenous 
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Introduction 
“If the state does not recognise us, we will not recognise the state.” This statement is 
the outcome of the First Congress of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago that 
was held in 1999. This motto challenges the contemporary state of Indonesia. It also 
repositions the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the state. The 
Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, 
AMAN) was formed in 1999 as a result of numerous meetings that helped to 
crystallize the ideas of the movement, eventually leading to the emergence of the 
indigenous peoples’ movement. AMAN is the biggest organisation that represents 
masyarakat adat in today’s Indonesia. 
The first seeds of the indigenous peoples’ movement were sown in the 1980s. 
Early discussions were initiated by the environmental activists from the Indonesian 
Forum for Environment – Friends of the Earth Indonesia (Wahana Lingkungan 
Hidup Indonesia, WALHI) and by the legal aid activists from the Legal Aid 
Foundation of Indonesia (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI). At 
the time, these organisations had already started working on the protection of the 
indigenous peoples whose ancestral lands were being expropriated by the government 
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and turned into mining and forestry concessions under the developmentalist policies of 
the New Order regime.  
In 1993, a number of organisations working on the protection of the indigenous 
peoples’ rights organised a meeting that led to the formation of the Indigenous 
Peoples Rights’ Advocacy Network (Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat, 
JAPHAMA). Subsequently, a number of similar networks have been established in 
various regions, such as Jaringan Penggerak Masyarakat Adat Nusa Tenggara Tengah 
(Jagat NTT) and Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kalimantan Barat (AMA Kalbar). The 
youths in Mentawai created Yayasan Citra Mandiri, while the youths in West 
Kalimantan formed an organisation called Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (LBBT) 
(Moniaga 2010:311). Furthermore, JAPHAMA, in collaboration with other 
organisations, gathered hundreds of indigenous peoples’ representatives from around 
the Indonesian archipelago on March 17, 1999, for the First Congress of the 
Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (KMAN I). This Congress resulted in the 
creation of an organisation called the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago 
(Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, AMAN). Since then, March 17 is remembered by 
all the indigenous peoples in Indonesia as the day of the emergence of the indigenous 
peoples’ movement. 
One needs to recognise that the emergence of the indigenous peoples’ movement 
in Indonesia was influenced by the international indigenous peoples’ movement. The 
United Nations, for example, announced in 1993 that this was to be the Year of the 
Indigenous Peoples. The period from 1995 to 2004 was announced as the First 
Indigenous Peoples’ Decade, followed by the Second Indigenous Peoples’ Decade 
from 2005 to 2014. This UN initiative brought about the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. The intense exchanges 
between the local Indonesian indigenous peoples’ activists and the advocates at the 
international level were facilitated by attendance at the international meetings, as well 
as through hosting international activists in Indonesia. Due to these exchanges, the 
two movements are closely connected. 
Despite the fact that the indigenous peoples’ movement is becoming stronger, the 
communities still have to struggle for their rights. In 2011 alone, AMAN registered 
around forty-eight conflicts that involved the indigenous peoples, consisting of a total 
of 947 families. These conflicts cover an area of 690,558 hectares1 and are caused by 
the lack of tenurial rights over the contested customary territories. Criminalisation of 
indigenous peoples is still recurrent. According to AMAN’s data, 224 members of 
indigenous communities were arrested and detained between October 2012 and March 
2013; five of them were found guilty in court and two of them filed cassation appeals. 
The existing legal regulations do not favour indigenous peoples. This is a reason 
for the frequent repression and criminalisation. Law enforcement is not a legitimate 
mechanism for achieving justice in these cases. On the contrary, it is seen as a system 
that sustains injustices towards indigenous peoples. Forestry Law is one of the 
                                                        
1 Compare with the data from the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) from 2012, that registered 
at least 198 conflicts; the majority of conflicts (45%) occurred in the plantation sector; the smallest 
number of conflicts (2%) occurred in the coastal areas (Konsorsium 2012).  




examples of an unjust law that is imposed upon indigenous peoples. At the present, 
the most recent data suggests that 16.62% of 129 million hectares, 67% of the land 
mass of Indonesia, had been determined as “forest area” (kawasan hutan) (Dirjen 
Planologi Kehutanan 2012). The government has already granted a lot of concessions 
to companies for the exploitation of forest resources. This, in turn, causes conflicts 
between the indigenous peoples and the companies operating in the forest areas that, 
in fact, have only an ambiguous legal status.2 
Some examples of such conflicts over forest use may illustrate these conflicts (see 
also AMAN 2013). In mid-2012, the local government of the Sumbawa Regency 
(kabupaten), West Nusa Tenggara, set at least fifty housing units of the indigenous 
community of Pekasa on fire to evict the community from their customary land. These 
houses represented the old village the community had rebuilt in the area that was 
designated by the government as the protected forest area. However, the local 
government had issued a license to a forestry company and a mining company to 
operate in the customary lands of the Pekasa community. The Datuk (traditional chief) 
of Pekasa, Edi Kuswanto, was arrested by the police and taken to court but no 
evidence could be adduced that the disputed land was part of the forest area. 
Nevertheless, the Sumbawa District Court Judge sentenced the Datuk Pekasa to 18 
months imprisonment with a fine of 100 million rupiah. At the appeal, the Supreme 
Court of West Nusa Tenggara upheld the verdict of the Sumbawa District Court. In 
June 2013, this case was filed for another appeal to the Supreme Court. 
A similar type of conflict occurred over the customary territory of the indigenous 
community of Pandumaan Sipituhuta in North Sumatra. In 2012, the police arrested 
and intimidated the indigenous peoples of Pandumaan Sipituhuta because they 
stopped the operation of PT Toba Pulp Lestari (PT. TPL) on their territory of 6,000 
hectares. The expropriation of the adat land had started in 2009 when the local 
government of the Humbang Hasundutan Regency issued a license to a pulp and paper 
company, PT. TPL. As part of its operation, the company had been felling the 
traditional benzoin forest that belongs to this community and started planting trees 
used for the production of pulp and paper. On September 18, 2012 a clash occurred 
between the community and the company’s security staff which was assisted by police 
officers from the Mobile Brigade (Brimob). Outnumbered, the security staff and police 
officers fled the area. In the aftermath, however, the Humbang Hasundutan police 
(polres) sent summons several times to some of the community members who were 
considered to be the clash coordinators. This case demonstrates that repression and 
criminalisation of masyarakat adat who defend their customary lands still occur and the 
                                                        
2 Several regents from the province of Central Kalimantan submitted a Judicial Review of the 
Forestry Law to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia in 2011. The decision of the 
Supreme Court corrected the legality of the state forest area. In brief, the decision of the Supreme 
Court suggested that a forest area can be said to be a legal forest area (not in conflict with the 1945 
Constitution) if the area has been already determined as a forest area, meaning that the area had 
already gone through the process of designation, defining borders, mapping and gazettement. This 
means that a forest area that is not supported by all these processes and is only pointed at by the 
Ministry of Forestry cannot be legally seen as a forest area. 
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legal regulations do not yet fully acknowledge the existence and the rights of masyarakat 
adat. 
The Forestry Law that does not favour the interests of the indigenous peoples 
means, in fact, that the rule of law in the field of forestry supports the expropriation of 
the customary land of the indigenous peoples. It also means agreeing with the acts of 
violence against the indigenous peoples. Therefore, a law reform and creation of new 
laws are needed to respond to the plight of masyarakat adat and to defend their rights 
against the expropriation of their customary land. 
The Colonial Adat Studies and their Implications 
The key concepts in the study of adat and adat law were developed by several Dutch 
legal scholars, such as Cornelis van Vollenhoven, Barend ter Haar Bzn and their 
colleagues. Vollenhoven analysed the data he gathered from the reports about the 
lifestyles of the Netherlands East Indies’ residents compiled both by the researchers 
and the colonial officials. He systematised the data about the customary laws in 
volumes called Adatrechtbundels (Adat Law Tomes).3 
Vollenhoven and his colleagues were sympathetic and highly interested in unveiling 
the lives of the indigenous peoples. They discovered communities with distinct legal 
systems that are different from those found in Europe. They tried to discover and 
understand the rule of law that the communities applied. Vollenhoven’s findings were 
published in a book entitled “The Discovery of Adat Law” (De ondekking van het 
adatrecht, 1928). 
The Dutch colonial government had started to implement the so-called “ethical 
policy”, which was centred on the issues of education, emigration and irrigation.4 The 
legal scholars, influenced by liberalist ideas, struggled to advocate on behalf of 
masyarakat adat. They wanted them to benefit from the “ethical policy” of the Dutch 
colonial government. The recognition of the existence of the adat law communities 
also became a means to administer the colonies by indirect rule, that is, through the 
local elites and in the absence of the colonial authorities. 
Several key concepts that are still being used today within the customary law 
research are adat law (hukum adat or adat recht), adat law circles (lingkaran hukum adat or 
adat rechtskringen), communal rights over land or “right to avail” (hak ulayat or 
beschikkingsrecht), and the adat law communities (masyarakat hukum adat or adat 
rechtsgemenschaapen). Adat law (adatrecht) is a term that was systematically used for the 
first time by Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and, subsequently, by Vollenhoven (Snouck 
Hurgronje 1893:16; Vollenhoven 1933:3; Benda-Beckmann F. and K. v. 2011:170-171). 
They realised that the term adat was used in many places to describe an entity united by 
                                                        
3 Cornelis van Vollenhoven wrote several series of Adatrechtbundels to describe the situation of laws 
and native customs in Indonesia in the early-20th century. 
4 The three major programmes are called Trias Van Deventer, because they were being promoted by 
the Dutch liberal named Conrad Theodor van Deventer. The three programmes are: (1) irrigation, 
build and improve irrigation and dam systems for farming needs; (2) emigration, i.e. encourage 
transmigration; and (3) education, i.e. promotion of education. 




morality, customs, traditions, and legal institutions, even though the concept was not 
found on all the islands of Indonesia (Benda-Beckmann, F. and K. v. 2011:170-171).5 
Furthermore, the concept of adat law circles (adat rechtskringen) was, in fact, created by 
these legal researchers in order to identify the common features and the culture-
specific forms of intrinsic logic of these communities in Indonesia. Their observations 
were systematised into 19 adat law circles (compiled between 1906 and 1918) reflecting 
the state of knowledge at a time when knowledge and resources were limited (Benda-
Beckmann F. and K..v., 2011:174).  
The term beschikkingsrecht refers to the concept of hak ulayat and describes a land 
management system of adat communities that regulates and allocates land among the 
community members holding cultivation rights. Vollenhoven names six characteristics 
of beschikkingsrecht6 in his book Miskenningen van het Adatrecht (1909). 
It is important to note that what is referred to as adat law communities or 
masyarakat hukum adat is a literal translation of adat rechtsgemenschaap. Adat law 
communities are local communities and live according to adat. Barend ter Haar Bzn 
suggests that a common origin (genealogy) and a shared territory are the key aspects 
that unite and characterize an adat community. Ter Haar Bzn maps 13 types of 
masyarakat hukum communities, such as nagari, marga, negeri, ohoi, huta, kuria, binua, 
gampong, and others. These types vary according to the way they combine the 
genealogical and territorial aspects mentioned above (ter Haar Bzn 1962:65-81).  
Independence, the New Order Regime and the Expropriation of the 
Indigenous Lands 
The founding fathers of Indonesia intended to keep the existing governing structures 
of traditional village units within the new government system in the formation of the 
new independent state. Soepomo and Muhammad Yamin were the two influential 
lawyers who developed the first Constitution of Indonesia. In their design, they 
envisioned a hierarchical, tiered system that consisted of several governance structures. 
The lowest tier of the governance system is a territory-based adat law which 
communities organised in traditional villages and which is seen as a basic foundation 
for nation-building. In the middle, there is a regional government that consists of the 
provincial and regional (regency/city, kabupaten/kota besar) government. The national 
government represents the top of the governance pyramid. 
                                                        
5 Vollenhoven stated that adat law is “all the regulations that become behavioral guidelines for the 
native communities and foreign orientals (timur asing) which, on the one hand, consist of control 
sanctions (this is why it is called law) and, on the other, is not codified (this is why it is adat)” 
(Vollenhoven 1933:3; Holleman 1981:23; Benda-Beckmann, F. v. and K., 2011:170-1). 
6 The six characteristics of beschikkingsrecht are: 1) a community’s authority over uncultivated land; 2) 
the use of land by outsiders can only exist through the agreement of the community; 3) payment for 
the land use as a form of recognition; 4) there is still a community authority over the land that is 
being cultivated; 5) collective responsibility over the territory; and 6) eternal land rights, which means 
the community possesses the unconditional right to relinquish (Vollenhoven 1909, 1919). Burns, 
however, contends that there is nowhere in Indonesia which fulfils all the six characteristics outlined 
by Vollenhoven (Burns 1989). 
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This governmental system can still be seen in the Law on Local Governance (UU No. 
22/1948) that states that “Regions of the Republic of Indonesia are divided into three 
tiers, that is: province, regency (big city) and village (small town), negeri, marga, and 
others, which carry a right to regulate and manage their own households.” Thus, adat 
law communities, entitled differently in each area and often referred to as village (desa) 
or some other name, are the foundation of the state governance system. However, the 
existence of the adat law communities gradually disintegrated later, and its existence as 
a lower-tier governance structure was no longer recognised within the subsequent legal 
regulations. 
Furthermore, the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL, No. 5/1960) also contributed to the 
marginalisation of the adat law communities by imposing a number of restrictions. This 
law recognises the land rights of adat communities under the term hak ulayat with the 
following conditions: (1) as long as such communities still exist, (2) it may not conflict 
with the national interest and the State’s interest, and (3) shall not contradict the laws 
and regulations of higher levels. This type of conditional recognition with strictly set 
requirements eventually led to the disappearance of the indigenous peoples’ land 
rights. What happened is, in fact, the state-isation (negaraisasi) of the indigenous 
territories (Rachman 2012).7 
This subjection of the adat land to the central state continued the colonial model of 
Domein Verklaring (Domain Declarations) despite the fact that the enactment of the 
Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) initially intended to eliminate this practice (Simarmata 2006; 
Termorshuizen-Arts 2010). The early nationalists had tried to surpass both adat law 
and the colonial governance system (Fitzpatrick 2008). However, the regulatory 
practice framework that was enacted during the formation of the new republic 
extinguished the traditional governance system and expropriated the indigenous 
peoples’ customary territories. 
During Suharto’s repressive New Order regime (1966-1998), the indigenous 
peoples were expropriated of their land, often without proper compensation, in the 
name of development of infrastructure, for mining and timber concessions. The 
communities that refused were put under extreme pressure, experienced violence and 
were labelled as the followers of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), conceived 
as the deadly enemy of the state.8 This, in turn, legitimised the silencing of the 
indigenous peoples. The case that is most often mentioned is that of the Amungme 
and the Komoro peoples in Papua Province, whose customary lands were handed over 
to PT. Freeport, a giant gold-mining company (Bachriadi 1998).  
                                                        
7 Operational regulations about hak ulayat (communal land rights, right to avail) in the BAL were 
developed by the government in 1999 through the Agrarian Ministerial Regulation No 5, 1999 about 
the Guidelines for Communal Land Dispute Settlement, that is, 39 years after the ratification of the 
BAL. 
8 This party was accused of masterminding the G30S incident, the coup, in 1965. The parties that 
were close to farmers at the time were considered to be the members of this banned party. Many 
party leaders and cadres were imprisoned and killed by the military and the paramilitary. Farmers’ 
movements that demanded land rights were often associated with members of PKI, thus, justifying 
their extermination. 




Customary land grabbing in the name of development resulted in protests from the 
indigenous peoples and their supporters, who were environmental and legal aid 
activists. In 1988, for example, hundreds of Batak Toba people of North Sumatra 
resisted the pulp and paper industry of PT. Inti Indorayon Utama (now called PT. 
Toba Pulp Lestari; Moniaga 2010:309). Men and women of this indigenous community 
protested because their signatures had been forged and the land taken over by the 
company. Similar types of protests against the developmentalist policies that 
overreached local communities also occurred in Kalimantan and various other places. 
Not only were their lands stolen, but the indigenous peoples also experienced 
discrimination. They were referred to by the government as “forest encroachers”, 
“uncivilised” and “isolated peoples”, and were treated as a “social illness”. On the basis 
of these assumptions, the Department of Social Affairs (now the Ministry of Social 
Affairs) developed a programme that aimed to empower the “isolated peoples” 
(masyarakat terasing). Under this programme, the indigenous communities experienced 
forced relocation. One example is the case of the upland Orang Tompi of Central 
Sulawesi, whose connection to their ancestral lands was cut off due to forced 
relocation, and they were forced to adapt to a new lifestyle and a new farming system 
that often failed (Li 2012:147; see also the chapter by Grumblies in this volume). 
Various land expropriation cases and the discrimination that these communities 
faced led to the emergence of various organisations that aimed to defend the rights of 
the indigenous peoples. These initiatives led to the establishment of AMAN, that has 
until now acted as the indigenous peoples’ organisation (see above). Therefore, one 
can say that the indigenous peoples’ movement emerged as a victims’ movement of 
Suharto’s developmentalist policies. 
Arena of Legislative Contestations 
The Reformation Period (reformasi) started in 1998 and led to the change of regime. 
This moment in Indonesian history presented an opportunity for rearranging the 
relationships between the state and the indigenous communities. If the indigenous 
peoples (masyarakat adat) and their supporters previously preferred informal protests, 
now was the time to try to push forward the agenda of the indigenous peoples at the 
formal, policy level.  
During the First Congress of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (KMAN 
I) in Jakarta in 1999, the Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head of the National Land 
Agency who attended the congress was pushed to recognise the land rights of the 
indigenous peoples. The participants, taking advantage of the opportunity, filed several 
complaints concerning cases of land expropriations that they had experienced. The 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs responded with a Ministerial Regulation on The 
Guidelines for Communal Land Dispute Settlement (No. 5, 1999). 
This ministerial regulation, furthermore, pushed forward the numerous initiatives 
that led to a number of regional regulations (Perda) on the recognition of the existence 
of indigenous peoples and their rights, including both land and local governance rights 
(such as in West Sumatra, Lebak, Jambi, Malinau, Morowali, Papua, Aceh, and many 
other places). At the same time, the initiatives of the regulatory legislations, such as the 
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Law on Local Governance, Law on the System of National Education, Law on Water 
Resources, Law on Forestry, Law on Plantations, and Law on the Management of 
Coastal Areas and Small Islands indicate that there is a legislative trend towards 
acknowledging the existence and the rights of indigenous peoples (Arizona 2010a). 
Despite the fact that many laws were initiated, these laws do not solve the existing 
problems. On the contrary, they make the situation even more complex, and are often 
not implemented. There are at least four major criticisms of these laws. Firstly, the 
conditional recognition of the indigenous peoples and hak ulayat, as formulated in the 
BAL No. 5/1960 (see above), is still in place. Noer Fauzi Rachman argues, “On the 
one hand, the state is willing to recognise; on the other hand, the state suspects the 
indigenous rights will interfere with what is referred to as ‘the national interest’, which, 
in turn, often implies the opening of large-scale commercial timber and other 
plantations” (2000; translation by the authors). Even worse, this model of recognition 
is the one that was also introduced in the Article 18B Paragraph (2) of the 1945 
Constitution, thus, making these requirements crucial in defining the existence and the 
rights of the indigenous peoples.9 This, in fact, happened during the process of the 
faulty formulation of the Constitutional amendment (Arizona 2012).  
Secondly, there is an erroneous understanding about the indigenous peoples and 
their rights to their lands and the natural resources. The lawmakers still consider the 
land rights of the indigenous peoples to be the rights granted by the state. However, 
the indigenous peoples themselves consider that their claim is older than the 
Indonesian state itself, which was only formed in 1945, since their ancestors have been 
living on their territories for many centuries. The indigenous peoples argue strongly 
that they are the original right-holders over land and natural resources. In addition, this 
claim also reflects the shock that the indigenous peoples experienced as a result of the 
expropriation of their ancestral territories through legal regulations. Due to this, this 
argument is an important one for the indigenous peoples. It demonstrates to the 
general public that the indigenous peoples matter. 
Thirdly, the laws still promote a standardised, identical governance system, as 
introduced by the New Order, in order to control the communities and the natural 
resources for economic development and political stability. The New Order 
government had issued the Village Law (or Desa) Governance (No 5/1979) which 
introduced a standardised desa (village) model throughout Indonesia; it replaced and 
destroyed the different traditional village organisations that managed the indigenous 
communities’ lives across Indonesia. Thus, the villages were made identical in relation 
to structure, decision-making process and political authority. This also caused a huge 
number of internal conflicts. Later, the post-Suharto government acknowledged that 
the Village Law was a failure because it was not in accordance with the 1945 
Constitution. Therefore, this Village Law of 1979 was replaced with the Village 
Governance Law (No. 22/1999). Today, there is an effort to revive a more 
                                                        
9 Article 18B, paragraph (2) of the Constitution reads: the State recognises and respects the unity of 
masyarakat hukum adat as well as their traditional rights as long as they are still alive and are in 
accordance with societal development and the principles of the unitary state of Indonesia regulated 
by laws. 




autonomous governance system based on adat. However, the lawmakers do not yet 
fully support this idea. 
Fourthly, there is a sectoralism of legislations concerning the indigenous peoples. 
In reality, the Indonesian legislations are still based on sectoral interests. The forestry 
problems, for example, are managed by the Ministry of Forestry that applies the 
Forestry Law without attending to any of the other existing interests. The same goes 
for the problems related to mining that are solely managed by the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources that also only applies the Law on Minerals and Coal rather 
parochially. Inter-institutional conflicts within the government also have an impact on 
the protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples. At one point, the territory of 
the indigenous peoples would be appointed as a protected area, but at another point, 
one of the Ministries would put it under a mining licence. Meanwhile, there is no 
organisation that coordinates all the programmes of all the ministries and state 
institutions in relation to the indigenous peoples. Therefore, the laws that are being 
enacted for the recognition and protection of the indigenous peoples are becoming 
more and more problematic because they are being developed within an ambiguous 
legal development paradigm. 
The Bill on the Recognition and the Protection of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (RUU PPHMHA) 
Efforts to renegotiate the status of the indigenous peoples in relation to the nation-
state are clearly reflected in the motto (rendered in the first sentence of this chapter) 
that was issued when AMAN was established in 1999. It was only at the Second 
Congress, KMAN II (2003), in Lombok that the demands for a special law on the 
indigenous peoples were made for the first time. Two important decisions from this 
congress in relation to the legislative process were: Firstly, to push both the 
government and parliament to implement the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree 
TAP MPR IX/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management to 
examine and revoke all the sectoral laws, among them are Forestry Law No. 41/1999 
and Mining Law No. 11/1967, that do not recognise and even harass the rights of the 
indigenous peoples and to replace these laws with a new, comprehensive, cross-
sectoral Natural Resource Management Law that also protects the indigenous peoples’ 
rights. Secondly, demand that the government and parliament of Indonesia make a 
special law that recognises and protects the rights of the indigenous peoples, as already 
stated in Article 18B Paragraph 2 in the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution. 
A meeting was organised at Wisma Margaguna, Jakarta in 2005 to map out ways to 
identify the indigenous peoples, drawing from local and international experiences. On 
the International Day of the Indigenous Peoples, August 9, 2006, the President of 
Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, gave a speech at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah 
in Jakarta. In his speech, he expressed respect and support for the recognition of the 
indigenous peoples and their rights, and acknowledged the importance of the nation’s 
diversity. The President said: 
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Recognition and respect, it seems, also need to be assessed according to the 
development of our society, the principles of the unitary state of the Republic 
of Indonesia and our laws, so that things become clearer. It is the laws that can 
regulate the traditional rights of the adat law communities. As far as we 
understand, up to today, there is no law that regulates this. I hope that we can 
prepare a draft law in the near future.10 
 
(President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, April 9, 2006; 
translation by the authors) 
 
The Third Congress, KMAN III (2007), was held in Pontianak, West Kalimantan. This 
congress also suggested that the indigenous peoples should be able to influence the 
drafting of the Village Law that was being initiated by several actors, including the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and several national NGOs. The congress also 
recommended that a Commission on the Indigenous Peoples be formed that would 
aim to coordinate cross-sectorally and become a mediator in the resolution of conflicts 
between the indigenous peoples and other parties. These suggestions were 
strengthened at the AMAN Working Group meeting in Sinar Resmi, West Java, in 
2009. This working group meeting stated that one of the reasons behind the 
oppression of the indigenous peoples is the absence of the comprehensive umbrella 
law that gives recognition, protection and respect to the indigenous peoples and their 
rights. That same year, a workshop was organised at Wisma YTKI in Jakarta. The 
workshop involved a number of NGOs that work on the issues of indigenous peoples. 
They expressed their commitment to the recognition and protection of the indigenous 
peoples by promoting a special law on indigenous peoples. A meeting at the Learning 
Centre of HuMa11 (now called the Epistema Institute) resulted in the formation of a 
team that would work on the advocacy of the Draft Law on the Recognition and the 
Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (RUU PPHMHA). The team consisted 
of a campaign team, a fundraising team, a lobbying team, and a research team to 
prepare a research paper and the draft law. 
Research consultations with AMAN members took place in seven regions in 2010. 
Public consultations were held in co-operation with the institutions of higher 
education, including those in Jember (East Java), Medan (North Sumatra), 
Palangkaraya (Central Kalimantan), Ambon (Maluku), Makassar (South Sulawesi), 
Papua, and Bali. In addition, a national public consultation was held in co-operation 
with the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 
LIPI) in Jakarta. On the basis of these meetings, the internal AMAN team worked on 
                                                        
10 http://www.kemsos.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=241 <July 08, 2013>.  
11 HuMa is the Association for Community and Ecologically Based Law Reform. HuMa is an NGO 
working to promote peoples’ law and natural resources law reform (http:www.huma.or.id).  




preparing the draft of the RUU PPHMHA and lobbied its inclusion into the National 
Legislative Programme (Prolegnas) in 2012.12 
A positive response from the National Parliament (DPR RI) could be seen at 
KMAN IV (2012), organised in Tobelo. At this congress, AMAN symbolically handed 
over the RUU PPHMHA to the chair of DPR RI. The chair responded that he would 
support the passing of the law and promote the draft law and that it would be 
approved at the plenary session of the same year, in 2012. However, up to the end of 
2012, the draft law had not been approved. The congress also recommended that a 
state ministry be formed that specifically works on indigenous peoples’ issues.  
Sometime later, the Epistema Institute, in co-operation with HuMa, organised a 
Symposium on Indigenous Peoples at Gallery 678 in Kemang, Jakarta that discussed 
the foundations of the indigenous peoples as the subject of a law that is going to be 
regulated under the RUU PPHMHA. In addition, the potential clash between the RUU 
PPHMHA and the RUU Desa (Draft Village Law) was mentioned. The meeting 
recommended that further research needs to be conducted to synchronise the two 
initiatives that are being discussed simultaneously in parliament. 
At the same time, AMAN once again organised a number of public consultations 
with their members in twenty different regions. The outcome of these public 
consultations was a proposal to incorporate several changes into the RUU PPHMHA. 
At the time, it was already scheduled at the Legislative Body for the beginning of 
September, 2012. At each meeting, the members of AMAN in the areas where public 
consultations were held put on pressure to speed up the ratification of the RUU 
PPHMHA. This is why the AMAN working meeting held in Palangkaraya in March, 
2013, agreed to accelerate the process of the RUU PPHMHA enactment. AMAN 
issued a statement that they would boycott the political parties that impeded or 
obstructed the discussion and legalisation of the RUU PPHMHA. 
On May 16, 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia accepted 
the petition from AMAN and two communities from Kenegerian Kuntu (Riau 
Province) and Kasepuhan Cisitu (Banten Province). The decision of the Constitutional 
Court revised a provision regarding the customary forest in Forestry Law. In this 
decision, the Constitutional Court emphasised that a special law is needed to follow up 
the provision of Article 18B section 2 of the Indonesian Constitution regarding 
protection and promotion the rights of indigenous peoples (Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 35/PUU-X 2012:184). 
Scope and Criticism of the RUU PPHMHA  
Responding to the growing strength of the indigenous peoples’ movement in 
Indonesia, the government passed a number of legal regulations both at the local and 
national levels (see Arizona 2010b).13 The RUU PPHMHA was agreed at the 
                                                        
12 Prolegnas is a step in the preparation of legislation in parliament, where a variety of the proposed 
draft legislations are considered and which is going to be discussed in a given year is decided upon. 
13 For more information regarding the trend of policy regulations on indigenous peoples in post-
Reformation Indonesia, see Yance Arizona 2010a.  
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parliamentary plenary session on April 11, 2013. The term that was used to define the 
indigenous peoples was masyarakat hukum adat, not masyarakat adat.14 Even though the 
difference between the two terms lies only in one additional word, hukum (law), the 
observers of the indigenous peoples have been debating the two terms for a long time. 
Some of them argue that the two terms refer to two different subjects of law, while 
others believe that both terms allude to the same subject of law.  
The term masyarakat hukum adat or adat law communities is often used by the 
policymakers, because this term appears recurrently in the legal regulations. The 
academics also use the same term, because it is a literal translation from Adat 
Rechtsgemenschaapen (see above). The masyarakat hukum adat are defined in the RUU 
PPHMHA as  
 
a group of people who have been living in a certain geographical area for 
generations in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia because of the 
ancestral connection and a special relationship with the land, territory and 
natural resources, who own a customary governance system and a adat law 
order on their territory.15   
 
At the same time, the term masyarakat adat is used by the NGOs and the indigenous 
peoples’ activists. This term was coined only at the beginning of 1993 to refer to the 
rural people who became the victims of the New Order developmentalist policies. This 
term is used in a smaller number of legal regulations that are still in force, such as the 
Law on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands (No. 27/2007). The deep 
fear of the indigenous peoples towards the use of the term masyarakat hukum adat is 
because the term risks suggesting that the indigenous peoples are only those who own 
a systematised, measurable law practice.16 This may overlook other realities of 
indigenous peoples, such as their belief systems, cultures, political systems, and other 
elements that define the identity of masyarakat adat. 
                                                        
14 Meanwhile, Article 18B, Paragraph (2), of the 1945 Constitution uses the term Kesatuan Masyarakat 
Hukum Adat (unity of customary law communities). 
15 This definition was agreed upon at the JAPHAMA meeting in 1993 at Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi. 
This definition became the working definition of AMAN. On the basis of this definition, the RUU 
PPHMHA proposed the six characteristics of the indigenous peoples mentioned. 
16 Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, an expert on the legal history of Indonesia, states that there are two 
ways of understanding masyarakat hukum adat – the first one is as masyarakat-hukum adat and the 
second is as masyarakat hukum-adat. The first reading implies that this entity is a subject of law called 
masyarakat hukum. The second reading suggests that adat law is the main element of this legal entity. In 
his opinion, the term adat rechtsgemenschaapen that was translated as masyarakat hukum adat should be 
interpreted according to the first reading (Wignjosoebroto 2012).  




Comparison between Masyarakat Hukum Adat and Masyarakat Adat 
Elements Masyarakat hukum adat/ 
Customary law communities 
Masyarakat adat/ 
Indigenous peoples 
Usage Used by the colonial 
government to refer to a 
subject of law formed by the 
“native” (pribumi) peoples. 
Refers to a movement of the 
rural peoples who still hold 
onto their traditions and were 
the victims of the 
developmentalist policy of the 
New Order regime.  
When did it 
emerge? 
Developed as a result of the 
colonial experiences at the 
end of the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century.  
Developed as a result of the 
New Order developmentalist 
policy in the period 1980-1990. 
Initial objective Indirect rule by the colonial 
government. Demonstrates 
the uniqueness of the 
“native” peoples.  
Movement for land restitution. 




Formulated by the Dutch 
legal experts and developed 
through research, teaching 
and state policy. 
Formulated by the social 
movements and scholarly 




Formed by anthropological 
research during the colonial 
times 
Inspired by the international 
indigenous peoples’ movement. 
 
The usage of the term masyarakat hukum adat is a compromise that allows the legislative 
process to continue. A similar situation happened with the Law on Environmental 
Protection and Management (No. 32/2009). This law uses the term masyarakat hukum 
adat, but gives the same definition that was applied for masyarakat adat, that is: “a group 
of people who have been living in a certain geographical area for generations because 
of the ancestral connection, strong relationships with the environment, and with a 
value system that defines the economic, political, social, and legal norms”. 
The usage of the term masyarakat hukum adat in the RUU PPHMHA also indicates 
that the policy-makers are still co-opted by the concepts that were inherited from the 
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colonial era and taken over by many legislations after independence, including the 
constitution, without deep and holistic analysis of the present realities.  
Stages of Legal Recognition 
One of the difficult questions is how to recognise indigenous peoples. What are the 
stages of recognition and decision-making that need to be formulated within a legal 
document? This question was discussed by the indigenous peoples’ movement at a 
workshop in Wisma Margaguna, Jakarta in 2005. The greatest challenge here is to find 
the most appropriate way to regulate the insertion of the practice of self-determination 
into the RUU PPHMHA. 
 
 
The RUU PPHMHA suggests three stages in the recognition process of the masyarakat 
adat: identification, verification and ratification. The identification is carried out by the 
indigenous peoples, the local government, or both together. The five indicators are: (a) 
history of the adat law communities; (b) adat territory; (c) adat law; (d) adat property 
relations, inheritance and adat artefacts; and (e) customary governance system. The 
results of the identification are handed over to the Committee on the Indigenous 
Peoples at the regency, provincial or state levels. These indicators of masyarakat adat are 
different, with six elements of beschikkingrecht that were promoted by Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven.17 Five indicators are used by the RUU PPHMHA to identify the 
subjectivity of masyarakat adat, and the sixth indicator was promoted by van 
Vollenhoven to show customary land management by native peoples. 
Verification, the second stage of the recognition, comprises checking back on the 
identification process. Results of the verification are handed over to the regent, 
governor or the president so that an approval can be issued. At the third stage, the 
decision is ratified. If the existence of the indigenous peoples is to be decided within 
one regency (kabupaten), the regent has the authority of ratification; if several regencies 
                                                        
17 See footnote 7 in this chapter. 




are involved, it is the governor; if several provinces are concerned, it is the president 
who ratifies the final decision. The communities have a right to challenge the decision. 
This model of recognition is complex (multiple parties) and problematic, since the 
principle of self-determination of the indigenous peoples is ultimately determined by 
the political decision-making of a regent, a governor or the president. In reality, it is 
not easy to translate self-determination into a policy framework. This is why the model 
elaborated in the RUU PPHMHA needs to be debated so that a fair, accessible 
mechanism can be developed. 
Administration and Conflict Resolution 
The RUU PPHMHA regulates the rights and the responsibilities of the masyarakat adat. 
The types of rights that are regulated within the draft law are the following: (1) rights 
to land, ancestral territory and natural resources; (2) rights to self-determined 
development, which includes the rights of the indigenous peoples to accept or refuse 
development agendas planned by other parties on the ancestral territories, and the 
rights of the indigenous peoples to determine their own development; (3) rights to 
spirituality and culture that include rights to profess and practice their own systems of 
traditional beliefs, rights to preserve and develop their own traditions and cultures, and 
rights to receive protection and promotion of their intellectual properties; (4) rights to 
their environment; and (5) rights to practice customary law and customary judicature. 
The regulation of various types of rights within the draft law adopts the 
stipulations from other laws and also translates the rights of the indigenous peoples 
that were outlined in UNDRIP. However, the rights to self-governance were not 
included in this draft law. The Legislative Body of the Parliament that prepared the 
RUU PPHMHA and the Parliamentary Commission II that discussed the RUU Desa 
reached the agreement that the rights of the indigenous peoples to self-governance 
would be included within the RUU Desa. Here, the right to self-governance is, in 
reality, the realisation of the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, which, in 
fact, is the condition for the indigenous peoples’ realisation of all the other rights. 
The RUU PPHMHA does not regulate the administration of the masyarakat adat 
rights in any concrete way and may hamper the fulfilment of their rights in the future. 
Even more so, in a situation where the majority of the administration of the masyarakat 
adat is connected to other governmental structures, such as the Ministry of Forestry in 
relation to adat forest or the National Land Agency in relation to the land rights, and so 
on. 
The RUU PPHMHA authorises the local adat organisations to resolve conflicts 
that arise among members within their own group. However, this authority is restricted 
to conflicts that are classified as civil offences and minor criminal offences. Major 
criminal offences and special criminal offences are resolved by the state judicature. A 
major criminal act within the draft law is referred to as a crime that is regulated via 
Book II of the Criminal Code. A “special criminal act” is defined as a criminal act that 
is outside the Criminal Code and is regulated through special legal regulations, such as 
acts concerning corruption, terrorism, drugs, and others. 
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At the same time, concerning conflicts that arise between two different indigenous 
communities, the RUU PPHMHA regulates that these conflicts need to be resolved via 
a consensus-oriented process of musyawarah (deliberation) between the local adat 
institutions. If this process does not succeed, the disputing members need to go 
through the adat judicature. If the parties disagree with the decision of the adat 
judicature, then the case goes to the state judicature, i.e. it is submitted to the Supreme 
Court. 
The draft of the RUU PPHMHA does not fully acknowledge the adat justice 
system. Firstly, the indigenous peoples do not strictly differentiate between a civil and a 
criminal offence, as these are recognised within the state law. Therefore, the difference 
as stipulated by the RUU PPHMHA is not accurate. Secondly, adat judicature is not an 
adat court. Adat judicature works as a local institution and is one of the functions of 
the adat council.18 However, it is not hierarchically organised in a similar way to the 
contemporary state administration. Thirdly, the draft law does not talk about ways to 
regulate conflicts that arise between the indigenous communities and external parties, 
such as companies that are operating on the customary territories. The RUU 
PPHMHA authorised the adat judicature. However, if there is a party that does not 
recognise the decision of adat judicature, the conflict goes to the Supreme Court.
  
Institutional Limitations 
As briefly mentioned, there is no state ministry or committee that specifically promotes 
the rights of the indigenous peoples. Even the RUU PPHMHA has not yet pushed for 
the birth of such an institution. The draft law mentions a special committee for 
masyarakat adat that is organised hierarchically at the regency, provincial and national 
levels. This is a temporary committee because its objective is only related to the 
verification stage of the recognition of the indigenous peoples. After the process of 
verification, the committee is supposed to be dissolved. 
  
                                                        
18 Article 44, paragraph (4), in the RUU PPHMHA states: Adat Judicature is formed by an adat 
organisation starting from a regency/city level and going to the provincial level. 




The RUU PPHMHA regulates a number of tasks and competences of the government 
to promote the rights of the indigenous peoples. The following table explains the tasks 
and competences within the RUU PPHMHA: 
 
Government tasks Government authority 
a. To develop and 
implement a programme 
for the empowerment of 
adat law communities by 
reconsidering the local 
wisdom/knowledge; 
b. To provide the necessary 
means and infrastructure 
needed by adat law 
communities; 
c. To socialise and inform the 
development programmes 
planned to adat law 
communities;  
d. To supervise or give 
guidance to the adat law 
communities  
a. To ratify the existence of the customary 
law communities; 
b. To approve policy on the empowerment 
programme of adat law communities by 
reconsidering the local 
wisdom/knowledge; 
c. To approve policies of the necessary tools 
and infrastructure; 
d. To approve policy for the protection of 
artefacts, culture and language of adat law 
communities; 
e. To approve policy of socialisation and 
information dissemination informing adat 
law communities about the development 
programmes; 
f. To approve a policy about the supervision 
or guidance of the customary law 
communities. 
 
Even though the draft law regulates the tasks and authorities of the government, it 
does not specifically mention the institutions that are responsible for executing these 
tasks. Several suggestions were made by KMAN IV in Tobelo in 2012. This congress 
gave a mandate for forming a State Ministry on the Indigenous Peoples and the public 
consultations suggested an independent Commission on Indigenous Peoples as an 
independent governmental institution. Nevertheless, these ideas were not 
accommodated within the RUU PPHMHA that is currently (May 2013) being prepared 
by the parliament. 
Challenges of the RUU PPHMHA and the Threat of Traditional 
Elites 
It was agreed that the RUU PPHMHA would be a parliamentary initiative. This means 
that this draft law will be discussed between the parliament and the government. Every 
law has to pass through two stages: firstly, the parliamentary commissions and, 
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secondly, the parliamentary plenary session.19 Each reading is carried out together with 
the government to achieve an agreement. 
In the first stage, the decision is taken as to which commission is going to consider 
the RUU PPHMHA. If it is in the Commission 2 that is also discussing the RUU Desa, 
then the opportunity for synchronisation between the RUU PPHMHA and the RUU 
Desa is greater. However, the risk here is that the RUU PPHMHA might lose its zeal 
to recognise the rights of the indigenous peoples on the basis of their ancestral 
traditions, because the RUU Desa focuses on structural government perspective. 
The government representatives, especially the ministries that also deal with the 
indigenous peoples such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education and 
Culture, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Marine and Fishing Affairs, Ministry 
of Environmental Affairs, and others, will be involved in the discussion of the RUU 
PPHMHA and will, therefore, be able to determine the content of the draft law. The 
challenge here, therefore, is overcoming the persisting sectoralism and promoting the 
understanding of the indigenous peoples’ concerns.  
The emergence of the indigenous peoples’ movement in Indonesia has also been 
followed by the rise of the group of noble elites that represent kingdoms and 
sultanates, which existed before the establishment of Indonesia. Gerry van Klinken 
(2007) and, more recently, Fadjar Thufail (this volume) analyse the re-emergence of the 
groups of kings and sultans and their impact. There are at least three associations with 
different leaders, such as the Association of Kingdoms and Sultanates of Indonesia 
(Asosiasi Kerajaan dan Kesultanan Indonesia; AKKI), led by Raja Samu-Samu from 
Moluccas; the Friendship Forum of the Sultanates of the Archipelago (Forum 
Silaturahmi Kesultanan Nusantara; FSKN) led by Sultan Banten; and the Forum of 
Information and Communication of the Sultanates of the Archipelago (Forum 
Informasi dan Komunikasi Kesultanan Nusantara; FKIKN) led by Puro 
Mangkunegoro. 
These groups constitute the traditional elites that are economically capable and 
have better political relations with the formal institutions. However, it seems that these 
groups are not well organised due to internal competition. As Klinken (2007) has 
shown, several of the individuals are district heads or/and parliamentarians at the 
national or regional levels. They can lobby and communicate with the chairs of the 
national and regional parliaments responding to this law initiative that can potentially 
be used to strengthen their traditional status. They do not oppose the indigenous 
peoples’ movement and they even voice the interests of the indigenous peoples. They 
aim to reclaim the lands of the kingdoms and sultanates that also applied the adat 
system, even though what they mean by adat is different from the adat of the local 
village people. The size of the difference between the adat of the kings and the adat of 
the common villagers shows that the claim on the basis of adat and tradition stretches 
over a wide scope and can be used for various interests (see the chapter by Thufail in 
this volume). The Sultan of the Melayu Sulatanate of Jambi, Raden Abdurrahman 
Thaha Syaifudin, for example, reported a case of indigenous land expropriation by a 
                                                        
19 Article 20, Paragraph (2), of the 1945 Constitution says that all draft laws must be discussed by the 
Parliament and the President to achieve a common agreement. 




company with a timber licence from the Ministry of Forestry to the United Nations on 
the basis of the claim that the customary territory had been expropriated.  
This danger, the use of adat for different purposes, also became apparent in the 
public consultations with kings and sultans in several regions that were conducted by 
the parliament in May, 2012. If left unguarded, there is a possibility that this draft law 
could be usurped by these feudal groups. 
Potential Frictions and Legacies 
The decentralisation process in the post-New Order era strengthened the neo-
traditionalism, the adat institution and the village organisation that previously 
constituted the political units of adat law communities. In West Sumatra, the local 
government played a role in issuing a regulation to return the original village 
governance system that is called nagari. The same applies to several other places, such 
as Aceh, South Sumatra, Maluku, and others (see Benda-Beckmann F. and K. v. 2010). 
The consequence is that the role of adat leaders becomes stronger in controlling 
the national resources by negotiating with the companies in their customary territories. 
This may also cause conflicts between the adat leaders and the administrative village 
leaders that can often explode in the power struggles over a village’s natural resources 
(see the chapter by Steinebach in this volume). This happened in West Sumatra 
between the wali nagari and the ninik mamak, and also in Bali between the desa dinas and 
desa adat (see the chapter by Hauser-Schäublin in this volume). This constitutes one of 
the conflictual points between the indigenous peoples and the village (desa). In several 
places, such as West Sumatra and Aceh, the whole village governance unit, called nagari 
in West Sumatra and gampong/mukim in Aceh, is referred to as masyarakat adat. In the 
local regulation of West Sumatra Province on the Nagari Governance (No. 2/2007), 
nagari is defined as the unity of masyarakat hukum adat that owns a certain territory, 
performs self-governance and acts in the interests of the local communities based on 
the customary philosophy of the Minangkabau that custom law based on sharia law, as 
well as sharia based on the holy Qur’an (adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah) 
and/or on the basis of the origins and local customs of the Province of West Sumatra. 
Thus, the definition of nagari in West Sumatra is the same as the one of desa and of the 
masyarakat adat. At this moment (May 2013), the discussion of the RUU Desa is on-
going in the parliament. Harmonisation of the RUU Desa and the RUU PPHMHA is 
needed in order to avoid a negative impact and a clash that the communities might 
experience in the future because of the application of both laws. 
Another challenge within the discussion of the RUU PPHMHA is the colonial 
legacy that is hampering the renewal of the political concepts related to adat and is 
obstructing the fulfilment of the demands of the indigenous peoples. We can see this, 
for example, in the decision to use the term masyarakat hukum adat rather than 
masyarakat adat within the draft law of the RUU PPHMHA. There are also differences 
between the concepts of the colonial studies of adat and adat law communities and the 
contemporary discourses of adat, as well as between beschikkingsrecht and adat land (tanah 
adat) or adat territory (wilayah adat), or between an adat law as adat that possesses 
sanctions and an adat as a general guiding principle of life that emerged and developed 
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among the people. Therefore, it would be necessary to break out from conceptual 
imprisonment of the past and to take a chance to make laws that advance the rights of 
the indigenous peoples. 
The concepts developed by the Leiden Adat Law School need to be straightened 
out not only because of numerous translation mistakes from Dutch into Indonesian, 
but also because there was a misinterpretation of the findings of the Leiden Adat Law 
School researchers (Soesangobeng 2012a).20 Soesangobeng proposes that Pancasila as 
the national ideology of Indonesia might serve as a guideline for correcting those 
concepts; unfortunately, he does not propose to conduct empirical studies that test the 
relevance of the concepts and terms that are used in the contemporary adat studies.   
 
  
                                                        
20 For a critical evaluation of the uses and (mis-)interpretations of adat see “Myths and stereotypes 
about adat law: a reassessment of Vollenhoven in the light of current struggles over adat law in 
Indonesia,” by Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (2011). 
 
 
“Today we Occupy the Plantation –  
Tomorrow Jakarta”: 
Indigeneity, Land and  





Indigeneity has become a category of agency and empowerment. This became evident 
in the adoption of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) in 2007 – not only transforming indigenous peoples from marginalised 
“victims” to “actors”, but also reframing the debate over indigeneity as one of “rights” 
rather than “claims” (Gilbert 2006; Merlan 2009).  
The debate over “indigenous rights” in Indonesia is nearly always one over access 
to natural resources and especially rights over land. Conflicts over land between 
communities and other stakeholders have become virulent in Indonesia1 as agricultural 
land becomes less and less accessible for the rural local population due to various 
economic and political developments. At the same time, competing rights over 
resources and land between “indigenous” groups and other stakeholders always refer 
                                                        
1 In 2010, 46 conflicts in the plantation sector, 31 conflicts between communities and companies, and 
30 forest conflicts were reported by official institutions in Jambi, the province in Sumatra with which 
this article mainly deals (Zazali 2012). 
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to adat (customs, traditions and traditional regulations) and, therefore, to questions of 
plural legal orders. The founding of Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN; The 
Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) in 1999 was a new development 
which mobilised and raised adat interests to the national level in many regions of 
Indonesia. This movement attempts to draw its legitimacy mainly from an analogy with 
the notion of indigenous peoples identified by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) convention 169 from 1989 (Benda-Beckmann 2011:185). It links the local 
concepts of traditional communities to the global discourse of indigeneity and 
indigenous rights. In identifying who is and who is not “indigenous” and, therefore, 
rightfully entitled to articulate adat-based rights over land, a group’s self-identification 
is acknowledged as a crucial criteria in the global context of UNDRIP and Human 
Rights declarations.  
I introduce a case-study from Jambi province (Sumatra) where violent conflicts 
over land have occurred between different local communities and a palm oil company. 
My focus is on the “SAD 113 – tiga dusun” (“Suku Anak Dalam 113 – three villages”, 
a heterogeneous group of activists and their strategic positioning (Li 2000) as 
“indigenous” at the intersection between the new agrarian movement and the 
indigenous rights movement.2 
I will investigate how global categories and discourses of indigeneity related to 
rights and territory are adopted at the local level to realign the ways how marginalised 
minorities and agrarian movement activists connect to the nation, the government and 
the “non-indigenous” population. I will not go into detail of these movements, their 
histories, connections and differences, contradictions and inconsistencies, but explore 
how the fight for access to farmland and to ethnic homeland (Hall et al. 2011) is 
combined. In doing so, I picture the way indigeneity is strategically performed, also 
contradicting global discourses and resulting in a unique local indigenous identity at the 
new frontier of land control where authorities, sovereignties and hegemonies of the 
recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, 
territorialisations and property regimes (Peluso and Lund 2011:668). 
  
  
                                                        
2 The SAD 113 group was also supported by different NGOs, but in 2012, their activities were 
marginal compared to the agrarian movement’s activities. In this article, I will not further discuss the 
NGOs arguments and discourses in relation to indigenous struggles for land.  
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The Conflict between Suku Anak Dalam and an Oil Palm 
Plantation 
“Today we occupy the plantation – Tomorrow Jakarta!” This pugnacious statement 
was made by a group of land-rights activists calling themselves “SAD 113 – tiga 
dusun” (Suku Anak Dalam – three villages – SAD 113) in the summer of 2012. The 
group was occupying land developed and managed as an oil palm plantation by the 
company PT Asiatic Persada (PT AP), but claimed as tanah adat ulayat (customary land) 
by the activists.3 
The land under discussion is located in the southern part of Jambi, close to the 
borders of the neighbouring province Palembang. The region falls administratively 
within the jurisdiction of two regencies, Muara Jambi and Batanghari. The natural 
region is structured by the Bahar River and its tributaries, which are closely tied to the 
history of the local “indigenous” population, Batin Sembilan, mostly referred to as 
“Suku Anak Dalam” (SAD; “Tribe of the Children of the Interior”). Therefore, I will 
refer to this area as Bahar region. The Bahar region used to be scarcely populated and 
densely forested until the 1980s. Since then, intensive logging, the establishment of 
acacia and large-scale oil palm plantations created by state and private corporations, as 
well as the implementation of transmigration projects, have changed the natural and 
social structure in the region dramatically. The area under concession for agricultural 
use (including forest conservation areas) by several companies now covers a range of 
more than 200,000 ha.  
Additionally more than 45,000 people, mainly from Java, were moved into the 
Bahar area under the transmigration programme, which seeks to reduce over-
population and poverty on the Inner Islands. Each family was given roughly 2.5 ha of 
land for subsistence needs which was accompanied by a land certificate as proof of 
ownership. Most of the autochthonous local Batin Sembilan groups, who hold no 
official land title from the Indonesian government, were alienated from their ancestral 
territories and either retreated into still forested areas where concession holders had 
not yet started planting agricultural crops or were resettled in housing estates provided 
by the social department. In 2012, several hundred Batin Sembilan people, some of 
whom still practiced a semi-nomadic life and shifting cultivation, lived on land already 
given to a forest conservation concession. The majority of the Batin Sembilan failed to 
adapt to the rapidly changing social, political and economic conditions. Others 
succeeded in catching up with these rapid changes, mostly by marrying non-Batin 
Sembilan partners who were already familiar with the system of a market economy. 
I will now focus on the case of PT AP to illustrate the development of the 
agribusiness in Jambi. 
In 1986, the company PT Bangun Desa Utama (PT BDU), with questionable legality, 
was given a 20,000 ha licence by the Minister of the Interior to develop a cocoa and oil 
palm plantation in the Decree No. SK 46/HGU/DA/86, the Ministry stated that the 
area was still occupied by residents who settled prior to the issuance of the utilisation 
                                                        
3 The Indonesian term tanah adat, customary land, is usually applied as a synonym to ulayat (see v. 
Benda-Beckmann and v. Benda-Beckmann 2011. Here, the SAD have combined the two expressions. 
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permit; PT BDU was obliged to deal with this issue. A forest department inventory in 
1987 showed, however, that more than 2,000 Batin Sembilan families were living and 
practiced shifting cultivation on 4,000 ha within the concession area (Colchester et al. 
2011:11). As some of these families refused to leave their territory, they were evicted 
by military force under the repressive New Order regime; they finally withdrew from 
the concession area. The company was renamed PT Asiatic Persada (PT AP) in 1992. 
Subsequently, ownership changed several times until it was bought by the Singapore-
based international agribusiness group Wilmar in 2006 (Colchester et al. 2011; Setara 
2012; TÜV Rheinland 2011).  
Guarded official entrance of the PT AP concession area. Photo: B. Hauser-Schäublin 2012 
 
The Wilmar group received funding from the World Bank Group’s development 
institution International Finance Corporation (IFC) and is, therefore, committed to the 
eight IFC Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability. It is also 
obliged to fulfil the criteria of the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO),4 
which pay special attention to international human rights laws and the UNDRIP. The 
latter recognises indigenous peoples’ right to own, use, develop, and control the lands, 
territories and resources they have traditionally occupied or used. It suggests that 
states, by legally recognising these lands, territories and resources owned by indigenous 
                                                        
4 Criterion 2.2. The right to use the land can be demonstrated, and is not legitimately contested by 
local communities with demonstrable rights.  
Criterion 2.3. Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal rights, or customary rights, of 
other users, without their free, prior and informed consent. 
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peoples, should take into account their customs, traditions and land tenure systems. 
Moreover, article 28 of UNDRIP affirms that indigenous peoples have the right to 
redress for the traditional lands, territories and resources which have been confiscated, 
taken, occupied, used, or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. 
The conflict between Batin Sembilan and the company has been smouldering since 
2000, and several locations inside the concession area are partly occupied and managed 
by a heterogeneous community of Batin Sembilan, political activists and farmers from 
all over Indonesia. PT AP accused the people living inside the concession area of 
illegally harvesting PT AP’s oil palm fruit and of selling them to processing industries 
outside the plantation area. The company, fearing a substantial loss of their fruit, called 
in the mobile auxiliary police brigade (Brimob) in July 2011. The conflict between PT 
AP and the local population peaked in August 2011 when the lorry of an entrepreneur 
living in one of the occupiers’ settlements inside the concession area was confiscated 
by a Brimob patrol. During the dispute between Brimob and the lorry owner, police 
weapons were stolen. This incident led to Brimob brigades raiding the entrepreneur’s 
village and destroying at least 80 houses and leaving several people injured by gunfire 
(Colchester et al. 2011; Setara 2012). The escalation was followed by a spiral of more 
or less violent actions where houses, guard posts and equipment were burnt down and 
people were forcefully evicted from the plantation area.  
An investigation of the conflict was carried out by TÜV Rheinland5 on behalf of 
Wilmar, and additionally, by an independent team in 2011 to encourage a resolution of 
the conflicts in the PT AP concession in line with the principles and criteria of the 
RSPO, the Performance Standards of the IFC, national law, and international human 
rights standards.6 In the evaluation of the situation, TÜV Rheinland (2011:9) states that 
“the RSPO Certification of PT Asiatic Persada will not be approved until the dispute is 
resolved”. The report of the independent commission states that:  
It is clear that the way that PT AP has acquired lands in Batanghari is in 
violation of the rights of indigenous peoples as set out in international treaties 
ratified by Indonesia and summarised in the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which Indonesia has endorsed. Most evidently, PT AP has 
violated the right of the Batin Sembilan communities in the concession area to 
the ownership and control of the lands and natural resources they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used. The company has failed to 
respect the people’s right to give or withhold their Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent. In depriving the people of their lands, the company has violated their 
other rights including their rights to subsistence and a decent livelihood. 
 
(Colchester et al. 2011:54) 
 
                                                        
5 PT TÜV Rheinland is a RSPO-accredited assessor which evaluates the implementation of RSPO 
criteria.  
6 For a detailed report on the conflicts between PT AP and local communities, see Colchester et al. 
(2011), Setara (2012), and TÜV Rheinland (2011). 
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By 2012, nearly 70% or 17,937 ha from the 20,000 ha managed by PT AP was claimed 
to be tanah adat ulayat (Setara 2012:13) by Batin Sembilan and their allies who organised 
themselves into seven different groups pursuing varying or overlapping goals and 
strategies. 
 
Inside the PT AP concession area: Orange banner stating “Welcome to the tanah adat of 
Suku Anak Dalam” installed by SAD 113. In the foreground is a green sign of the PT AP 
stating: “Area of PT Asiatic Persada due to land use permit for agricultural commercial lease 
(HGU) from 1986. Any kind of activity is forbidden in the HGU area.” A number of relevant 
decrees and paragraphs are displayed as well.      Photo: B. Hauser-Schäublin 2012 
 
As in many similar cases all over Indonesia, the conflict is based on ambiguities and 
competition between codified state laws and customary laws (hukum adat) creating a 
situation of plural legal orders which have existed since the Dutch colonisation. The 
origin of the land conflict can be traced to back to the period of Suharto’s New Order 
regime (1965-1998) with its repudiation of local land rights and resource claims. The 
exploitation of forests and other natural resources on Indonesia’s Outer Islands were 
part of the government’s agenda of economic development and nation-building. All 
land, especially if communally owned, and all natural resources of economic interest 
were formally conceptualized as the property of the Indonesian state (see chapter by 
Arizona and Cahyadi in this volume). 7  
                                                        
7 Access to land in Indonesia is still regulated mainly by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) which is 
based on the Dutch Agrarian Law from 1870, the 1967 Forestry Law and the latter’s replacement law 
of 1999. Next to the National Land Agency, control over areas that are classified as forest lies with 
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Similar to the PT AP case, most conflicts over land and other resources between local 
communities and private or state-owned companies erupted after the downfall of 
Suharto in 1998 and with the beginning of political decentralisation, regionalisation and 
democratization. These processes also created a more NGO-friendly climate when 
freedom of speech allowed the questioning of political decisions and the articulation of 
local (indigenous) identities and rights. It was the official line of Suharto’s regime that 
Indonesia is a nation which has no indigenous peoples, since all Indonesians are 
equally indigenous. Therefore, the internationally recognised category “indigenous and 
tribal peoples” (as defined by the ILO Convention) has, so far, no direct equivalent in 
Indonesia’s legal system (Li 2000:149; but see the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in 
this volume). The convention takes a practical approach and only provides criteria for 
describing the peoples it aims to protect. Self-identification is considered as a 
fundamental criterion for the identification of indigenous and tribal peoples, along 
with the criteria outlined below in article 1(1) (see also chapters by Göcke and Cabrera 
in this volume): 
a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions 
or by special laws or regulations; 
b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account 
of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions. 
 
(ILO 1989) 
These definitions entail the relation between “indigenous” and the “others” (conceived 
as mainstream society), as well as universal criteria or conditions which should facilitate 
the identification of indigenous peoples.  
The Batin Sembilan in a Historical Perspective 
The Batin Sembilan as indigenous people experienced different relationships with the 
pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial states, during which they were categorised as 
“Kubu”, “Isolated Tribe” or “Children of the Interior” by governmental discourses 
and the sedentary population. In the following section, I will outline how being 
indigenous in Jambi has changed from a negative derogatory category towards a 
category of empowerment that is strategically employed by various actors.  
                                                                                                                                       
the Department of Forestry. The revised 1999 Forestry Law decrees that all forest, and the natural 
richness within it, is under the control of the state (article four), and instructs the central government 
to regulate its management and exploitation (Bakker and Moniaga 2010). 
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The Batin Sembilan (sembilan = nine) themselves trace their origin back to nine 
brothers who ruled along nine rivers in the border region between Jambi and 
Palembang. The nine brothers are said to be the offspring of Raden Ontar, a local ruler 
who is believed to be a descendant of Maruhum Sungsang Romo. According to the 
Batin Sembilan, he was one of the former rulers of Jambi before it became an Islamic 
sultanate in the 15th century. This sultanate is known as Jambi Melayu II. The Melayu 
inhabitants of the sultanate were linguistically and culturally heterogeneous, organised 
through the concept of lineage groups (suku) and associated with a particular territory 
which formed small chiefdoms ruled by local elites (Andaya 1993:16). The political 
structure of the sultanate was rather one of concentric circles of power than 
hierarchically vertically structured. Guillaud (1994) describes the representation and 
governing of space in the sultanate of Jambi as appanages or fiefs, a spatial projection 
of both the royal genealogy and the organisation of the court. Accordingly, all land was 
owned by the sultan, who also held rights over mineral and forest produce. The rights 
of usage were granted or withdrawn by the sultan and a proportion of the yield from 
all cultivated lands held in usufruct had to be delivered to him (Kathirithamby-Wells 
1993). Land was also granted to the suku as communities, but not as individual 
property. Land could be distributed and inherited within these communities, according 
to their adat. Land could neither be sold nor bought.  
Reconstructing the Batin Sembilan’s history that is rooted in those days is rather 
difficult as written sources only start in 1615 when the Dutch and English East India 
Companies arrived in southeast Sumatra (Andaya 1993). These sources present the 
European perspective on local history, whereas local oral traditions were not recorded 
in writing until recently; they certainly shifted over time. Therefore, much of the Batin 
Sembilan’s origin, as well as their status and relation to other ethnic groups and ruling 
elites, are difficult to disentangle. However, the oldest settled communities in Jambi are 
commonly termed as “batin” groups, batin being a title associated with the leaders of 
non-Muslim jungle and sea peoples. The character of these batin groups was 
considerably modified by the penetration of Minangkabau influence (Andaya 1993:14). 
Batin Sembilan as Kubu Bahar 
By the 17th century, territorial lineages still formed the basis of the social organisation 
of the moving clans (suku pindah) scattered over a wide area on the Jambi-Palembang 
border. The names attached to such lineages vary: An 18th century inscription refers to 
them as marga, the term commonly employed in much of the Palembang-Jambi region 
(Andaya 1993:17). This region was registered by the Dutch as Marga Kubustrecken 
(“Koeboestreken”) or Kubu-margas (“Koeboe-marga’s”), which was originally 
inhabited by suku Kubu (van Dongen 1910). “Kubu” was a collective name used by 
the sedentary population to refer to non-Muslim hunter-gatherer bands or shifting 
cultivators who led a more or less nomadic life in the vast forests. The name “Kubu”, 
derived from the Malay word (kubu, mengkuburkan diri) for “hiding” or “retreat”, 
referred to the groups dependent on the forest. Claims by suku to specific stretches of 
territory were often traced back to ancestors in distant times, also by the Kubu:  
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By reliving the peregrinations of their ancestors a kinship group reiterated its 
rights to fish in certain rivers, to hunt the animals and collect forest products in 
a particular area, and to clear the jungle for swidden agriculture. It was in these 
terms in the early twentieth century that the orang kubu, the jungle dwellers of 
the Jambi-Palembang border, traced the origins of their possession of large 
tracts of land in the Lalang district. Kubu in adjoining domains could then see 
themselves as linked through the kinship of their ancestors, who had also laid 
down the territorial boundaries within each group could freely move. 
 
(Andaya 1993:9) 
Forbes (1885) states that nomadic Kubu were roaming in the forests at the borders of 
the Jambi sultanate and Palembang regency, as well as along the banks and tributaries 
of the great rivers Musi and Batang Hari. Kubu groups were named according to the 
main rivers which delineated their territories: Kubu Bulian, Kubu Bahar, Kubu Lalang, 
and Ridan Kubu (Hagen 1908). The Kubu marked their boundaries by planting fruit 
trees (durian, rambutan, etc.). Land was not considered as property, but certain trees, 
especially fruit trees or those used for honey extraction, were (Forbes 1885).  
The sedentary population treated the Kubu, with their nomadic and non-Muslim 
lifestyle, only with contempt. Forbes in the 1880s described the first attempts by the 
Dutch to settle the Kubu in villages and introduce to them a sedentary lifestyle and 
agricultural practice (1885:121, 123). As long as they were not settled, they were 
regarded to be in their “wild” stage (Forbes 1885:121; Hagen 1908:11), and were 
characterised as “overgrown children of the woods” by Forbes (1885:123).8 
The Malay consider the Kubus far their inferiors, a position which the latter 
seem to accept with very marked submissiveness. ‘You Kubu!’ is a term of 
opprobrium which I have often heard applied by one native to another with 
whom he had quarrelled. The village people consider them littler other than 
beasts.  
 
(Forbes 1885:124)  
From the historical sources and the Batin Sembilan’s orally transmitted history, we can 
assume that the Batin Sembilan is one of those groups formerly referred to as Kubu 
Bahar and Kubu Lalang. Today’s plantation occupiers themselves trace back their 
origins to the Kubu Bahar and Kubu Lalang groups. They connect their territorial 
claims to the activities of some heroic ancestor.  
                                                        
8 Colonial administrators and anthropologists were already debating in the late-19th and early-20th 
centuries whether the Kubu were original polytheist proto-Malay people or a degenerated group of 
people who had fled into the forest during wars between different rulers of Jambi and adjacent 
kingdoms.  
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Dutch Rule 
Jambi was finally subjugated by the Dutch in 1906 after several years of guerrilla 
warfare. After the sultan’s death, the colonial administration replaced the former 
political structure of the sultanate. Local adat defining rights and access to land were 
acknowledged only as long the land and other resources were not destined for colonial 
exploitation. Otherwise, such land was categorised as “woeste grond”, that is, not 
productively used land or waste ground, and declared as the property and domain of 
the state (Benda-Beckmann 2005:7). This procedure elided the former adat-based land 
rights and people’s classification of the forests according to the way they were used. 
Instead, “woeste grond” created a no-man’s land, an undifferentiated wilderness that 
should be cultivated and civilised by industrialised plantation agriculture with cash 
crops, such as cacao, coffee, tobacco, and especially rubber. Thus, local concepts of an 
encompassing Lebenswelt were ignored and the western concept of ownership and 
property imposed, which allowed the exploitation of what became categorised as 
“natural resources”.  
In line with the conceptual division of wilderness and civilised cultivation, the 
colonial government continued their efforts to tame and govern the margins and the 
marginalised by settling the “wild Kubu” and tying them to a place in order to govern 
them. In 1905, the village of Muara Bahar at the mouth of the Bahar River was the first 
Kubu settlement in the region, which was established with military force to safeguard 
the borders to Palembang. According to Dutch records, settling of the Kubu 
proceeded as described by Loeb: 
The Kubu live in the partly swampy stretch between the Musi, the Rawas, the 
Tembesi and the Batang Hari. At this date [1935] practically all the Kubu, 
willingly or unwillingly, are united and registered in villages (dusun’s). In 1907 
there were 7,590 Kubu distributed in five sibs (marga’s). […]. While most of 
them have been converted to Islam, this conversion has been in name only. 




The Dutch rule has served the Kubu ethos, so that voluntarily or by force, they 
settled down in villages. How this kind of life is contrary to the Kubu, I heard 
from several people. Moreover, the Kubu have found a clever escape, satisfying 
both the officials and the Kubu individually. Under pressure of officials the 
Kubu built pretty villages, neat huts, in which they live, as was the custom of 
their ancestors, and here they cultivate the crops in their fields. They went to 
the villages as necessity dictated or when a festival was celebrated. 
(Schebesta 1926:3)9 
                                                        
9 Translated by Kummerow and Baer 2005. 
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Civilizing the Kubu was apparently not always successful, and land use continued as 
before. In respect of the land tenure of the Bahar Kubu, Keereweer (1940:368) states 
the “beschikkingsrecht (right to avail – hak ulayat) belongs to the Kubu community. 
They needed a large area, borders were known and safeguarded”.10 In summing up, we 
can state that under Dutch rule, the Batin Sembilan were also marginalised and were 
not acknowledged as owning land as this was appropriated by the colonial state.  
After Independence and New Order  
After Indonesia reached independence in 1945, a new category for communities like 
the Kubu was created by the Indonesian government. The Batin Sembilan, still called 
Kubu, were, like other communities all over Indonesia, defined as suku terasing  
(“isolated tribes”), then as masyarakat terasing (“isolated communities”) and, finally, as 
komunitas adat terpencil (KAT; “traditional remote community”; Depsos 2003). Forest 
dwellers such as the Batin Sembilan were judged as being highly dependent on natural 
resources and isolated from development and progress. Thus, their way of life was 
associated with backwardness and ignorance (Saudagar 2002:i). The Social Department 
stated that a big gap and a lot of difference exist between the value system of the local 
culture and those of the people (i.e. “mainstream” Indonesian) outside of the 
traditional remote community (Depsos 2003:10). State policies tried to minimise these 
differences by forcing remote communities into modernising and development 
programmes, where attempts were made to teach moral and religious values, as well as 
a sedentary lifestyle and agricultural practices. Starting in 1973, more than 6,000 Batin 
Sembilan in the Bahar region were officially settled by the Social Department. 
Nevertheless, as already experienced under Dutch rule, most of the Batin Sembilan 
returned to their former ways of life inside the still forested areas as long as this was 
tolerated.  
Batin Sembilan and Landless Peasants becoming “Indigenous”  
As already briefly outlined, the Batin Sembilan have been a marginalised community 
for centuries who were never acknowledged by sovereigns to possess land as their own 
property. Their land tenure was either connived or ignored and violated. Who is the 
SAD 113 community that now claims land to be tanah adat of the Batin Sembilan? 
The SAD 113 group derives its name from being “Suku Anak Dalam”. They trace 
their origin back to three ancestral Batin Sembilan villages (dusun) that had been located 
inside the plantation area.  SAD 113 was founded in 2003 and, at that time, claimed 
113 ha of customary land: The spokesman of SAD 113 is Pak Bebas (pseudonym), 
who traces his genealogy back to ancestors who originally inhabited the Bahar region 
(see above). The group consisted of about 530 families in 2012, but the majority of 
these families could not prove autochthonic origin. They are mostly of Javanese origin 
and have either married a spouse from a local Batin Sembilan family or claim to be 
                                                        
10 Whether beschikkingsrecht can be translated as “hak ulayat” is discussed by legal scholars, see e.g. 
Soesangobeng (2012b).  
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members of an extended family and friends of the autochthonous Batin population. 
The descent system of the Batin Sembilan is bilateral and a member (whether male or 
female) of another ethnic group who marries a Batin Sembilan is acknowledged as 
Batin Sembilan. Land tenure is inherited by sons and daughters equally. This system 
allows, for example, a Javanese migrant who married a Batin person to call him/herself 
Batin Sembilan and claim access to customary land as regulated by Batin Sembilan adat. 
Accordingly, many strategic marriages take place. 
The SAD 113 who not only claim but also occupy the land of the PT AP are 
supported by various institutions, including political parties as well as NGOs; they 
form a heterogeneous alliance of activists who associate themselves mainly with the 
“new agrarian movement” (Peluso et al. 2008). Each of these outside partner groups 
bring in their own visions and goals which are merged with the original claims of the 
Batin Sembilan producing a new dynamic. In 2012, the SAD 113 requested about 
3,800 ha of land inside the concession; this land should be given the status of an 
“enclave” and then be controlled by the occupiers. Similar to the government’s policy 
of allocating land to transmigrants, the occupiers intend to grant each family 2 ha.11 
Since the occupied land is already planted with harvestable oil palms and the activists 
do not plan to change the crops, the families would become owners of individual oil 
palm plots, thus participating as smallholders in the agribusiness.  
The occupiers are supported by the People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat 
Demokrat – PRD),12 an Indonesian left-wing political party. By using anti-neoliberal 
rhetoric, this party demands that all natural resources shall be used for the welfare of 
the Indonesian people. The National Peasant Union (Serikat Tani Nasional –STN) is 
affiliated with the PRD, supports farmers in land struggles and is one of the leaders of 
the agrarian movement.13 STN is actively coordinating the organisation of the SAD 
113 in Jambi. With the support of STN, the SAD 113 set up an infrastructure and a 
central camp inside the plantation area with a meeting place also functioning as office. 
Everybody who wants to enter the camp from the main road has to pass a security 
post which is painted in the PRD’s party colours and is decorated with the PRD’s and 
STN’s flags and symbols.  
The unifying moment between the indigenous Batin Sembilan and the agrarian 
movement is the claim for land, either as ancestral territory linked to a local ethnic 
identity or for the landless people, such as Javanese who spontaneously immigrated to 
the area, who as an economic and social class strive for social justice and economic 
participation. In response to the demands of SAD 113 and also based on the criteria of 
RSPO and articles 16-32 of UNDRIP, PT AP argues that SAD 113 community 
members are mostly not SAD, that is, indigenous people in a narrower sense. They, 
therefore, tried to identify the genealogies of the occupiers in order to check whether 
                                                        
11 The remaining land will probably be managed by the supporting activists together with the SAD 
113. 
12 The PRD had previously existed as the People’s Democratic Union, which was established in 1994. 
13 A few years before the fall of Suharto demonstrations, strikes and other forms of action against the 
regime in Indonesia increased. These demonstrations and strikes were led by several organisations, 
which started their activities around 1993-1995. Some of these organisations were the STN. 
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they can prove a long-standing relationship with the area and, thus, are legitimised to 
make claims on behalf of RSPO criteria.  
The SAD 113, not least through the activities of the STN, strategically use criterial 
and relational aspects in defining their indigeneity to facilitate the inclusion of non-
indigenous activists as well. The activists’ self-identification not as Batin Sembilan, but 
as Suku Anak Dalam (SAD) is of great significance. 
SAD is a politically correct but, at the same time, more powerful synonym for 
KAT or “Kubu” (Departement Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1985:26). Following the 
pan-Indonesian indigenous organisation AMAN, the term KAT (komunitas adat terpencil, 
or traditional remote community) was replaced by the name “masyarakat adat” 
(traditional community). Masyarakat adat is translated as “indigenous people” and 
allows them to ally with the international indigenous peoples’ movements. SAD, 
therefore, explicitly refers to masyarakat adat and the distinctive international attention 
indigenous communities receive; they are, as Tyson called it, different and “special” 
(Tyson 2011) and, therefore, appeal to the category of “indigenous” as defined by the 
ILO convention and used in UNDRIP. 
 
 
Batin Sembilan graveyard inside PT AP oil palm plantation. Photo: Stefanie Steinebach 2012
  
In contrast, the name Batin Sembilan implies not first and foremost indigeneity, but 
rather defines the community’s place in history and the changing socio-cultural 
landscapes and ruling dynasties over centuries. The term rather links the Batin 
Sembilan in a positive way to the sedentary general populace, than differentiates and 
distinguishes them from the latter.  
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The strategic self-identification as SAD in the context of land disputes with PT AP is a 
political positioning that relates local claims to global discourses. At the same time, the 
self-identification as SAD combined with the Batin Sembilan’s inclusive systems of 
kinship, makes being SAD a homogenising and inclusive category. The cultural 
differences, once highlighted by the Depsos 2003, were de-emphasised in favour of a 
unified political positioning vis-à-vis the nation state. This unification is provided with 
its own particular history. Pak Bebas also insisted on the use of the term SAD, as it 
reduces cultural differences and hierarchies between Batin Sembilan and “others”. He 
states: 
There are many groups of SAD, but we all can be traced back to the same 
ancestors – in former times it was the time of the depati, Depati Sending 
Ketanoh, Depati Jentikan [the Batin Sembilans political authorities are called 
depati]. This was some time ago, well, we do not like to be called Kubu now, 
but Suku Anak Dalam. Why SAD? Because we used to have a religion, we used 
to have settlements, we lived an appropriate life. During the colonisation by the 
Dutch and the Japanese [during the Second World War], we ran into the forest 
because we did not want to be colonised. Colonised – we did not want to be, so 
our ancestors gathered in the forest where we again established a village in this 
forest – ha, that’s our history. 
We own the absolute authority (sovereignty) here – I said we will fight for our 
land but actually we are fighting for the self-confidence of the Suku Anak 
Dalam because in 1986 we were expelled by the [oil palm] company. I know the 
history; there existed villages, graveyards that were destroyed by the company. 
Who cares if the name [of the company] was PT BDU or PT Asiatic a few years 
ago if we can still see durian trees, graveyards…Before the Dutch colonisation, 
we already had our villages here. Bahar was the oldest settlement of all. 
 
(Pak Bebas August 2012) 
In this statement, some of the frictions, fractions and contradictions in the 
construction of a local indigenous identity according to global criteria are revealed: Pak 
Bebas self-confidently dissociates himself from the “Kubu” they once were according 
to historical sources. He emphasises the SAD similarity with the sedentary majority 
population and the “appropriate” lives (in the government’s sense of the term) their 
ancestors had led. Paradoxically, by doing so, he inadvertently erases the historical 
characteristics of being “Kubu” from which today’s occupiers originally draw their 
legitimation of claiming the once forested territory. This also means that the 
differences between the SAD and the non-SAD are eradicated and, therefore, the 
differences that would grant the SAD the privilege of the special others, the 
“indigenous”, are negated.  
For Pak Bebas, the social (re-)integration of the marginalised SAD in the national 
mainstream society and the acknowledgement of political sovereignty over land are 
another goal he wants to achieve. In this context, it does not matter whether the 
group’s ancestral villages and settlements were established before, during or after 
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colonial rule. The SAD’s shared attitude towards the former colonisation when they 
resisted by fleeing into the forest seems to be more important. This resistance against 
colonisation also unites the SAD with the sedentary majority of the Jambinese 
population who actively opposed the Dutch. This explanation given by Pak Bebas also 
links the SAD to the nationalistic anti-colonisation rhetoric of the STN. 
When I attended a community meeting in the central camp in August 2012, people 
were busy installing posters of the young (socialist) president Sukarno (who was 
forcibly succeeded by the rightist New Order regime in 1965). He was shown in 
military uniform; a slogan against colonialism and for the freedom of the Indonesian 
people was written across the picture; beneath was the text: “Let’s practice article 33 of 
the 1945 Indonesian constitution”. This article on the national economy and social 
welfare states in paragraph (3) that the land, the waters and the natural resources within 
shall be under the powers of the state and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the 
people. After the ceremonial opening of this meeting, the community was asked to 
stand up and sing the “lagu darah juang” (a political battle song challenging the Suharto 
regime) with raised left fists.  
Anti-colonial rhetoric is an important element in claiming peasants’ rights. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the category of the “peasant” used 
in this political context and to distinguish it from a “cultivator” (who, for example, 
practices shifting cultivation) or from a (rather entrepreneurial) “farmer”. Nevertheless, 
the nomadic Kubu once practiced shifting cultivation, a form of production that 
differentiated them from the sedentary peasants who practised intensive wet rice 
agriculture. This reclassification of the SAD’s economic activities, and the subsuming 
of different livelihood systems under the name of a single mode of production 
(“peasants”), facilitates the overcoming of (cultural) differences and the creation of a 
single political category – the peasant class. Here again, contradictory and conflicting 
versions of history are employed to create a unifying and powerful local identity. 
 The “peasant” is understood by the STN and in accord with the PRD as a pre-
industrial social and economic category that suffered from various impacts of colonial 
oppression and capitalism. In the context of land occupation, being a peasant is 
associated with being part of a class struggle against unjust economic conditions. Later 
during the meeting, the head of the local STN branch commented on the importance 
of supporting the indigenous claims for customary land: 
We have to evoke feelings – a feeling of ownership! This is what Pak Bebas said 
– this is tanah adat ualyat. In the moment we say this is our customary land, we 
are fighting for our customary land which was stolen by PT BDU in 1986 which 
then changed its name to PT Asiatic (Asiatic Persada). Today we continue to 
come back to our home villages of origin of which we are the heirs. This means, 
we say we are getting ready, we prepare ourselves, all we different groups or the 
members of the SAD. Because this land is our property (milik kita); we do not 
steal or rob it from Asiatic, but we will come back to our villages of origin. We 
will set up shelters and huts, and, in the near future, maybe we will build a nice 
meeting hall. We will invite all the peasants or SAD groups to set up guard 
posts… 
78 Stefanie Steinebach 
 
By taking up Pak Bebas’ statement, the STN’s speaker also explicitly establishes a 
connection between the SAD and the non-indigenous population. The “different 
groups” mentioned by the speaker should unite in their struggle for access to land that 
was unrightfully taken from them. All the SAD are victims; victims of the Indonesian 
state. Pak Dedi (pseudonym), the STN’s speaker, continued: 
 
We do not only fight for our customary land but also for the self-confidence of 
the SAD. Ninety-nine per cent of the SAD are illiterate, but the government 
does not care, they do not care for the SAD. If the government does not care 
about the SAD it is not our fault, but the fault of the government. The SAD 
have always been peasants. They just did not have the right technology to 
become successful. 
 
(Pak Dedi, STN Jambi) 
Conclusion 
Land tenure conflicts, such as the SAD 113 versus PT AP case, are the outcome of 
struggles over the acknowledgement and allocation of rights, local history, power, and 
ideologies; they lead to changing patterns of inequality (Peluso 2012) in respect of land 
access and economic welfare. The peculiarity of this case lies in the heterogeneous 
composition of the activists whose ideologies, political experience and strategies and, 
therefore, also their access to power originally differed. In the course of their fight for 
land, which brought these different groups – autochthonous people, landless 
immigrants, the STN (and also NGOs) – together, these groups merged, resulting in 
what they named as the SAD 113. Their common goal, which eclipsed cultural 
differences, is to get access to productive land and receive a tract of land, a plot of oil 
palm plantation, as land to allocate and manage according to their own will. Through 
the concept of indigeneity, as promoted by international conventions and subsequently 
by NGOs, their claims have gained attention and recognition. The Batin Sembilan, not 
least through their documented history in the contested area, as I have shown above, 
certainly fit the global category of indigenous peoples; they fulfil the criteria as 
described by the ILO convention 169 and others. It is the distinction of being 
“indigenous” in an international sense that makes them something “special”. However, 
the Batin Sembilan are only one part of the SAD 113 Additionally, their marriage 
patterns (bilateral descent) which easily allow the integration of “foreigners” promote 
anything but boundedness and exclusivity. They allow the alliance with members of 
other communities, such as landless immigrants, and support from the STN. 
Therefore, other members of the SAD 113 are landless cultivators who sail under the 
flag of the peasant movement. These claimants argue on behalf of the national 
Indonesian constitution which states in article 33 “that the land, the waters and the 
natural resources within shall be under the powers of the state and shall be used to the 
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greatest benefit of the people”. They understand it as the national citizens’ and, 
therefore, everybody’s right to gain access to land for their own use. In the struggle for 
land, discourses of indigeneity argue with the distinctiveness of territorialised culture, 
often opposing the nation state. The landless peasants’ discourse refers to their rights 
as citizens as defined by the state. While applying these discourses of indigenous and 
peasant, both seem contradictory at first glance, especially when claiming the same 
piece of land, as in the Bahar region. However, these discourses or peasant and tribal 
allegories (Tsing 2003) are not necessarily filled by the local activists. The Batin 
Sembilan do not want to be indigenous tribal people different from others; they see 
themselves, nowadays, as sedentary farmers like others who are not Batin Sembilan, 
and as displaying an identical culture. They also expect to gain access to land which will 
mostly be planted with the boom crop – oil palms. 
Taking into account the international discourses on human rights and indigenous 
peoples that acknowledge these minorities as subjects with rights that should be 
protected against the laws of the nation state, legal pluralism becomes another 
dimension in which customary law is defended against national law. By applying the 
global category of indigenous people, the SAD 113 group makes use of it for their 
economic empowerment and a strategic positioning. It legitimates not only the 
occupation of the plantation, but also the creation and occupation of a third space, one 
that is between discourses. The SAD 113 have developed a rhetoric of inclusion 
uniting territorialised culture and landless class by explicitly referring to common 
citizenship. This leaves room for manoeuvres that do not fit the categories of 
indigeneity or of landless peasants, but is an expression of strategies of unification: 
Peasants become indigenous and the indigenous are included in the peasant class. This 
new identity as a “class of indigenous peasants” makes the Bahar region a new frontier 
of land control where national notions and global discourses of land ownership and 








Being Wana, Becoming an “Indigenous People”. 
Experimenting with Indigeneity in Central Sulawesi  
 
 
Tracing the trajectories of indigeneity should be 
about enablement and not endless deconstruction. 
 




The often quoted revival of adat (custom or tradition) in Indonesia is closely related to 
the international movement of indigenous peoples. The latter invoked the former. The 
Wana of Central Sulawesi decided to become indigenous in 2011,1 but did they also 
decide to become part of an international movement?  
                                                        
1 While some data here apply more generally to Wana of Central Sulawesi, in the following I am 
concentrating on Wana living in and around Taronggo and Salisarao, Kecamatan Bungku Utara, 
Morowali.  I have carried out fieldwork in this area for a total of about fourteen months, spread over 
a period of three years. I am deeply grateful to the members of the Wana communities in that area 
for their hospitality and patience, as well as to the residents of Taronggo. 
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Wana only recently became involved in the politics of the so-called masyarakat adat 
(adat communities) movement.2 The ongoing threat of land loss and forced 
resettlement, historically a well-known state of distress for Wana, led to new network-
building with a local NGO from Palu, the province’s capital. This fresh-born relation 
initiated a novel form of agency, so far unknown to Wana. The embracement of their 
status as masyarakat adat brought with it a new vocabulary and attitude towards their 
status as a marginalised people, leading, on the one hand, to what might be called 
empowerment, but, on the other hand, causing several new forms of conflict. In this 
contribution, I will focus precisely on the politics of becoming masyarakat adat, its 
effects and complications, and how its outcome is deeply entangled with the religious 
beliefs and experiences of marginalisation. Based on field work conducted before and 
after the Wana redefined themselves as masyarakat adat, I will pay special attention to 
the dynamics of this change and reveal several complexities of what “empowerment 
through indigeneity” can mean.  
At its beginning, the global movement of indigenous peoples was mainly formed 
in those countries that are dominated today by people of European descent, so-called 
settler societies. It was not until the 1990s that the global movement, with its roots in 
America and Australia, spread to Asia and Africa. However, the revival of local custom 
as a signifying marker of the indigenous people movement in Indonesia was also 
inaugurated by specific national processes related to the downfall of the Suharto 
regime in 1998 and the concurring democratisation and decentralisation. Furthermore, 
historical circumstances forming and extending the meanings of adat added to the 
specificity of Indonesia’s indigenous people movement. Last but not least, following 
Henley and Davidson (2008), it was the poor conditions under which minority groups 
had to face a marginalised standing under the politics of Suharto’s New Order regime. 
Due to these reasons, it would be too easy to reduce Indonesia’s adat revival to part of 
an indigenous movement that is primarily formed and directed through international 
discourse – on the contrary: “the current interest in adat is not just a national offshoot 
[…]. The revival also reflects a specifically Indonesian ideological tradition in which 
land, community and custom […] provide the normative reference points for political 
struggles“ (Henley and Davidson 2008:849). One of the main players in the current 
adat movement is AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), founded in 1999 after 
the first nationwide meeting of adat communities in Jakarta. These communities 
initiated AMAN out of their experience of marginalisation, for example, in the form of 
land loss or forced resettlement, during the Suharto era. With AMAN they formed a 
new weapon to fight for their rights, especially land rights, which were neglected and 
violated under the New Order regime. Engaging in the masyarakat adat movement and 
associating with AMAN or other NGOs triggered new, often conflict-laden, processes, 
socio-cultural change and shifting political constellations for these groups. Salisarao 
                                                        
2 I am aware of the fact that it is a critical and in some ways political decision to equate the term 
masyarakat adat with “indigenous people”. However, as Acciaioli, for example, has made clear, it is 
the term used by activists of the Indonesian movement and underlines its global connections. 
Therefore, I will use it in the same way, keeping in mind the inconsistencies and, therefore, 
problematics of using both terms as a synonym for each other (Acciaioli 2007:314). 
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Wana used the apparatus of the masyarakat adat initiative and entered the movement 
for exactly the same reasons: To fight for their land.  
Although there were numerous criticisms attacking overly romanticised pictures of 
indigenous people tied closely to a pristine idea of the environment, in Central 
Sulawesi, as Tania Li has pointed out (2007b), AMAN activists in 2003 were still 
defenders of the popular picture of indigenous groups as the often quoted 
“ecologically noble savages” (Raymond 2007; Redford 1991). Activists stated, 
according to Li, “that there still exist communities in Indonesia living in harmony with 
their environment, possessed of indigenous ecological knowledge” (2007b:343). 
Furthermore, it was added that indigenous groups were sharing communal land tenure 
systems and would rely on independent, democratic forms of traditional autonomy, 
thereby portraying “an oasis in the middle of the desert” (Li ibid). In this sense, the 
idea of indigenous groups in Indonesia as not only “ecologically noble savages”, but 
also “self-organized people” reveals a national context in which the imagination of 
indigeneity is closely connected to local or countrywide experiences. For Li, the 
indigenous people movement or, better, the masyarakat adat idea  
 
presented […] the direct inverse of everything that was problematic about New 
Order development: individualism, greed, ecological destruction, an emphasis 
on modernity understood as Westernisation, control by international financial 
institutions, burdensome debt, and the loss of national economic, political, and 




Of course, the problem behind these assumptions, in local as well as in international 
debates, is complex. While Li speaks about the “difficulty of locating the perfect adat 
subject” (Li 2007b), the same accounts for global discourse, where a general definition 
of indigenous people is a highly political and tricky issue (see the chapters by Göcke 
and Cabrera, this volume; see also Dove 2006; Hodgson 2002; Kuper 2003; Pelican 
2009), leaving “anthropologists anxious about the concept” (Dove 2006:194) of 
indigeneity itself. This anthropological “over-concern” concerning the definition of 
indigeneity led Dove to the following question: “What do we make of the 
extraordinary coincidence that anthropology (and the social sciences) began to critique 
the concept of indigeneity at the very time that it was being legitimised by mainstream 
global organizations like the United Nations and the International Labour 
Organization?” (Dove 2007:147-148).  
In this essay, I will try, therefore, to avoid a discussion of what the adat movement 
means on a national or international scale or in terms of definition. Instead, I will focus 
on the “art and politics of being Wana, becoming masyarakat adat”, a phrase I have 
borrowed in part from Jane Atkinson, who worked among northern Wana and wrote 
the ingenious monograph “The arts and politics of Wana shamanship” (1989), as well 
as from Dorothy Hodgson with her recent book on Maasai indigeneity titled “Being 
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Maasai, becoming indigenous” (2011). In combining these two titles, the current theme 
of recent Wana involvement in a movement becomes apparent and makes clear their 
ongoing positioning (Hodgson 2011) between culture and discourse.  
The debate on indigeneity and, to quote Li, “the discourse of adat is a political 
force” (2007b:338). Adat can be an important source of power for historically 
marginalised people, as the Wana of Central Sulawesi are. One first must get access to 
this political force, however, and then must learn to handle it. It is a force Wana people 
did not possess until recently. As swidden farmers living in the uplands of Central 
Sulawesi, the Wana are often described as “primitive” people who “better fit the bill” 
(Li 2000:162) of the “real indigenous”. They could probably easily be described as a 
“perfect adat subject” (see above). However, they were not spotted by the brokers of 
the indigenous people’s movement until recently.  
The process of reframing their identity, which was based for so long on ethnicity 
and religion, to embrace a new identity as indigenous people (Hodgson 2011:3) is 
rather a current process whose effects are not fully assessable at this point.  
Ethnographic Setting 
The Wana ethnic group is located in Central Sulawesi, living in an area covering the 
realms of three administrative districts (kabupaten): Morowali, Banggai and Poso. Most 
people talking about the Wana ethnic group in Kabupaten Morowali generally refer to 
those Wana living in the Cagar Alam Morowali (Nature Reserve) – the largest nature 
reserve in Central Sulawesi, covering an area of 225,000 ha of the eastern peninsula. 
The anthropologist Michael Alvard describes those Wana living in the upland area of 
the Cagar Alam in an article from 2000 as “rather remote” compared to their coastal 
neighbours: “They have maintained relative isolation from much of the outside world, 
and most adults speak no or very little Indonesian, have little or no interaction with the 
cash economy, and maintain a traditional religious belief system” (Alvard 2000b:429). 
More than ten years after Alvard’s research, I was confronted with a different picture. 
Isolation was still a matter for consideration, but mainly for geographic and 
infrastructural reasons. Wana living inside the Cagar Alam frequently visit villages 
outside its boundaries, mainly to sell resin or rattan. The resin trade has a long history 
for Wana (Atkinson 1989:264) and plays an important part in their current economy, 
effecting intense interaction with people outside the nature reserve.  
Although the amount of research focusing on the Wana remains low,3 the attention 
paid by outsiders towards Wana inside the reserve is noteworthy: A number of tourists, 
                                                        
3 Apart from Jane Atkinson, who did research in the Upper Bongka region, and Michael Alvard, who 
conducted research on hunting practices and sustainability among Wana of Posangke (2000a; 2000b), 
an M.A. thesis by Cynthia Riccardi (1999) deals with agriculture among the Wana of Kayupoli, 
focusing mainly on the documentation of the swidden cycle. Additionally, there are two short articles 
by the environmental activist and current governmental representative Jabar Lahadji dealing with 
minority rights and the impact of reserve zones on the Wana (1999; 2008). The extensive work by the 
Dutch missionary Albert Kruyt, published in 1930, offers highly valuable insights in historical 
conditions among the Wana (Kruyt 1930). Regarding literature on my specific research area, there is 
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tourist guides, a local NGO, documentary filmmakers,4 and anthropologists have 
occasionally been visiting Wana within the reserve. Nevertheless, visitors generally 
almost never concentrate on Wana living outside the reserve’s borders. One such area 
is Salisarao, located east of Kayupoli and south of Posangke (both Wana settlements 
within the reserve) and north of the village of Taronggo. Salisarao Wana, although 
conveniently located for tourist interest, i.e. only a couple of kilometres hiking upland 
from road-accessed Taronggo, have never before been visited by non-Indonesians, nor 
do Indonesians pay attention to the area. An informant from Kolonodale told me that 
Salisarao Wana were “too modern” for tourist or NGO means and are believed to 
“have moved away too far from their ancestors’ way of living”. This is a common 
argument tied to the indigeneity discourse, where “the spurious calculus of authenticity 
and cultural purity” denies an indigenous status to those who do not fit the 
“stereotypical ‘feathers-and-beads’ expectations [and who] often find themselves 
stigmatised as ‘half-breeds’, ‘assimilated’, or even ‘imposters’” (Cadena and Starn 
2007a:9). My source referred to the opportunity for Wana living outside the reserve’s 
borders to be able to engage in a different agricultural system, for example, growing 
cash crops, coconut trees or, more recently, cocoa, since the nature reserve’s 
                                                                                                                                       
only the work by Alvard on the Posangke area; no research has yet been conducted on Salisarao or 
Taronggo.  
4 The filmmakers Gerard Nougarol and Martine Journet have produced a number of outstanding 
documentaries on Wana shamanship, for example, “Indo Pino” (2002) and “Gods and Satans” 
(2004).  
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restrictions do not apply to them. Their involvement in cash crop cultivation and the 
decreasing importance of the “traditional” swidden farming cycle has led outsiders, 
such as the source in Kolonodale, to come to the conclusion that Salisarao Wana are 
less “backward” than their semi-nomadic neighbours within the reserve. Planting cash 
crops seems to have a significant impact on perceptions of indigeneity. As Li states for 
the Lauje in the Western part of Central Sulawesi, growing cocoa has turned them 
from “primitives” into “‘real farmers’ building up a long-term investment” 
(2002b:421). Since cocoa has “the lure of modernity” (Li 2002b:421), Salisarao Wana 
have become for some, i.e. tourists, their inner-reserve relatives, or, as the source 
stated above, too modern.  
Marginalisation 
For others, however, such as their neighbours living in the lowlands or state officials, 
Salisarao Wana still remain in the marginalised stance they experienced even before 
colonial times (Atkinson 1979; Kruyt 1930). Explanations can be found in a 
multiplicity of reasons, all related to each other and of relevance to the Indonesian adat 
discourse. One reason is religious affiliation. According to state ideology, adherence to 
one of the six officially recognised “world-religions” functions as a marker of modern 
citizenship; religion is further “associated in nationalist culture with education, 
cosmopolitan orientation, sophistication, and progress” (Atkinson 1979:688). 
Moreover, “Wana failings to match the ideal of a progressive citizenry are summed up 
for nationalist Indonesians in the fact that the Wana lack a religion” (Atkinson 
1979:688). Most upland Wana have successfully managed to resist conversion attempts 
with which they were confronted from the colonial side, lowland neighbour side or 
contemporary missionaries. In addition, as Saputra insists: “[H]ome grown animism 
has always been given a devil’s image” (Saputra 2012). In this regard, religious 
conversion to either Christianity or Islam is an important matter for perceptions of 
“civilizatory modernity”, since Taronggo, the geographically closest full administrative 
village, is inhabited by an interreligious community, where non-converted Wana, Wana 
who have converted to a “world religion”, and other Christians and Muslims live 
together.5 In this interreligious context, Atkinson’s analysis of how Wana religion is 
shaped alongside this outside pressure, although written long before the downfall of 
Suharto’s regime, remains meaningful today: Wana 
are acutely aware of and sensitive to the way they are regarded by others more 
powerful than themselves. What they call agama [religion] Wana represents a 
self-consciously constructed response to the judgments of the dominant society.  
                                                        
5 In the following I will use the term Wana from a religious perspective. There are also Christian and 
Muslim Wana living in Taronggo, but in this essay, I will apply the term only to those Wana who 
have so far resisted religious conversion.  
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This response builds on the images of what constitutes a religion that the Wana 
have received in their dealings with Muslims and Christians.  
 
          (Atkinson 1988:53) 
Apart from Salisarao Wana’s reliance on their belief, an important aspect distinguishing 
between “modern” and “backward” citizens remains the reliance of most Wana on 
swidden agriculture, their non-centralised housing situation, their language and their 
lack of proficiency of Bahasa Indonesia, the official state language, and their remote 
location. Hence, Salisarao Wana can easily be described as an “indigenous group”.  
By the time I entered the field in 2010, it seemed that Wana had not heard of the 
opportunity of empowerment by claiming status as indigenous people. They presented 
themselves to me, the anthropologist, as a marginalised people who had no chance of 
overcoming their status. Of course, Wana had and have their own strategies of 
resistance, their own “weapons of the weak” to speak with Scott’s words (1985). But 
their resistance was a rather subtle notion of “tentative resistance” (Scott 1998:289); it 
was an everyday form of boycotting or ignoring government or other institutions that 
were disadvantageous to Wana.  
Wana in the uplands, as well as Wana living in the interreligious community of 
Taronggo, never seemed to openly challenge the government or other oppressors; they 
showed no obvious motivation to directly and openly oppose the processes of 
marginalisation. Avoidance of direct confrontation seemed to be a historically 
congruent matter among Wana.  
The Dutch missionary Albert Kruyt, who wrote an early account on the Wana 
(1930), and Jane Atkinson came to the conclusion that the Wana were historically 
generally rather “shy victims” than heroes: 
Timidity [among the Wana] had its roots in the endemic regional warfare of the 
nineteenth century. In the regional game of headhunting the Wana were often 
the heads, the victims of neighboring peoples [...]. Although the imposition of 
Dutch rule in the region at the beginning of this century put an end to raiding, it 
inaugurated a new form of local terrorism.  
 
 (Atkinson 1989:263)  
In this last sentence, Atkinson refers to Wana resettlements forced by the various 
governments – a fact already mentioned by Kruyt:  
The To Wana have been a much disturbed folk. […] Peace did not become 
their share either, when the [Netherlands] government put its powerful hand on 
them. In the beginning of the occupation the administrative government 
supposed that these shy people would get to know order and law most easily if 
they were forced to live near the coast. But the people did not wish that with 
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the result […] that many patrols of soldiers were sent repeatedly into this land 
to draw the people down to the coast. […]  
The misery of these people must have been great. Of those who had let 
themselves be forced to settle near the coast, many died.   
 
 (Kruyt 1930:403-4, translated by A.G.) 
Forced resettlements remain a government objective which Wana are all too much 
aware of; I will return to this aspect later. Pressure experienced through the colonial 
government still plays a major part in historical accounts shared by the Wana today. 
Atkinson describes Wana “timidity” as rooted in early warfare activities. Historical 
experiences of being disadvantaged during fighting regimes led to an open self-
victimisation: “Wana openly acknowledge their cowardice as a people” (1989:262).  
“Timidity” has remained an important point of self-reference, embodied in a self-
marginalisation process deeply entangled with a millenarian cosmological perspective. 
In the following section, I will elaborate further on cosmological narratives to 
demonstrate why the Wana are reluctant to resist.   
Cosmological Narratives 
In Wana cosmological narratives, also called katuntu (Wana language, called Bahasa 
Taa: BT), it becomes clear how important the current state of marginality is for their 
prospective future.6 The Wana see their land as the navel of the world, pusen tana (BT). 
Pusen tana is, furthermore, the source of baraka (BT, power), kasugi (BT, wealth) and 
pagansani (BT, knowledge). In the past, it is told, there was a golden age, called tempo 
baraka (BT) – a time of magical and powerful knowledge when the Wana region was 
inhabited by the taw baraka (BT), powerful people. All Wana were able to access and 
use these sources of power through, as Atkinson has shown, wali m panto’o (BT), 
meaning “the becoming of the word” in Atkinson’s translation (1989:43). One would 
just need to close his or her eyes, for example, speak the spell adi adi (BT) and the 
wished-for object would appear (see also Atkinson 1989:43). However, in Atkinson’s 
words, “the golden age was not to last”. One day, a special group of Wana, the taw 
baraka, decided to leave the earth and go to another place at the end of the world. 
Their departure ended the golden era. The taw baraka took with them the attributes of 
the golden era: power, wealth and knowledge (and, depending on the story-teller, 
clothes and/or a book).  
Their departure demarcated the end of the Golden Age and opened up a new age 
of poverty where “powerful knowledge is no longer a commonplace but limited to a 
very few”, and ordinary Wana were left behind, “powerless, poor and limited in their 
                                                        
6 Atkinson (1989:44) calls these stories of a time when wishes would become true katuntu. During my 
research, the meaning of katuntu appeared to be extended to all stories of a magical and powerful 
past.  
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access to knowledge” (Atkinson 1989:44). Magical knowledge, wealth or power were 
no longer accessible to the Wana people. Therefore, Wana often present themselves 
today as a poor and pitiful people, caught in a marginal stance.  
Nevertheless, there is hope. The Wana believe that one day, their powerful allies, the 
taw baraka, will return to pusen tana and introduce a new Golden Era for them. In the 
meantime, it is essential for Wana not to break out of their current state of misery. 
Only those Wana who remain in the current powerless state of pity and have not 
converted to another religion will be rewarded by the returning taw baraka (see also 
Atkinson 1989:44).  
In this cultural construction, marginality is cosmologically constituted as a 
temporary condition. A breakout is, however, possible with the help of the taw baraka, 
expected to come back one day. This explanation becomes crucial for the marginalised 
status of the Wana when talking about resistance and empowerment, as I will show in 
the following. Furthermore, this condition as pitiful people, continuously displaying 
their own people with the words kita taw be’a, meaning something similar to “we are a 
stupid people”, is another explanation for Wana “timidity”, or at least for their 
reluctance concerning open resistance strategies.7 
Organised or open resistance, in accounts told by my informants, was not a matter 
of concern in Salisarao or Taronggo meetings. Instead, the refusal to meet with state 
officials or missionaries, returning to, staying in or hiding in the upland regions were 
the common strategies to deal with outside pressure. Pratt highlights the role of 
physical isolation in this relation: “Remoteness, when activated as a force, almost 
inevitably translates into difference and a perceived absence of assimilation. It can also 
generate a narrative of refusal of a presumed invitation to assimilate” (2007:402).  
Nevertheless, this pattern was soon to change. By the year 2011, during my 
research stay, the Salisarao Wana were confronted with the danger of land loss and the 
urgent pressure from the local government to resettle to a centralised village. These 
risky developments inaugurated the process of becoming “indigenous”, or what can 
also be called becoming masyarakat adat.  
A Chronology of Becoming Indigenous 
Similar to many other regions in Indonesia, Central Sulawesi is home to a growing 
number of palm oil companies among many others. PT Kurnia Luwuk Sejati, a 
national palm oil company from the Eastern part of Central Sulawesi (Luwuk, 
Kabupaten Banggai), has continuously bought land in the area around Taronggo, 
beginning in 1997/8. Nesting between the mountainous uplands to the north, the 
Cagar Alam to the west and partly east, as well as a river and other settlements to the 
east, Taronggo today is encapsulated in an oil palm plantation, reaching out from the 
south. Seen from above, Taronggo appears like an island in an oil palm ocean. 
                                                        
7 Atkinson refers to the strategy of dealing with pressure from outside in the form of fleeing as more 
complex than Kruyt suggested. She points to a more organised form of resistance, also encompassing 
the practice of disappearing into the forest, but backed up by leaders who “were thought to have 
special access to information about the fate of the Wana land” (1989:319).  
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Numerous Wana complain that they have been illegitimately disowned from the land 
they were holding around Taronggo. False promises by company and local 
governments left many Wana without any compensation. As a consequence, available 
land had become extremely scarce in the Taronggo area in 2010, though PT Kurnia 
had high intentions for expansion. The new target for plantation development was 
found in the upland area north of Taronggo: the area of Salisarao.  
The company’s and local government’s joint plan became more and more pressing. 
More than 100 Wana households were currently located in the approach region of 
Salisarao. A new project was formulated for those Wana living in Salisaro: All families 
were to be resettled to a new village that was still to be built. The plans were presented 
to me by government officials and company affiliates with great enthusiasm, offering 
Wana the opportunity to live in a modern setting, a village with road access, a school 
and a church. Government and company ignored the fact that Wana living in Salisarao 
were not only practicing swidden agriculture on their land, but had also been 
successfully planting cocoa for more than 15 years. A resettlement would have made 
them landless peasants, left without the opportunity of independent cash crop 
cultivation and/or a subsistence economy. Furthermore, road access was not desired 
by the community, neither was the construction of a church.  
Resettlement programmes in the name of development during the New Order 
regime were a common picture in Indonesia, to quote Li’s account from 1999: “[t]he 
target group is expected to move from isolation and backwardness to the status of 
‘ordinary villagers’ culturally normalised and enmeshed in the regular system of village 
administration and national development” (1999:302). Through the resettlement of 
Salisarao Wana, government and company would have easily killed two birds with one 
stone: Succeeding with the expansion of the plantation (thereby more profit for the 
kabupaten) and letting Wana become part of the Indonesian mainstream, making them 
“civilized people” with all the attending attributes.  
As I mentioned earlier, the Wana have had several historical experiences with 
resettlement programmes. Taronggo itself was built as such an action by the Dutch 
government at the beginning of the 20th century. At the beginning without success: 
Kruyt describes Taronggo as an uninhabited village, a proof of Wana strategies of 
resisting resettlement initiatives by the colonial government: “This new village, and all 
the other villages that I have visited later on, clearly shows that the To Wana have 
remained faithful to their old habit of living scattered on their fields. […] I did not 
even meet a dog or chicken in some villages on my journey through this land” (Kruyt 
1930:406-7; translation A.G.). Up to today, Wana have more or less silently boycotted 
resettlement strategies. A recent resettlement site close to Taronggo, now a part of the 
village called Rio Tinto, was built after a landslide in 2007. However, except for a small 
Christian group that has settled there and has opened up an orphanage for Wana 
people, only two or three Wana families have settled there permanently. Most Wana 
have returned to the uplands, leaving behind an abandoned settlement, a witness to 
failed resettlement goals.  
Nevertheless, this pattern or (successful) strategy of subtle resistance would not 
have worked against the new resettlement plan in 2011. The fear of actual land loss 
made the situation extremely threatening for Salisarao Wana. How could they defend 
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themselves against the (as it seemed) overwhelming power of government and 
company? 
The biggest problem, the Wana stated, was the lack of information about their 
rights to their land. When local government and PT Kurnia officials spread the word 
that the Wana had no legal ownership of their land or their crops, everyone believed it, 
since, and here again I quote Li: “The legal standing of any of these ‘rules’ would 
certainly be disputed by legal experts on customary land rights. But in the absence of 
countervailing knowledge and support, a headman’s bullying is sufficient to unsettle 
villagers who are isolated and unsure of their ground” (Li 2007b:342). 
One might argue that the situation after 1998 should look different, with regional 
autonomy laws actually strengthening local communities. However, authors such as 
Erb et al. argue that decentralisation and regionalism has not always worked in favour 
of masyarakat adat who “are still not being given the kind of autonomy that they desire, 
to design and arrange their own culture and communities” (2005:150). One example is 
the invention of the BPD (village representative body, Badan Perwakilan Desa), 
mentioned in the regional autonomy law no. 22 of 1999. This group of people is 
supposed to watch over the kepala desa (village head) and to make sure that local 
custom and adat is respected and protected; “to make the rules of the desa; to make 
sure that the needs and desires of the population are heard; and to make sure that the 
local village government acts properly and does its job”.8 By this means, the BPD is an 
attempt to put an end to KKN (abbreviation for corruption, collusion and nepotism) 
and to guarantee local participation. However, Erb et al. give a warning concerning the 
role of the BPD: As a counterpart to the kepala desa, the BPD will remain the target of 
the former, who if “he still wants to be involved in corruption, etc., will do his best to 
keep control of power in the village and obstruct the BPD” (2005:170). To come to 
my point here: The head of the BPD (Ketua BPD) in Taronggo is also the kepala desa’s 
father! So much for the end of KKN in Taronggo. What has changed after the end of 
the New Order regime is the law, but without access to it (or knowledge about it), the 
situation for Salisarao Wana after 1998 had not changed much.  
What was needed was legal advice. The Wana searched for this among their, what 
I call, “powerful friends”. Let me briefly explain why I chose this, I believe, rather 
provocative term. Dorothy Hodgson describes her situation as an anthropologist 
entangled in a Maasai indigenous movement with a position as an interlocutor. She 
does so to refuse a position as a “collaborator”, as Les Field has argued, in an attempt 
to bring together academic working and collaboration with peripheral communities 
(Field 1999:195; see also Hodgson 2011:15). Hodgson, however, describes her 
situation instead as a:  
scholar who shares her ideas and work with Maasai activists and organizations 
in ongoing, constructive, and perhaps, even occasionally contentious dialogues 
and debates in an effort to inform and shape their policies and practices, 
without directly aligning myself with one group or faction of the movement.  
   (Hodgson 2011:15)  
                                                        
8 Law no. 22, Passage 104. Translation taken from Erb et al. (2005:170).  
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With this intention, I fully agree with her positioning as an interlocutor, but during my 
research it became very clear to me that I was not regarded by my informants as simply 
that. The people I met, lived with, engaged in interviews, and so on perceived of me as 
a person with significant power – something they lacked substantially while facing the 
threat of land loss. It was very clear for them that I would serve as their “powerful 
friend” in times of struggle. Aligning myself with one group or one side of the protest 
was a decision that I had to make – but it was also already made for me by my Wana 
interlocutors.  
In the beginning, actual and less subtle resistance started with the idea to make a 
signature list signed by all willing members of Salisarao and Taronggo Wana – an idea 
for which I was responsible. Of course, I was worried about my own positioning as an 
anthropologist, but eventually I was regarded as a person with resources, knowledge 
and networks, hence I answered many questions and tried to help with information the 
best I could. In the end, the signature list was somehow the beginning of “open” Wana 
resistance. What followed were informal gatherings, long discussions with neighbours 
about opportunities and chances. Then finally, the local government and PT Kurnia 
organised a community meeting with Salisarao Wana, initially planned to happen in the 
upland area; but instead, Salisarao Wana pressed for a meeting in lowland Taronggo, 
where they hoped for support from their “more educated” village neighbours. Instead 
of waiting for the officials to hike up to the mountains, Salisarao Wana hiked down to 
meet them in the village community hall. It took a long time waiting for them. It was a 
Sunday and the kepala desa, the elected village head, had spontaneously decided to 
attend the church service with an unofficial gathering afterwards. The word spread that 
he was not brave enough to face his upland citizens within the “realm of the law”. 
People believed an upland meeting would have encouraged kepala desa and the 
company towards further lies and manipulations. The upland as a realm of the 
uncivilised, the primitive, where the state border seems to become blurry and fuzzy, 
would have functioned as lawless, thus stateless, hinterland. In the end, the meeting 
was helped by the severe delay, and had positive consequences: the plan for the 
plantation’s expansion was terminated.  
Nevertheless, although the success was celebrated, Salisarao Wana did not trust the 
decision. As time passed, more and more people became intimidated by the official’s 
“helping hands”. The local head of the company himself told me that the moment I 
returned to Germany, the expansion and resettlement plans would immediately restart 
again. Therefore, due to the ongoing threat of land loss, the Wana searched for more 
“powerful friends”. They found them among the members of the NGO, Yayasan 
Merah Putih.  
During my research stay, I had once mentioned the NGO, Yayasan Merah Putih, 
to my informants. This NGO is located in Palu, Central Sulawesi’s capital, and had 
already been working with Wana from the Bulang area on the northern coast of 
Central Sulawesi. Among other things, they had helped those Northern Wana to fight a 
resettlement plan in that area. Furthermore, they had implemented a special form of 
school to promote at least some education for Wana people in the area, the sikola lipu, 
named after the local word for Wana settlements. This form of school system is self-
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organised by NGO-trained Wana individuals and focuses on basic skills, such as 
reading, writing and mathematics.9 
I mentioned the NGO and its school only in passing, but the interest it raised 
among Salisarao Wana was astonishing. Insufficient education is for Wana people, 
another explanation for their marginalisation. Those Wana living in the mountains are 
too far away from the village infrastructure to be part of the state school system. 
Lowland Wana within the village of Taronggo go to school, but are not very 
enthusiastic about it, since both teacher and the curriculum are very oriented towards 
Christian values. Praying and singing are regarded as tools to press Wana children 
towards religious conversion.  
The idea of a Wana school “free from religion” was stuck in many heads and I 
noticed my interlocutors often kept discussing this topic until sunrise. Finally, in March 
2011, they wrote a short letter to the Yayasan Merah Putih explaining their situation 
with the palm oil company and pleading for further help. Three months later, two 
Wana were invited to meet with the NGO members in Palu. Meanwhile, in July 2011, I 
left for Germany and kept out of the dynamics between the NGO and Wana.  
Suddenly Masyarakat Adat 
By the time I returned to the field in March 2012, something had changed. I was 
welcomed, not by my usual welcome committee, but by “members of a masyarakat 
adat”. I had left the field site with the Wana not knowing what the term masyarakat adat 
actually meant or how it was connected to the indigenous people’s movement. Wana in 
Taronggo and Salisarao had not much of an idea about their rights and how special 
their situation was. Similar to other upland groups in Central Sulawesi, they had not 
heard about a movement in Indonesia, neither had they heard, at least the vast majority 
of them, of AMAN. As Li highlights: “Most Central Sulawesi villagers are not aware of 
definitional debates among activists and scholars taking place in the provincial capital 
Palu and in other urban centers” (2007b:345). To this point, Wana had not been part 
of a political movement of indigenous people, but the new and ongoing interaction 
with Yayasan Merah Putih had made them become part of the movement. Suddenly 
they were masyarakat adat.  
At the time of my return to the field, the enthusiasm of the Wana was great. 
Hiking up through the Salisarao mountains, I was surprised to find magazines and 
leaflets of various NGOs, information material concerning palm oil and indigenous 
groups all over the world in almost every household. Additionally, DVDs on land loss, 
environmental degradation and indigenous rights were watched repeatedly in the 
village. Numerous Wana had participated in meetings with the NGO, and once, even 
the bupati (administrative head of the kabupaten) had welcomed them. At that point, it 
seemed that the plan for the plantation’s expansion in the area of Salisarao had been 
finally terminated. 
                                                        
9 For a description of Bulang Wana (Kabupaten Tojo Una Una) and their entanglement with YMP, 
see the work of Nasution Camang (2003).  
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Among other things, these new developments had in some ways changed some 
people’s impressions of being marginalised. Similar to changes Li had discovered 
during interviews she conducted in 2001 and 2003 with her informants claiming to 
have “‘learned to talk bravely’ from his NGO allies” (Li 2007b:346), many of my 
interlocutors also claimed an improved self-confidence when talking to government 
officials or outsiders, using the Indonesian language, “being able to speak to power” 
(Jackson and Warren 2005:557); although not always fluent, they did not feel as shy 
(mea, BT) as before. Further developments were, for example, that informants stated 
they were no longer afraid of the government, but had now experienced how to 
behave berani (courageous). They had learned about their rights and stated now to 
know how to engage in a discussion with officials. Of course, this was not the same for 
all Wana. Those people who were in closer contact with NGO allies evidently profited 
the most in terms of how to behave and react in discussions with officials, “belajar 
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The most central change came in the form of the so eagerly wished for school sikola 
lipu. The NGO had given in to this urgent wish. On a visit to Taronggo, they had 
trained six locals as teachers in a two-day workshop. Two of them were sent to Palu 
for further training. After that, a group of very enthusiastic Wana had built a large 
house in the Salisarao mountains to be used as a school building. Then finally, in April 
2012, the first day of the new school started. More than 50 children and around 15 
Being Wana, Becoming an “Indigenous People” 95 
 
 
adults arrived, some of them hiking for more than two hours. Scheduled twice or three 
times a week, the school functions as an important sign of self-determination for Wana 
people. For them, it is part of becoming masyarakat adat. It is part of expressing agency.10  
Problems 
Nevertheless, the politics of representation were not without any problems. The 
process of “being Wana, becoming indigenous” led, on the one hand, to some 
empowerment; on the other hand, several new problems occurred. The concept of 
masyarakat adat was or is not understood, imagined and used by Wana people in a 
uniform way. New sources of knowledge and new “powerful friends” led to new 
power constellations. There occurred, for example, a problem between the old leaders 
and the new leaders. Wana who had developed closer ties to the NGO and/or now 
took a position as a new kind of leader are regarded with a sense of distrust by some 
individuals. Their motivations are sometimes unclear to the rest of the community. It 
happened that Wana who had travelled to Palu adopted a new language filled with 
NGO vocabulary that was incomprehensible for their upland families and produced a 
sense of distance.  
Furthermore, former leaders, although respected elders, were worried about their 
status, as they were now often left out of discussions and informal meetings due to 
allegations of corruption. These new developments prompted among some of them a 
repositioning towards government officials, while simultaneously functioning as 
administrative representatives of the suku (BI, ethnic group) Wana. Tyson notes the 
same dynamic: “a return to adat has, in many places, been found to perpetuate 
clientelism by creating ‘opportunities for powerful groups to advance their interests in 
the name of a revival of distinct traditions’’’ (Tyson 2011:660). 
Distrust became, furthermore, a matter of concern related to those teaching at the 
sikola lipu. From the Wana side, the teachers, although most of them Wana themselves, 
are assumed by some to receive money from the NGO, profiting a great deal from the 
school’s institution. This source of jealousy makes the internal solidarity hard to 
sustain. The non-Wana community of Taronggo perceives of Wana teachers as a 
source of trouble. The common opinion in Taronggo is that the school itself is illegal, 
since it has so far not been acknowledged by the state, nor does the curriculum include 
religious teachings.  
Pressure on teachers is very high, especially on converted Wana teachers, who are 
distrusted by non-converted Wana and disapproved of through their Christian or 
Muslim community. During the first four weeks of the school’s inauguration, four of 
the teachers resigned and were replaced by other, non-trained Wana. Religion, 
therefore, remained a matter of concern, although the school was celebrated as a 
sekolah tanpa agama, a school without religion. A number of Wana were suspicious of 
the school and assumed that there was a Christian or Muslim missionary background 
                                                        
10 In addition, YMP and other NGOs are currently working on a PERDA (Peraturan Daerah), a 
regional regulation, for the Kabupaten Morowali, to monitor the protection and recognition of Wana 
people and their rights (see also Li 2007b:346).  
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connected to the school. Wana have historically experienced strong religious pressure 
from their neighbours and the government to convert to Christianity or Islam, as 
mentioned above. Therefore, many Wana still do not fully trust the NGO – or the 
anthropologist – to be free of religious intentions.  
Connected to religious concerns, another worry becomes relevant: Some of my 
informants were reluctant to become involved in the movement due to cosmological 
reasons. Here, I come back to what I introduced at the beginning as the cosmological 
grounds of marginalisation. According to Wana belief, breaking out of their current 
pitiful condition could make the Wana no longer suitable for the expected Golden Age 
predicted in Wana cosmological narratives. Wana who were to become rich and 
powerful, even educated, due to their new empowerment, would no longer fit the bill 
of the pitiful people who are to be rewarded with salvation by their spiritual friends, 
the taw baraka. Some Wana fear they will no longer be proper candidates for the taw 
baraka once they have left marginality behind. This consternation leads to further 
mixed feelings among upland and lowland Wana towards the new political positioning 
as masyarakat adat. Hirtz reminds us that it takes an idea of difference to enter the 
indigeneity category, “it takes modern means to become traditional, to be indigenous” 
(Hirtz 2003:889). It is this modernity that blocks the way towards salvation.  
In this context, another paradox becomes apparent: On the one hand, the solution 
to the current problem lies, according to the movement, in the recognition of being 
masyarakat adat. This implies, however, recognition of the nation-state as such, but: 
“Why should masyarakat adat demand recognition from a state whose claims to 
sovereignty they wish to challenge?” (Li 2001:653). Based on this contradictory appeal, 
the act of playing by the rule of the state, adopting its strategies, the legitimacy of the 
state receives acknowledgment by those who initially had the aim of challenging it (Li 
2001; Tyson 2011). The ambivalence of this potential expected to lie behind the idea of 
recognition (Tyson 2011:670) is further traceable in the difficulty Wana see in 
recognising the state (see above). In their millenarian and experience-based 
perspective, recognition of the Indonesian nation-state has never been a goal of Wana 
political positioning.  
These are just some examples of consequences which occurred entering the 
masyarakat adat movement. Becoming indigenous in Taronggo is a highly political 
decision and its consequences are, up to this moment, not fully visible. The process of 
becoming masyarakat adat saved the Wana from land loss, but led to several new 
problematic constellations. The challenges of being recognised as indigenous are 
manifold.  
Discussion 
The process of becoming indigenous not only produced and produces new power 
constellations among the Wana, but also interethnically and interreligiously. The new 
positioning the Wana have taken is, however, a state of articulation others have made, 
or as Li formulates: “Those who demand that their rights to be acknowledged must fill 
the places of recognition that others provide” (Li 2001:653). In this respect, their 
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repositioning closer towards NGO allies gave them the opportunity to resist the 
resettlement project, which is a common reason in Indonesia to enter the movement. 
It gave them a school to provide education according to their own wishes and needs. 
However, it also meant they would become more visible on the political stage. It 
further meant they could one day break out of their marginalised status. A status they 
need to keep, at least in some sense, to enter their millenarian idea of a new Golden 
Era. This has led to serious concern among Wana families living in the uplands.  
Wana becoming indigenous is a development exemplary for other groups 
becoming part of the indigenous people movement: “Individuals and communities that 
have been attracted to the masyarakat adat movement have found there a language, a 
sense of solidarity, and a set of allies that have helped them articulate and advance their 
claims, especially claims against the state for control over ancestral lands” (Li 
2007b:346). They have not, however, suddenly transformed, as Hodgson states for the 
Maasai, “from peripheral minority groups with little political recognition or power vis-
à-vis their nation-states to transnational activists with formidable international lobbies 
and leverage” (Hodgson 2011:2). Instead, the Wana used an expanding transnational 
structure dedicated to strengthening the position of indigenous people and used it for 
their own needs. They had not heard much about the adat discourse in the past, the 
debate was mainly held in cities and far away from the people it affects. They had no 
idea how it could be applied to them or whether they would count as “indigenous”. 
Nevertheless, in the fight for their land, it became a tool of resistance and a marker of 
a new identity that explained at least part of their marginalisation to them. However, as 
I have outlined, the Wana becoming masyarakat adat led to processes of cultural 
transformation and social change and its full extent has, to this moment in time, not 
yet become assessable.  
Cadena and Starn remind us of the global character that underlines indigeneity; for 
them it “is a worldwide field of governance, subjectivities, and knowledge […]. 
Indigeneity itself materializes in an intricate dynamic among converging and competing 
agendas, visions, and interests that transpire at local, national, and global levels” 
(Cadena and Starn 2007a:12). Albeit indigeneity was and is celebrated by most scholars 
and activists as an international movement, the example of the Wana becoming 
indigenous reveals, in the first place, the importance of actual local aspirations and 
circumstances. Wana had no interest in becoming part of the international or even 
national movement or to become recognised as indigenous. Instead, they were in 
search of allies, “powerful friends” to help them deal with their concrete situation as 
uplander citizens of the Indonesian nation-state that continues to form the political, 
economic and social conditions and preconditions in which Wana have to find, 
rearrange and formulate their positioning.  
The idea of indigeneity in Indonesia emerges through the lure of resisting unequal 
power relations. Sangaji concludes from his insider perspective that, in the case of 
Central Sulawesi, the masyarakat adat initiative “is in the first place a reaction to 
restricted and unjust forms of economic development” (Sangaji 2007:333).  
The Wana have become indigenous for the same reasons. Whether the 
development initiated was something they had expected or even wished for is a critical 
question, the problems stated above testify to the far reaching consequences their 
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decision had. Pratt reminds us: “The process of becoming indigenous […] does not 
end when one acquires the label. It begins there” (Pratt 2007:399). The Wana are no 
victims in this movement, however, they are creative agents of their culture who, 
against the background of complex and hybrid dynamics and dimensions of 
marginality, are constantly renegotiating and reformulating their position as an upland 
group. Some use the discursive powers revealed by the politics of becoming masyarakat 
adat and turn them to their own use, some will eventually turn away from the label and 
return, some in a metaphorical, some in an actual sense, to the uplands, waiting for the 




Adat as a Means of  Unification and  
its Contestation.  





After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the politics of democratisation and decentralisation 
triggered manifold developments with regard to adat and culture in Indonesia. In many 
regions, it led to a “revival of adat” (Henley and Davidson 2008) and “new politics of 
tradition” (Bubandt 2004). By this time, the Maluku region had experienced tensions 
and violent conflicts. In many parts of the region, adat was seen as “the only viable 
means for long-term reconciliation, social cohesion, and successful local government” 
(Frost 2004:1). Therefore, many efforts were undertaken to strengthen adat and adat 
institutions for reconciliation and peace. Bräuchler (2007) analyses two cases in Maluku 
and describes the strategies and challenges applied. Although she mentions divergent 
perceptions of the relationship between governmental politics and adat, she does not 
examine the consequences of an overlap of political authority and endeavours to 
strengthen adat. This is the point of entry of my paper. I will analyse the political 
authority of the district head of North Halmahera and the way he and his supporters 
engage in adat to promote unification and reconciliation among formerly conflicting 
parties. The district head’s double role as a representative of the state or dinas and as 
adat leader became prominent when he hosted the Fourth Congress (KMAN IV) of 
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Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the 
Archipelago (AMAN) in Tobelo in April 2012.  
In focusing on the contested character of adat, I will, firstly, briefly portray the key 
actors, their background and motivation. In a second step, I will describe and analyse 
the currently dominant version of adat and how this version should contribute to 
reconciliation and peace. I will, furthermore, show how this dominant version is 
contested by another diverse set of actors consisting of adat leaders from different 
locations and other public figures. I will argue that adat in North Halmahera indeed has 
significant potential for reconciliation, especially the bridging of religious differences. 
However, the promotion of a shared adat implies a homogenisation, and takes place at 
the expense of the multiple local adat variations and of the migrants excluded from it – 
especially those from Java and those belonging to the ethnic minority of the Makean 
who are now living in the southern Kao region1. 
The district of North Halmahera was established in 2003 as part of the 
decentralisation and administrative restructuring of the province of North Maluku 
(pemekaran). Its population was about 160,000 people in 2010. While the province is 
numerically dominated by Muslims (75%), the majority of the district of North 
Halmahera is Protestant (60%).2 The district is divided into four regions.3 My research4 
focuses on three of these regions: Kao, located in the south, the territory of Tobelo 
town and the region of Galela in the North. Discourses on adat often refer to this 
geographic differentiation, as does the analysis of the violence that took place there 
between 1999 and 2001: Kao was the region where the conflicts started; the other 
regions only became involved later.  
Different interpretations of the causes of the conflict were given by scholars in the 
aftermath. Brown, Wilson and Hadi (2005:18-19) relate the conflict to the 
establishment of the province of North Maluku in October 1999 and, therefore, see it 
as a result of the decentralisation policy. The administrative restructuring, as Wilson 
argues in another paper, led to violence that was indeed about “territory, natural 
resources, and ethnic solidarity”, primarily between migrants from Makean and the 
local residents of Pagu, one of the communities in Kao (Wilson 2005:89). A similar 
interpretation is given by Braithwaite et al.: They see the ethnic competition between 
migrants and the “indigenous population” of the region for “access to justice, access to 
compensation and a failure to be heard by government” as the main reason for the 
conflict (2010:224-225). Bubandt takes a different stand when he explains the conflict 
as the consequence of “the rise of a new politics of tradition” (2004:13), as a 
                                                        
1 The island of Makean was hit by a volcanic eruption in 1975. Therefore, many people migrated to 
Kao (Hondt and Sangaji 2011:4). 
2 Census 2010 (BPS 2010). 
3 “Region” refers to the four areas distinguished by North Halmahera’s government: Tobelo, Kao, 
Galela, and Loloda (see also Dinas Pariwisata dan Kebudayaan Kabupaten Halmahera Utara). 
4 The field research in North Halmahera between April and May 2012 was part of a research project 
on indigeneity in Indonesia in the context of the project on “Cultural heritage between sovereignty of 
indigenous groups, the state and international organisations in Indonesia” (directed by Brigitta 
Hauser-Schäublin of the Interdisciplinary Research Unit, “The Constitution of Cultural Property”, at 
the University of Göttingen, funded by the DFG). 
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competition between Ternate and Tidore, the two sultanates of North Maluku, over 
political influence in the newly established province (see also Klinken 2001).  
In spite of these diverse interpretations, most authors agree that the conflict had 
taken on a religious character, a fight between Christians and Muslims, by the end, 
especially in the regions of Tobelo and Galela. As Duncan points out in 
“Reconciliation and Revitalization”, an analysis of the revitalisation of adat for 
purposes of reconciliation in Tobelo, the community leaders of Tobelo concur. In 
their point of view, the weakness of adat in Tobelo made the town vulnerable to 
violence (Duncan 2009:1088). Therefore, they initiated a “resurgence of tradition” in 
the aftermath of the conflict, because “by strengthening, and in some cases recreating, 
adat institutions, they believe they can ensure future peace and stability” (ibid:1091).  
The currently dominant version of adat as proposed by a group of powerful Tobelo 
actors focuses on the establishment of unity of what is called Hibua Lamo. This means 
“big house” in the Tobelo language. It is used as a term for a philosophy and a spatial 
and social organisation based on a common adat structure. Thus, it stands for the unity 
of ten “indigenous communities”5 in North Halmahera, living in the four regions of 
the district. Hibua Lamo is thought to unite the inhabitants of North Halmahera 
independent of their religions. People involved in processes of adat strengthening 
declare that adat can “rebuild unity and prevent future conflict in the region” 
(ibid:1084). It has to be added that the two factions, both the group which is reshaping 
and promoting adat as a means of regional integration and unification, as well as its 
opponents, are elite people whose discourses have only been adopted or supported by 
people in everyday life to a limited extent. 
Set of Actors  
The “Tobelo Group” 
Let me describe the two different sets of actors involved in the negotiations over adat 
in North Halmahera.  
The first, which I will call the “Tobelo group”, is consciously shaping and creating 
a unifying version of adat for the whole of North Halmahera, which they call Hibua 
Lamo adat. The central figure is the current district head. 
 
                                                        
5 The term “indigenous community” is here used as the translation of the Indonesian term masyarakat 
adat (see the Introduction by Hauser-Schäublin and the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in this 
volume). The crucial criterion for becoming “indigenous” is self-identification. Based on this self-
identification some community leaders applied for AMAN membership. As some respondents 
emphasised, the ten communities discussed in this chapter were encouraged to take this step by what 
I call the “Tobelo group”. The group’s endeavour to promote an encompassing regional adat by 
uniting them under the umbrella of Hibua Lamo is strongly interconnected with their membership of 
AMAN and engagement in the indigenous discourse.  
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Jiko Makolano: The district head’s election campaign poster illustrates 
the blurred boundaries between the adat and the administrative sphere. 
It merges the spatial and social order of Hibua Lamo with the state’s 
division of the province.              Photo: Serena Müller 2012 
 
He holds an engineering degree and started his political career as the sub-district head 
of Tobelo in 2001. After the conflict, the governor of North Maluku had charged him 
with re-establishing peaceful relationships between Christian and Muslim factions of 
society. This endeavour proved quite difficult: He was faced with rejection and 
resistance from both groups in the beginning (Bataona 2009:107-108; Dramastuti 
2012:84; Braithwaite et al. 2010:223). Nevertheless, he finally succeeded in encouraging 
Muslim refugees on the island of Morotai to return to Tobelo, and convinced the two 
parties in the conflict to sign a peace declaration in April 2001. In 2005, two years after 
North Halmahera became a district of its own, the sub-district head was elected as 
district head. He is not only politically important, but also active and respected in the 
local branch of the Evangelical Church, the Gereja Masehi Injili di Halmahera (GMIH). 
Adat, for him, is the only collective resource powerful enough to overcome the 
religious differences. This conviction is obvious in all his social and political 
engagements: He gives speeches in the Tobelo language, wears traditional costumes 
and integrates traditional dances and music in public appearances, and always strives to 
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act as a role model in implementing adat values. Because of his deep commitment to 
adat, he was appointed as Jiko Makolano (“Ruler of the Bay”), as “guardian and 
protector” of the region (Papilaya 2012:1) in 2005; as jiko makolano, he is regarded as 
the highest adat leader of the regional unity of Hibua Lamo (see below). He is seen as an 
integrative figure (pola anutan), source of inspiration (sumber inspirasi) and guardian 
(pengayom) (Namotemo 2009:11). He “structured adat institutions” (kelembagaan adat) 
and “made publicly known and actualised institutions” of Hibua Lamo culture (budaya) 
(Papilaya 2012:89).6 He then documented further institutions of this encompassing 
Hibua Lamo adat structure and began with their establishment. In 2012, after KMAN 
IV was successfully held in Tobelo, the district head was elected head of the National 
Council of AMAN.7 
The district head closely consults and collaborates with a local adat activist in these 
activities. He works as a “special advisor on Tobelo adat issues”, as Duncan has 
expressed his tasks in English (2009:1093). The advisor’s parents were both craftsmen 
producing local handicrafts and educated him with an awareness of adat and culture. 
He, also an engineer, had founded dance and music groups since the 1980s in order to 
promote cultural practices and to further pride in local adat. The advisor is interested in 
local history and culture, continuously searches for North Halmahera’s adat roots, 
forms and histories, and has published on these issues as well. He teaches social and 
cultural anthropology, with special reference to local customs and tradition, at the 
Padamara, a college established in Tobelo after the conflict in order to facilitate a 
harmonious and peaceful North Halmahera. For this purpose, the college explicitly 
focuses on the inclusion and transmission of local knowledge in its “development-
oriented education”.8 The adat advisor is engaged in the promotion and dissemination 
of adat, both by dance and music performances, as well as ceremonies, which he 
organises for the district head. He designed the monument for KMAN IV held in 
Tobelo in 2012 and was in charge of the opening ceremony as well as the inauguration 
of AMAN’s head and its national council.9 He also designed his own house in a style 
                                                        
6 These are only two out of eight important roles (peran) of the district head mentioned in “Kharisma 
Hibua Lamo”, a book paying tribute to his charismatic leadership and appreciating his merits in the 
establishment of Hibua Lamo as a uniting element in North Halmahera (Papilaya 2012:87). 
7 This council is called Dewan AMAN Nasional (DAMANNAS). Together with the Secretary-General 
(Sekjen), the highest representative of AMAN, the council functions as the highest decision-making 
body for the alliance (see AMAN 2012c). 
8 For further information on the college’s history and aims see the college’s website (Admin 
poltekpadamara) (2012). 
9 The monument “O libuku iata ma akere” (empat penjuru mata air, the four directions of the springs of 
water) consists of an octagonal basin and four stairs leading up to a second circular shaped basin with 
four pillars on top. The construction of the stairs alludes to the four cardinal directions fundamental 
to North Halmahera’s philosophy. During the congress a “ritual of the archipelagic waters” (Ritual 
Air Nusantara) took place. For this purpose, indigenous delegates had brought water from well-
springs located in their communities’ ancestral territory. These waters were merged in the monument. 
This is meant to symbolise the unification of indigenous endeavours into a more promising nation-
wide struggle for indigenous rights and recognition. 
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he classifies as traditional.10 As it is constructed around a big open space, it can be used 
for meetings, such as workshops during KMAN IV. The position as an adat activist is 
complemented by his membership of North Halmahera’s parliament.11 
 
 
The monument Air Nusantara in Tobelo. Holy water from all over Indonesia was merged in 
the monument during the opening ceremony of KMAN IV in April 2012. Tobelo activists 
borrowed from Hibua Lamo philosophy in its construction, especially the importance of the 
number eight and the cardinal points.                               Photo: Serena Müller 2012 
 
Besides these two key actors, the Tobelo group comprises only a handful of other 
people. Almost all of them are Christians. Further members are, for example, the 
district head’s wife, pastors, adat leaders, an expert in the Tobelo language, the owner 
of a local newspaper, and the head of the Department of Culture and Tourism. 
Thus, they are affiliated with very different social institutions and fill important 
positions in the administrative, religious and academic fields. They all share a common 
interest in cultural issues and strive to make adat an important issue in the public and 
private life of North Halmahera’s population. United by this shared motivation, their 
endeavours are organised and coordinated: They promote the discourse on adat by 
                                                        
10 He used the octagonal form and equipped it with cultural emblems and symbols. He used red and 
yellow/gold very lavishly to symbolise the struggle and fame of the kings and simultaneously 
prosperity of the society. Furthermore, he decorated it with the salawaku, the traditional shield, 
symbolising skilfulness, heroism and peace (Papilaya 2012:51). 
11 He was member of North Halmahera’s parliament as a representative of the Golkar party until he, 
the district head’s wife and another person active in adat strengthening in North Halmahera, were 
accused of having violated party bylaws and replaced by Golkar in March 2013 prior to the election 
of the governor (Marsaoly 2013). The district head (also Golkar) ran for Governor in this election as 
an independent candidate, although Golkar had officially nominated another person (Sidik 2013). 
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conducting meetings and publishing books on adat-related issues. The Tobelo group 
sees culture and adat as a modernising interpretation of the past; they also acknowledge 
their personal involvement in the shaping of adat performances and in material objects. 
However, these actors differ in their perspective on the relationship between political- 
administrative and adat affairs: Whereas the district head underlines that it is impossible 
to distinguish between these spheres as he performs both roles simultaneously, his adat 
advisor is critical of this merging of roles and highlights the dangers of adat being spoilt 
by politics. The latter’s call for a strict separation of these roles is supported by other 
members of the Tobelo group. 
“Hibua Lamo Critics” 
The second set of people, whom I will call “Hibua Lamo critics”, has one important 
role in common: They all function as contacts and representatives of their 
communities with the Tobelo group. Therefore, they are invited to and attend 
meetings organised by the Tobelo faction on issues of North Halmahera’s adat. Some 
are invited because of their leading positions in adat structure, which is acknowledged 
by their community. Others are civil servants, and thereby, the district head’s direct 
subordinates, and are appointed by their superior as a “coordinator” of their particular 
community. They are, therefore, neither representatives of, nor legitimised by, their 
communities to speak or decide on adat issues. Consequently, they cannot make 
decisions on behalf of their communities and do not feel comfortable in their position. 
This is especially so as, in some cases, there are incongruities between the local 
delineation and composition of the community and the boundaries as defined by the 
Tobelo group. This applies particularly to Galela in the north. Hibua Lamo critics are 
scattered in the regions of Kao and Galela. They are quite diverse in their perspectives, 
motivations and aims and less organised than the Tobelo group.  
The Hibua Lamo critics I met are sub-district heads, adat leaders as well as religious 
authorities; accordingly, they are also situated at the intersection between dinas, adat and 
agama (religion). Although they have been involved in the process by the Tobelo group, 
they are critical of the developments in recent years. One major point especially 
mentioned by representatives from Kao is that they reject the religious interpretation 
of the conflict from 1999-2001 as promoted by the Tobelo district head and his 
supporters. Instead, they emphasise ethnic causes and struggles over territory and 
natural resources in the course of administrative restructuring. However, in contrast to 
Kao, representatives from Galela follow the Tobelo group’s religious interpretation of 
the conflict and share their perception of adat as a bridging force. Thus, they share 
Tobelo’s perception of the importance of adat. However, they refuse their efforts to 
homogenise local articulations of adat and demand respect for diversity and each 
community’s particularities. 
All critics from Galela and Kao criticise and refuse modernised forms of adat. 
Many of them are adat leaders and are, therefore, interested in and knowledgeable 
about what they regard as traditional adat ceremonies, manifestations and forms. They 
consider themselves the “true experts” (in adat) and claim to hold knowledge on 
“authentic” adat. Hibua Lamo critics stress rather the importance of the originality of 
106 Serena Müller 
 
adat forms, such as costumes, and underline diversity rather than uniformity of adat as 
promoted by the Tobelo group. The critics also refuse modernisation and active (re-) 
creation or “adjustment to present-day necessities”, such as the use of cement in the 
construction of traditional houses or the accommodation of adat costumes to “office 
needs”, as it is propagated by the Tobelo group. Some of them recognise change as an 
inevitable process, but reject its deliberate creating and shaping.  
Generally, Hibua Lamo critics agree with Tobelo activists that adat in Tobelo itself 
has almost disappeared, whereas it is still quite lively and visible in the regions outside 
town, especially in Kao. However, in their opinion, activists should draw on extant 
forms when strengthening adat. In this context, each community regards its own adat 
as the most original, most authentic one. Hibua Lamo critics admit that Tobelo activists 
visited, for example, the region of Kao to learn about adat in the aftermath of the 
conflict; but they feel that the adat implemented does not really draw on these visits 
and find themselves misquoted in publications. Some of these critics even speak of 
adat as “made up” (dibuat) and “invention” (rekayasa) by the Tobelo group and accuse 
them of “lying” and creating “myths” that are not “real” history. 
This modernised adat is often criticised for its “Tobelo centredness”. The Hibua 
Lamo critics blame the Tobelo group for authoritarian behaviour, enforcing an 
expansion of Tobelo adat by interfering in the internal affairs of other communities 
and attempts to erase non-Tobelo communities’ histories and wipe out their identities. 
This perception is strong, as Tobelo’s role as a focus of adat strengthening is fused 
with its position as a political-administrative centre. Whereas the Tobelo group is 
divided over the relation between governmental politics (dinas) and adat, Hibua Lamo 
critics agree on the necessity of carefully separating these spheres. It is difficult for 
them to see the synergies and positive effects of the double role of the district head. 
Most of the Hibua Lamo critics hold adat in high esteem and fear, therefore, that adat 
will be subordinated to governmental-political affairs or personal interests. 
Adat to Overcome Religious Tensions  
When talking about Hibua Lamo, Tobelo activists refer to the different meanings of the 
word. The first is the literal translation of the Tobelo word as “big house”, and refers 
to the traditional communal meeting house. The second one is a more metaphoric 
understanding of Hibua Lamo as a local philosophy and system of values – something 
that is inscribed in every Hibua Lamo member’s heart (Papilaya 2012:39-40). Related to 
this, Hibua Lamo, in its third connotation, refers to a social and spatial organisation 
based on this philosophy.12 
The house, therefore, is essential to the understanding of adat as a uniting force in 
North Halmahera. As Platenkamp analysed, in Tobelo, a house unites people of a 
common origin on a particular territory, endowing the members with a shared identity 
                                                        
12 According to scholars, Hibua Lamo or, in his former spelling, Saboea lamo (Campen 1883:309, cit. in 
Platenkamp 1993:69) or Laboewah-lamo (Aantekeningen 1856:224, cit. ibid) is also rendered as the 
name of one of the communities residing at Lake Lina (Platenkamp 1993:69, ibid 1988:129; Leirissa 
1990:126). Today, this community is identified with the hoana Gura. 
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(1990:77). When Tobelo activists called for a strengthening of adat with its potential to 
overcome religious differences and unite people of different origins after the conflict, 
they advocated Hibua Lamo, seeing it metaphorically and physically as a house that 
creates a shared identity and a unity. The district head comments that the suitable 
approach to establish a feeling of solidarity 
 
[…] is to re-establish mutual trust between local residents and establish a feeling 
of brotherhood and peace, because greed and suffering will not outdo love and 
the consciousness of brotherhood, of being of one blood and of one family in 
Tobelo, in this territory.  
 
(Papilaya 2012:21; transl. S.M.) 
Therefore, for him, it is the call of an “upright consciousness” to resurrect Hibua Lamo 
culture (budaya) that is “about to moulder if one does not make it blossom”. This 
culture will create unity while also recognising and appreciating the existence of 
differences (district head in Papilaya 2012:22; transl. S.M.). 
Hibua Lamo as Philosophy 
As briefly mentioned, Hibua Lamo literally means “big house”. The form and function 
of the traditional communal house in North Halmahera constitute the framework of 
the Hibua Lamo philosophy. There are two important features of a communal house in 
North Halmahera: One is the large shared centre of the house which constitutes a 
space for communication, interaction and conflict resolution for all families living in 
the different wings attached to the house (Duncan 2009:1088-1089). The second 
important feature is its octagonal form and the openness resulting from an absence of 
walls, symbolising openness in all cardinal directions (Papilaya 2012:41). 
This philosophy also has two facets: On the one hand, “Hibua Lamo is understood 
to function as a glue, a means of development and a force to unite spirits and bodies 
for communal prosperity” (ibid:42; transl. S.M.) and, therefore, create a unity of Hibua 
Lamo people who share one common origin. On the other hand, Hibua Lamo is 
described as being able to incorporate people from outside into the community. The 
adat advisor stated that everybody is invited to the community like the wind that can 
enter the house from every direction. Everybody coming to the house or community is 
to be regarded as saudara, sibling, regardless of their religious, ethnic or cultural 
background, and every guest is to be treated like royalty. Thus, a spirit of “solidarity, 
familiarity, kinship, equality, and mutual respect” is created, both with people of the 
same origin and with migrants living in the region (ibid:27). Hibua Lamo philosophy is a 
bearer of “love, truth, wisdom, and benevolence. The ancestors of Hibua Lamo have 
transmitted it to their descendants. It functions as a bearer of wisdom, as identity and 
universal blessing” (ibid:28; transl. S.M.). 
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Hibua Lamo philosophy, as it existed in the past and manifested itself as a cultural 
practice, has been transmitted orally. Since, according to the Tobelo group, adat had 
almost ceased to exist prior to the conflict, knowledge about values and their practical 
implementation had also receded in importance. Therefore, the Tobelo group strives 
for a reactivation of awareness of adat. They convey the philosophy of Hibua Lamo and 
its inherent values to North Halmahera’s population in two ways: by publications and 
by enactment. The district head favours the latter means of transmission. He 
underlines the fluidity of the concept and the process necessary to come to an 
encompassing understanding. He stated in an interview that he continues to become 
aware of new values to be added to the core of the philosophy. Therefore, he resists 
giving lectures or writing about it, but he tries himself to become a model and 
inspiration for others through his public behaviour. He presents himself as an 
embodiment of Hibua Lamo values and behaviour. He hopes that more and more 
people will follow his example and act with patience, respect and humility. In his 
function as the host and moderator of KMAN IV in Tobelo in April 2012, he 
successfully soothed the participants’ emotions in many sessions by reminding people 
of “adat behaviour”, by deploying his charisma and by just being calm himself. 
Although he led the congress as district head and adat leader, he also served guests by 
providing beverages, cleaning the floor of rubbish and equipping speakers with 
microphones. By doing so, he enacted the basic “ideologies” of simplicity 
(kesederhanaan) and honour (kehormatan) and gave an example of the fundamental values 
of Hibua Lamo philosophy.  
These values are further described in the Tobelo group’s publications as affection 
(kasih saying), truth and justice (kebenaran and keadilan), sincerity and concern/ 
compassion (ketulusan and kepedulian), and mutual assistance (kepelayanan), and 
partnership or unity (persekutuan). This kind of documentation constitutes the second 
strategy that is employed to convey Hibua Lamo philosophy and values to community 
members. In creating it, members of the Tobelo group break down the “universal” 
philosophy of Hibua Lamo and carefully select specific values and guiding principles 
which they consider crucial for adequate everyday behaviour. The results are published 
in co-operation with the local government.13 This documentation focuses on the 
intellectual understanding and direct dissemination of the philosophy. It both 
complements the district head’s way of bringing adat into public view, and, in its 
codifying character, also opposes his perception of Hibua Lamo philosophy as 
something that one can only understand incrementally over a period of years.  
The Hibua Lamo critics neither explicitly use the term Hibua Lamo philosophy, nor 
do they analytically differentiate between values, ideology and principles, as the Tobelo 
group does. They just speak of adat. Adat, in their opinion, is a guideline for everyday 
life and social interactions and embodies values. Here, their views show similarities 
with the district head’s perception of “behaving as adat people do”. When asked about 
                                                        
13 The most prominent examples are Banari’s paper on cultural values, Kuat’s publication on adat 
values and their implication in North Halmahera (both published in Duan (2009), a book 
documenting the close connection between the district head and Hibua Lamo) and Papilaya’s 
explanations (2012:27-43). 
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guiding values, they refer to similar concepts as those highlighted by the Tobelo group. 
All adat leaders underline the importance of mutual appreciation and respect, as well as 
politeness and familiarity, as fundamental values in their respective communities; they 
even invoke the same examples of the implementation of these values in everyday life. 
In line with their criticism of Tobelo centredness and their perception of having the 
most original and authentic culture, most Hibua Lamo critics refer only to their own 
communities’ values. They rarely refer to similarities in philosophy which they might 
share with other communities, and sometimes even describe their values as particularly 
outstanding. With regard to the implementation of values in daily life, most critics 
agree with Tobelo activists that awareness of adat has declined in times of 
“modernisation”. Therefore, they state that families and schools should play a crucial 
role in transmitting these values to the younger generation as they are necessary for 
harmonious social interaction. Here, the Hibua Lamo critics advocate the more 
intensive teaching of muatan lokal, a school subject in which the students are taught 
“local contents” (such as local language and customs). In their opinion, this can 
become a means to transmit each particular community’s values, history and language 
to children and, thus, maintain them as an integral part of their identity. 
Hibua Lamo as Regional Unity14  
According to the Tobelo group, Hibua Lamo, as a regional and social entity, unites ten 
indigenous communities or hoana in the “big house” of North Halmahera. The Tobelo 
word hoana has a range of meanings: It can refer to descent, a community, an ethnic 
group, or just to residents of a particular territory. Four of these ten hoana are located 
in Tobelo town, two in the regions north of the town (Galela and Loloda) and four in 
the southern region of Kao. Accordingly, the definition of a hoana, its internal 
constitution and its boundaries vary. According to the Tobelo group’s understanding, 
belonging to a hoana in Tobelo town is defined by origin and, thus, descent, whereas 
for Galela and Kao, they define membership by residence in a particular territory. 
The suggested unity of these ten hoana derives from a shared historical origin. Their 
ancestors once settled together at Lake Lina, south of Tobelo town. In the course of 
history, they moved away because of changing living conditions, natural disasters and 
internal social conflicts, settling in different places in North Halmahera and creating 
new communities. The Tobelo group seeks to trace and write down this history of 
fissions and expansion by referring to academic sources and oral histories.15 Above all, 
Hibua Lamo is meant to promote peaceful relations in North Halmahera. Today, Hibua 
Lamo is more or less geographically congruent with the district of North Halmahera.  
The unity of Hibua Lamo is reinforced by common adat institutions and an adat leader 
representing all ten hoana at the top of the hierarchy: the jiko makolano (“Ruler of the 
Bay”). Today, the district head holds this title. Historically the term refers to a chief of 
a political domain or a “district” rather than an adat leader, since this title was given to 
well-deserving officials by the sultan of Ternate in order to ensure the loyalty of the 
                                                        
14 The Tobelo group often refers to the unity as “hoana ngimoi”, “ten hoana”. 
15 The common origin at Lake Lina and their dispersal up to the current partition into ten hoana is 
documented in Papilaya 2012:53-59 and Yesaya B. et al. 2012. 
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chief and his community (Fraassen 1980:90; Duncan 2009:1092). The title had been 
obsolete for a long time but was brought back into use after an old woman had the 
revelation that the jiko makolano would return in the person of the current district head. 
In 2013, he established an adat court and its members were appointed.16 They were 
tasked with formulating adat regulations and functioning as an organ of jurisdiction.17 
Complementary to this encompassing Hibua Lamo structure, Tobelo activists pushed 
forward the strengthening of internal adat institutions in each hoana. This re-
establishing and revitalisation of adat structures was especially urged upon the 
communities prior to the KMAN IV in April 2012. 
It is precisely this spatial and social unity of Hibua Lamo that is controversial for 
Hibua Lamo critics. Although some of them acknowledge and respect endeavours to 
apply adat as a bridging force, most of them deny an encompassing spatial and social 
unity and refuse to acknowledge its importance for unification. The most contested 
elements are the common origin from Lake Lina, as suggested by the Tobelo group, 
the classification into hoana, the position of an encompassing adat leader, jiko makolano, 
and, last but not least, the filling of this position by the district head.  
Both Galela and Kao representatives deny their descent from Lake Lina. Most of them 
argue on behalf of oral histories or with reference to the works of Adnan Amal (2010a; 
2010b), a Galela-born lawyer who published on Maluku’s history, to counter the 
Tobelo group’s version of history. The most sophisticated endeavour was undertaken 
by activists from Galela, who initiated a meeting of respected adat leaders to discuss 
the Galela people’s origin. With the support of a social scientist teaching in 
Yogyakarta, the outcome of the discussion was combined with an interpretation of 
academic writings (both local and international) in a paper explicitly challenging the 
Tobelo activists’ publications (Anonymous ca. 2012).  
Critics from Galela and Kao also contest the naming of the ten communities as 
“hoana”. Prior to registration in AMAN, every group used its own particular 
terminology both to conceptualise and to name the community. However, in order to 
create unity, administratively and in other ways, the Tobelo group, as the initiating 
force18 of AMAN membership, started to establish hoana as a common term for all 
communities.  
Hibua Lamo critics, by disclaiming common origin, also challenge the unity of the 
ten hoana. They prefer to position themselves as partners (mitra) rather than members 
of Hibua Lamo in the sense of the Tobelo group. An interviewee from Kao maintained 
                                                        
16 See Dinas Pariwisata dan Kebudayaan Kabupaten Halmahera Utara 2013a. 
17 See Dinas Pariwisata dan Kebudayaan Kabupaten Halmahera Utara 2013b. Notably, this 
establishment is legitimised by a district head’s decree (430/132/HU/2013) and, therefore, 
undertaken in his function as part of state administration and not primarily as adat leader. 
18 AMAN membership of indigenous communities located in North Halmahera was initiated 
primarily by the district head’s adat advisor, who got in contact with Jaringan Baileo Maluku, a 
Maluku-based network committed to the struggle for indigenous rights, the recognition of adat 
institutions and community development. Presently, AMAN engagement is restricted to Tobelo 
groups and the community of Pagu, which established close relationships with the provincial and 
national offices of AMAN independently of Tobelo and is focusing on reclaiming its ancestral 
territory that is used by a gold mine. 
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that the four communities in Kao indeed constitute a unity of their own. He argued 
that they were once under the reign of the Sultan of Ternate who appointed one 
official, a particular jiko makoano, for the region of Kao. Kao should, therefore, relate as 
a partner to Tobelo and, similarly, both jiko mako(l)anos should be equal (setara) to each 
other. Kao representatives also reject the term hoana, and some, furthermore, even the 
names for their communities or the translation and historical explanation of these 
names. Their self-identification contradicts the identification by Tobelo activists. This 
leads to a perception that they are neither equal members in Hibua Lamo nor equal 
partners with Tobelo groups. Instead, their histories and, thus, their identifications are 
marginalised or neglected.  
The Hibua Lamo critics from Galela argue differently, but with the same outcome. 
For them, the difference in language is the most important indicator of the differing 
origins of Galela and Tobelo people (Anonymous ca. 2012:44). Furthermore, they state 
that their own concept of a communal house is bangsaha and not Hibua Lamo. 
Nevertheless, they concede that they are living in North Halmahera and, therefore, in 
the area that the Tobelo group defines as that of Hibua Lamo; but they insist that they 
do not belong to Hibua Lamo. They say that Galela/Loloda does not consist of two 
hoana but of two doku19 whose boundaries are not congruent with those defined by the 
Tobelo group. This also explains why the Galela communities were often represented 
in Hibua Lamo meetings of the ten hoana by sub-district heads who were appointed as 
hoana coordinators and not by adat elders or leaders. Therefore – like Kao – they 
consider themselves not as members of Hibua Lamo, but as autonomous partners. 
Critics from both regions also reject the idea that they live in the realm of an 
encompassing jiko makolano or are his subjects. They accept the district head’s 
administrative authority, but refuse his claim of adat leadership that will “evolve a 
hegemony of one group over another that is, due to historical circumstances, in a 
politically weaker position” (Anonymous ca. 2012:45; transl. S.M.). Some do this by 
challenging the historical evidence of such a title; others with reference to Tobelo 
lacking a bay – an argument countered by Tobelo activists by hinting to North 
Halmahera’s shape of a bay. Many critics fear Tobelo’s political supremacy and their 
subordination to its definition of adat domains.  
Hibua Lamo’s Material Expressions 
The third element of Hibua Lamo adat I analyse is adat in its materialised form. Tobelo 
activists regard these manifestations as essential for the promotion of Hibua Lamo adat. 
In “Kharisma Hibua Lamo” they highlight the development of the cultural facilities 
(pembangunan fasilitas budaya) pushed forward by the district head, such as the communal 
house and their “Batik Hibua Lamo”, as one out of eight important steps in his 
charismatic leadership to strengthen adat (Papilaya 2012:87).  
The decision to build a communal house in Tobelo town was one of the Tobelo 
activists’ first steps to promote adat. As mentioned above, the term for the traditional 
communal house “Hibua Lamo” stands for many different things, including a 
                                                        
19 Others speak of soa. These different perceptions exemplify the contestation and space for 
interpretation. 
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communal house as well as a philosophy. Tobelo’s communal house, inaugurated in 
2007, was meant to integrate these dimensions and become a place for meetings and 
conflict mediation in order to promote peaceful coexistence. Today, the communal 
house functions as a venue for carrying out “traditional ceremonies” (upacara adat) and 
“meetings of leaders with their people”. It is a symbol of “unity and reconciliation” 
(Dinas Pariwisata dan Kebudayaan Kabupaten Halmahera Utara.). In one of their 
publications, the Tobelo group explains the house as a “symbol of kinship 
(kekerabatan), a meeting centre and a place to honour Hibua Lamo values, the spiritual 
values they inherited from their ancestors (leluhur)” (Tobelo Post 2009; transl. S.M.). 
The house is constructed in a traditional way and draws on a few examples still 
existing, such as the one on Kakara, a small island off the coast of Tobelo, which is 
regarded as one of the adat strongholds of Hibua Lamo. It has an octagonal floor area 
and, thus, adopts a fundamental architectural feature shared by different hoana in Hibua 
Lamo (Namotemo 2009:19). The newly built communal house in Tobelo has been 
adjusted to present-day circumstances, as it should function as the communal house of 
all Hibua Lamo communities and enable meetings of North Halmahera’s inhabitants. In 
contrast to its historical model, it has exterior walls. It has four entrances, in order to 
be congruent with the value of openness as the elementary feature of Hibua Lamo 
philosophy, one in each cardinal direction. Moreover, it has been furnished in a 
modern style (Papilaya 2012:42). 
Meanwhile, the “Hibua Lamo” in the centre of Tobelo town has also become a 
tourist attraction with the tourist information centre next to it. Its importance is 
further highlighted by the fact that the government of North Halmahera decided to 
make it the emblem of the district.  
For Tobelo activists, the communal house in Tobelo, constructed in the centre of 
Hibua Lamo territory, should occupy a special emotional place in the heart of Hibua 
Lamo people, too. However, Hibua Lamo critics rarely refer to the function of the 
communal house spontaneously. As it is located in Tobelo town, they say, its 
importance is restricted only to Tobelo. When asked about the architecture of the 
building, the Hibua Lamo critics elaborate on regional differences in style and, most 
notably, disapprove of its modifications for practical purposes.  
Conclusions 
The analysis above examines the shaping and deployment of adat by a charismatic 
Tobelo leader and his supporters as a means to unite people of different religious 
affiliations. In a period of only ten years, a broad knowledge and understanding of 
Hibua Lamo both as a philosophy, a system of values and a form of spatial and social 
organisation has been established among the inhabitants of North Halmahera. This 
shared knowledge and understanding is based on a narrative of common origin and 
shared traditions and rituals. The most important event is the annual celebration and 
commemoration on April 19 of the Peace Declaration of 2001. This declaration 
marked the onset of an intensified promotion of adat and, thus, is a constitutive 
moment in Hibua Lamo’s recent history. Since 2007, this date is marked as HUT 
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Hibualamo, as the birthday of Hibua Lamo20, and celebrated with a parade through 
town, cultural festivals and competitions.21 This yearly commemoration reminds North 
Halmahera’s population of the violence that has recently shaken the region and 




Rehearsal ritual: Revitalised rituals are an important element of Tobelo activists’ endeavours 
to strengthen adat. These ceremonies are often arranged by the district head’s adat advisor. 
The picture shows the traditional war dance called cakalele that is performed with a spear and 
a salawaku, a shield. The rehearsal shown here is for a ritual that had not been performed for 
decades; it took place in May 2012 with great media attendance.    Photo: Serena Müller 2012 
 
Endeavours to strengthen adat and promote a common identity and history of Hibua 
Lamo require negotiation, selection and emphasis upon certain elements and variant 
forms of adat over others. Different interpretations express particular actors’ interests 
and motivations. The negotiation and especially the contested character of Hibua Lamo 
unveil different perceptions of the connection between the political-administrative 
domain (dinas) and adat and of the legitimate authority to talk about, define and enact 
adat. Most representatives of the Tobelo group perceive adat as flexible and dynamic. 
For them, adat is constantly transformed and can be or has to be actively adjusted to 
                                                        
20 The communal house in Tobelo was inaugurated on April 19, 2007. The birthday, thus, primarily 
refers to the communal house, but by linguistic sameness also to the establishment of Hibua Lamo as 
a regional unity. 
21 In 2012, the date was chosen intentionally as the day for the opening of the KMAN IV. In 2011, a 
parade showing Hibua Lamo’s diversity was organised and a Hibua Lamo cultural festival is held almost 
every year (2008, 2010, 2011, and 2013).  
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changing conditions. Critics of this perspective refer to another concept of adat. 
According to them, adat is something static, “traditional” and has to be “authentic”. 
Therefore, they demand historic evidence of adat symbols, institutions and common 
history. In general, they reject active, goal-oriented intervention.  
The economic, political, and symbolic resources available to actors in negotiations 
are distributed unequally. Members of the Tobelo group are embedded in the state-
administrative as well as in the adat domains. Thus, they draw on governmental and 
other public resources to carry out research on adat-related issues and history, hold 
discussions and meetings, promote the results of these meetings as an “official” 
version of adat and history, and disseminate it throughout North Halmahera. This 
powerful position facilitates a quick dissemination of Hibua Lamo philosophy and 
unity. Several Hibua Lamo critics are also civil servants, though subordinate to the 
district head in rank, and, in general, because of their rural location. They are, 
therefore, in a less powerful position in these negotiations and face difficulties in 
making their voices heard; they feel disrespected. The powerful implementation and 
greater visibility of the Tobelo group’s adat endeavours is perceived as an attempt to 
create an adat hegemony in North Halmahera by critics (Anonymous ca. 2012:45) with 
its centre in Tobelo town and a rural periphery. 
Most critics do not challenge the district head’s authority as an elected 
representative in the state administration, but they criticise the unclear distinction 
between his two roles in adat and dinas. The establishment of hoana and an 
encompassing adat organisation, as well as the effort to make the communities re-
establish their internal adat institutions, expands the political-administrative power of 
the district head to the domain of adat and, therefore, interferes in particular 
communities’ adat. 
Up to now, the Hibua Lamo critics have not been organised as a group; they act 
rather as individuals when they challenge the Tobelo group’s dealing with adat. Most 
people are indifferent about adat strengthening. Furthermore, the shift, which Tobelo 
hopes to effect, of people with a shared adat instead of with their particular religions 
has not yet been accomplished (Duncan 2009:1081). Many people still think in 
categories of religion. Danius’ (2012) study of local interpretations of election results, 
party politics and the appointment of governmental employees shows that 
interreligious envy and mistrust are still pervasive. It remains questionable, therefore, 
whether Hibua Lamo can serve to bridge the differences among religious and social 
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Introduction 
“Together, we’re working towards one vision: A just and sustainable world.” With 
these lines the foundation, Global Greengrants Fund, presents its mission. This US-
based charity provides funds to indigenous groups in Indonesia through co-operation 
with a Southeast Asian non-governmental organisation (NGO). To make claims for 
recognition in the name of masyarakat adat seems to require more than self-
determination. Fund-raising and coalition-building with international and national 
NGOs have helped nurture indigenous activism in Indonesia and continue to provide 
pivotal financial but also ideational resources until the present day. The largest actor in 
this adat movement, the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), for 
example, lists about two dozen collaborations with international donor organisations 
and more than 30 national non-governmental allies.  
But with so many parties involved – how can and do such coalitions work? What 
motivates organisations from different political, institutional and regional fields to join 
forces for indigenous issues? Why is it that indigenous peoples may contribute to a 
“just and sustainable world”? Do these external actors take part in shaping the political 
discourse on indigeneity in Indonesia? 
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Many questions arise when focusing on the institutional functioning of the adat 
movement, supporting actors and their use of the concept of indigeneity. An analysis 
of external collaboration, which AMAN as part of this movement establishes, 
consequently leads to the field of international development. One anthropological 
entry-point for analysing the role of social movements in development is a critical, 
constructivist perspective (Escobar 1992, 2012; Ferguson 1997). Proponents of this 
perspective often highly criticise the arena of international development as a form of 
western, neoliberal imperialism that maintains itself through the implementation of 
normative policies. “As a solution” to technically focused practitioners, who impose 
projects “from the top”, they assume social movements from the Global South.1 
Those would fight for peoples’ interests “from the bottom” or “grass-roots” and 
protest against or resist mechanisms of imperialism. Those NGOs, taking an 
intermediary and officially often neutral position between both sides, are often accused 
of being Trojan horses of western interests (Carroll 2009).  
I argue that merely aligning to this perspective would lead to one-sided 
assumptions in the Indonesian case. I do not intend to estimate whether NGOs are 
“doing good” or not (Murdock 2003), nor does the critical constructive perspective 
explain the fact that AMAN does not resist, but instead establishes ties within the field 
of development.  
Therefore, I will not only look at the discursive sphere of official texts and policies, 
but also at an unofficial sphere of practices “beyond policies”. These are, first and 
foremost, dynamics of interaction between individuals behind the formal structure of 
international development. This interaction has consequences for the internalisation of 
particular norms and modes of action for both practitioners and activists. They 
endorse a conceptual mobility of policies by reinterpreting and reproducing those 
norms. I adopt the conceptual frame of “order and disjuncture” (Lewis and Mosse 
2006) to grasp both the official and unofficial sphere and its interrelation. In this 
frame, order is meant to be the official sphere in which the organisations co-operate. It 
is formed by policies and programmes. Disjuncture then occurs within or through the 
informal sphere, as different goals, meanings and interpretations can be traced there. 
Constructivists often regard the latter as potentials to break the official order. My 
findings will show a more differentiated, less dichotomic picture instead. Interaction 
enables actors to follow different interests, while upholding order at the same time.  
Drawing from fieldwork in Jakarta and Bogor, I will explore various arenas of 
interaction between AMAN and the Southeast Asian organisation, The Samdhana 
Institute, and the Indonesian organisation, Partnership for Governance Reform.2 In an 
                                                        
1 The term refers to developing countries and is an alternative to existing terms, such as “Third 
World”. It is considered as less judgmental and less subjective in academic literature than “Third 
World”, which indirectly ascribes negatively connotated backwardness to nations and defines 
development as an inevitability that has to be imitated by these nations. 
2 My fieldwork was part of the project “Cultural Heritage Between Sovereignty of Indigenous 
Groups, the State and International Organisations in Indonesia”, led by Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin, 
and is part of the interdisciplinary research unit on “The Constitution of Cultural Property”, funded 
by the German Research Council (DFG). I would like to thank Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin and 
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intermediary position, these organisations constantly have to balance relations between 
different parties from the bottom and the top.  
The paper begins with a description of visions and programmes to illustrate the 
official order into which the organisations embed their assistance. This is 
complemented with insights from the rather unofficial sphere of dispositional meaning 
that lies behind the statutes. What follows are examples of recent support for AMAN 
along two common topics which demonstrate the reproduction or embeddedness of 
policies. Together, normative programmes and reworked policies reflect certain 
notions of indigeneity which will be subsequently outlined. The last part of the chapter 
focuses on the lifestyles of practitioners and activists to trace the unofficial arena of 
interaction and its establishment. Thereby, another crucial dimension of mobility will 
be revealed: social mobility. I argue that these conceptual and social mobilities balance 
the encounters of order and disjuncture and bridge the official and unofficial sphere of 
international collaboration. 
The Intermediaries: Visions and Programmes 
The Samdhana Institute 
The Samdhana Institute (hereafter Samdhana) is a transnational NGO focusing on 
mainland and insular Southeast Asia. It has a representative office in the Philippines 
and another one in Indonesia. Founded in 2003, the Samdhana Institute is an “Asian 
Centre for Social and Environmental Renewal” made up of “a community of 
practitioners” who work in different fields, such as conservation, international 
development, law, education, and human rights activism (The Samdhana Institute 
2013a). Beyond the official definition, respondents added a personal intention to 
establish a “post-institutional” space where the expertise of its members can be 
congregated and oriented towards agendas to which they are personally committed 
rather than just for which they are employed. Another major motivation is to pass this 
expertise on to the “following generation” by mentoring it; so, as the Sanskrit term 
samdhana indicates: “a peaceful coming together, a giving back” exists (The Samdhana 
Institute 2013a). Samdhana officially envisions  
a region where natural, cultural and spiritual diversity are valued and 
environmental conflicts are resolved peacefully, with justice and equity for all 
parties. Achieving this requires that communities who directly manage their 
local natural resources have clear rights, ready recourse to justice, strong and 
skilled leadership, stable financial resources and access to appropriate technical 
support. 
      (The Samdhana Institute 2013a) 
                                                                                                                                       
Francesca Merlan from the Australian National University for helpful comments and criticism on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
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Samdhana’s main issue is “Sustainable Natural Resource Management”. Although this 
broadly addresses nature conservation, Samdhana’s members also emphasise people’s 
rights and benefits in the context of social justice and human rights. As mentioned 
above, this focus is not only reflected in official formulations, but it also constitutes 
the personal commitment of many members, which is based on shared values. Apart 
from these outward-oriented goals, Samdhana has another rather internal purpose 
which, in the official sphere, is articulated as follows: “To offer [its members] 
opportunities as well as support […] to remove themselves from their immediate 
environment and reflect upon and communicate their experience and ideas” (The 
Samdhana Institute 2013b). Therefore, Samdhana wants to promote its members by 
offering them a shared, almost private space for contemplation and the exchange of 
views. This idea is based on a rather spiritually interpreted work ethic and a personal 
“bond” between the members, which is expressed and performed by occasionally 
practicing yoga together. Therefore, team meetings are sometimes held in a yoga centre 
in Bali. Many Samdhana members, who generally call themselves Samdhana Fellows, 
informally identify the organisation as a form of “family” or “home” and underline 
their feeling of togetherness. However, their engagement is predominantly part-time in 
addition to their main employment in institutions such as international organisations, 
Indonesian NGOs or research institutes. More than a third of all members are 
Indonesian and also live in Indonesia, while others come from or are working in other 
countries. The organisation comprised 59 Fellows at the time of the field research. As 
Samdhana’s work is transnationally spread throughout Southeast Asia, an International 
Board of Directors was installed as the highest governing body and policy-maker. The 
office in Bogor is run by seven to nine Indonesian employees together with some 
Fellows. Their tasks include grant and general finance management, human resources 
and project coordination. The whole functioning of the organisation (administration 
and projects) is based on funds granted by international donor organisations, such as 
the Ford Foundation and the International Union for Conservation of Nature.  
 
Samdhana has three official “priority themes” (The Samdhana Institute 2013c), namely  
 
 Natural Resource Conflict Resolution, 
 Leadership Development, and 
 Community-Led Natural Resource Management.  
 
To realise these themes, the organisation primarily provides financial support to “local 
NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs)” (The Samdhana Institute 2012). 
Therefore, Samdhana established a so-called Small Grants Programme in 2005. Via this 
programme, applicants can receive financial grants ranging from USD 100 up to 
USD 20,000. The importance and benefit of such small-scale funding is warranted in 
official statements as an approach that focuses on beneficiaries “where other support is 
not available” (The Samdhana Institute 2013d) because donors find them “too small to 
fund” (unpublished document). Thus, the Small Grants Programme attempts to bridge 
the gap between donors and local initiatives through Samdhana’s ties to both parties. 
Considering the informal sphere and internal ideology behind the small grants 
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approach, this focus on local initiatives seems to derive from the personal commitment 
of Fellows with the “grass-roots”. This provides evidence of a rather unconventional, 
activist orientation, which Samdhana aims to integrate into the official and 
conventional frame of project mechanisms. This orientation can be further identified 
within the ideology of Samdhana’s main funding organisation of the programme, 
which has specialised in small grants to support rights-related and environmental 
issues: the Global Greengrants Fund mentioned already. The charity states on its 
website: “Our strategy is to support local leaders – primarily outside the United States 
and Western Europe – in fighting [social] injustices. Through activist-led grantmaking, 
we find these leaders and provide seed funding for grass-roots action on the front lines 
of social change” (Global Greengrants Fund 2013). 
Besides financial support, Fellows also provide direct assistance to local actors 
around the three priority themes. In the context of Conflict Resolution, Samdhana’s 
lawyers offer legal support and conflict mediation for communities in situations of 
land seizure or detention. Beyond this reactive assistance, Samdhana’s work also 
addresses conflict prevention for both multi-actor disputes and internal conflicts 
within communities. Importance is given here to critical, political education as 
assistance in policy analysis and development.  
Local Leadership Development is another priority theme within Samdhana on 
which members perceive it necessary to work because large-scale development and 
conservation projects would neglect such direct assistance at the grass-roots. 
Therefore, Samdhana, with its small-scale approach, intends to strengthen the long-
term functioning of local organisations in order to make them self-reliant, for example, 
in fund-raising. This again unconventional approach seems to be strongly connected 
with the personal identification of Fellows as “mentors”. 
The third official priority theme, Community-Led Natural Resource Management, 
usually called Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) among 
conservation experts, is regarded by Fellows as an appropriate approach for a 
realisation both of social justice and biodiversity preservation. Therefore, Fellows 
advocate for and support communities’ traditional ways of environmental use. 
Partnership for Governance Reform 
After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the elections in 1999, international 
donor organisations together with Indonesian representatives from governmental and 
non-governmental fields jointly took measures to foster the democratisation process in 
the country. Based on an initiative by the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Partnership for Governance Reform 
(hereafter Partnership; the Indonesian name is Kemitraan) was founded as a UNDP 
programme in March 2000 (Mallarangeng and van Tuijl 2004: 924). Two years later, the 
project-based programme was registered as an independent “non-profit civil law 
association” managed by Indonesian-led bodies (Partnership 2012a). However, it 
retained its status as a UNDP programme until 2009. 
The Partnership’s vision is “to establish fair, democratic and sustainable 
governance for the welfare of Indonesian citizens” (Partnership 2013). Looking at the 
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official sphere, a thematic proximity to concepts and ideas from the field of 
international development seems to prevail. All activities, which the organisation 
realises, shall lead to good governance. In general, the concept of good governance 
emphasises political reform of governmental structures and practices and aims at 
building a transparent and legally accountable state apparatus. The Partnership follows 
this approach and contextualises it within the Indonesian setting.3 Its official mission is 
described as, “disseminating, advancing and institutionalizing the principles of good 
and clean governance among government, civil society and business, while considering 
human rights, gender balance, the marginalized and environmental sustainability” 
(Partnership 2013). 
The organisation follows a so-called “multi-stakeholder approach” by appointing 
its members from sectors of government, civil society and business (Partnership 
2012a:4). The realisation of political reform is sought through a twofold strategy, 
namely, to build internal capacities of state institutions and to enable actors from civil 
society to monitor these institutions and engage with them at the same time. Hence, 
the Partnership’s motto is “building capacity from within, and applying pressure from 
without” (2012a:11). This transports the image of the strongly intermediary and neutral 
position of the organisation. Formulations stress the Partnership’s role of involving all 
relevant actors in the reform process, first and foremost, in the design and evaluation 
of the Partnership’s programmes. Moreover, their strategies would need to be 
synergised and harmonised within a strong network of “partners” (Partnership 2012a).4  
Another indicator for the Partnership’s orientation towards international 
development are the UN Millennium Development Goals, into which activities are 
embedded. At the time of my research, the Partnership focused on four programmes 
which serve as clusters for different projects and give evidence of the importance of 
the concept of “good governance”.  
 
These were: 
 Democratic Governance,  
 Public Service Governance,  
 Security and Justice Governance, and   
 Economic and Environmental Governance.  
            (Partnership 2012a) 
These headings comprise projects such as “Corruption Eradication”, 
“Dezentralisation”, “Poverty Eradication”, and “Human Rights Promotion” 
(Partnership 2012a). The Partnership provides a huge portfolio of assistance for the 
                                                        
3 For a complete list of the good governance principles which the Partnership pursues, see 
www.kemitraan.or.id/main/content3/21/22/24 <June 3, 2013>. 
4 The usage of the term “partner” or “partnership” is highly debated among scholars within the 
anthropology of development. Constructivist critics argue that these terms conceal unequal power 
relations which, in fact, would determine donor-NGO relationships. For a critical discussion of The 
Partnership of Governance Reform, see Crawford (2003) and Mallarangeng and Van Tuijl (2004). 
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implementation of such projects, including workshops, policy analysis, technical 
supports, and grants (Mallarangeng and Van Tuijl 2004:921). Until the end of its status 
as a UNDP programme, members in the Partnership’s main governing bodies were 
also appointed from international donor organisations. These members had a 
supervisory role (Crawford 2003:146-148; Mallarangeng and Van Tuijl 2004:921). Since 
its establishment as an independent association, the Partnership has been governed by 
two completely Indonesian-managed bodies. Its executive office is situated in Jakarta 
and the organisation’s administration and activities are funded by foreign money. The 
major funding organisations are national governments, such as the government of the 
Netherlands and the United States of America, international organisations, including 
the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, and internationally operating 
companies from the private sector, such as Siemens, a German technology enterprise. 
In contrast to Samdhana, the Partnership’s official programme and statutes do not 
indicate a critical positioning of the organisation in regard to conventional or rather 
unconventional development work. However, these texts comprise only one domain to 
analyse NGOs. In order to understand how universal concepts are, in fact, understood 
by practitioners, I will analyse in the following chapter how these organisations 
support indigenous peoples in practice. 
Climate Mitigation and Mapping  
Samdhana and the Partnership support AMAN in manifold ways. The Partnership and 
Samdhana often operate on similar topics, which is, I suggest, the impact of 
international policies concerning indigenous issues.  
One important topic is REDD+, a policy instrument stemming from international 
climate politics.5 It can be described as a market-based scheme of compensation 
payments from industrialised countries to initiatives for forest conservation and 
emission reduction in the countries of the Global South. Its introduction to Indonesia 
began in 2007. At the time of my research, the Indonesian state was still in a 
preparatory test phase, officially called the REDD Readiness phase. Thus, policies 
were still in preparation and exemplary pilot projects were implemented. Although still 
in an initial phase, the Indonesian government and national and international 
companies displayed great interest in this form of management of natural resources, 
which follows the definition of forests under REDD+.6  As pilot projects have shown, 
REDD+ inevitably affects indigenous peoples, since many of them are living in and 
around forested areas (Forest Peoples Programme 2011). 
                                                        
5 REDD stands for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” and generally 
describes the idea of a payment mechanism for forest conservation. The term REDD+ indicates 
concrete measures to practically introduce and finally realise this idea (Clements 2010). 
6 REDD policies in the Indonesian context are based on a weak definition of forests, which is due to 
the absence of a globally accepted definition. The current UN definition only puts emphasis on the 
territorial size and tree cover of an area and does not refer to characteristics such as primary or 
secondary forest (see FAO 2013; Hein 2013).  
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To turn this passive involvement into active involvement, Samdhana started the 
“REDD Preparedness Project” within its Small Grants Programme. Seen as an answer 
to top-down, government-led measures under the term REDD Readiness, this project 
focuses on the “preparedness and engagement of indigenous peoples, local 
communities, community based organisations and local NGOs” in REDD+ issues 
(The Samdhana Institute 2012). It is interesting that 30% of small grants are constantly 
flowing to AMAN communities. This assistance goes back to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), which the organisations signed in 2009 (AMAN 2012b). 
Samdhana funds local AMAN initiatives, which conduct “capacity building” for 
communities on REDD. In other words, people are introduced through AMAN to 
policies and overarching concepts such as climate change, “Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent” or REDD.7 They are taught about their legal rights and opportunities 
through workshops, traditional gatherings, etc. This is also in line with Samdhana’s 
priority themes of Conflict Resolution and Leadership Development, which address 
political education.  
REDD+ is also a guiding topic for the Partnership’s collaboration with AMAN 
members. The Partnership’s assistance is part of its so-called Forest Governance 
Programme, in which sustainable ways for the management of forested area are 
elaborated.8 In Central Kalimantan, which is a priority region for REDD+ pilot 
projects, the Partnership, as intermediary, co-operated with the provincial 
representative of AMAN. Together, the organisations identified exemplary adat groups 
for the development of a pilot scheme within the ongoing Readiness Phase, the 
“community REDD+”. This scheme demonstrates how REDD+ could be 
successfully introduced to a community and indigenous issues could be integrated into 
broader policy processes. Therefore, training sessions on Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent were held for AMAN cadres. According to the Partnership, climate change 
negotiations and REDD+ projects can offer opportunities for indigenous groups to 
formulate claims in the public sphere. In part, this perspective seems to be based on a 
rather informal consensus of the Partnership practitioners with AMAN concerning the 
recognition of indigenous peoples. Respondents underlined that they endorse 
indigenous claims for “rights on customary (adat) land” (Partnership 2012b) and 
acknowledge AMAN’s critical position towards the Indonesian state. However, 
because of AMAN’s critical position, staff of the Partnership often find it difficult to 
mediate between the indigenous alliance and state representatives. 
“Participatory mapping” is another topic or instrument which Samdhana and the 
Partnership support. In contrast to REDD+, this topic partially originates from an 
international arena of large-scale conservation, but was brought forward by activists 
and has to be seen against the political background of the New Order regime that did 
                                                        
7 “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (FPIC) is a guiding but not binding principle, institutionalised 
within the UN framework. It is also part of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). In sum, it implies an unmanipulated consultation of indigenous 
peoples before project implementation in order to  reach the consent of all parties involved, which is 
based on equal knowledge (see also Barelli 2012). 
8 The Forest Governance Programme is part of the Partnership’s Economic and Environmental 
Governance Cluster. 
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not recognise the land claims of indigenous peoples. As land conflicts with the state 
and companies have been a major issue of the indigenous movement since its 
beginning in the 1990s (see the chapter by Steinebach in this volume), participatory 
mapping has become an important instrument for indigenous activism. Indigenous 
peoples can identify and visualise their knowledge about the boundaries of their 
customary territory by themselves with the help of modern technology, such as GIS 
systems. Proponents of this instrument regard it as an important entry-point to 
empower adat communities to fight for their land claims. According to Peluso (1995), 
early forms of participatory mapping had already entered Indonesia in the 1980s via 
international conventional projects for conservation. At that time, ideas that local 
peoples and their knowledge could contribute to biodiversity conservation began to 
enter international organisations, such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), based on 
experience in the field (Alcorn 2005:52-53). In Kalimantan, for example, traditional 
management systems were documented to improve the long-term management of a 
nature reserve (Peluso 1995:395). Indonesian activists then took the opportunity to 
adopt this kind of mapping and to spread it to local groups. As Peluso states, they 
reinterpreted it as a sort of resistance and counter-movement to state mapping, which 
did not consider people’s rights but instead was a basis for exploitive development 
projects of the Suharto regime (1995:398-400). Thus, by “stealing the master’s tools”, 
(Tsing et al. 2005) participatory mapping could “cut through the labyrinth of 
Indonesia’s elite politics that never really touches upon the lives of ‘small people’” 
(Natalia 2000:75).  
In 1995, Indonesian activists established a national network for participatory 
mapping activities, the Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif (JKPP; see also Royo 
2000:82). In 2010, the Indonesian government took a step to unify its spatial data of 
forest cover, the One Map policy. Until then, forest mapping had been produced by 
several ministries leading to various legal regulations and, thus, a lack of indigenous 
peoples’ legal protection, among other things (see the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi 
in this volume). AMAN took the opportunity of customary maps to become 
recognised in this One Map. In co-operation with JKPP and Forest Watch Indonesia, 
the indigenous alliance founded a national agency to feed customary maps into a 
national database – the Ancestral Domain Registration Agency (Badan Registrasi 
Wilayah Adat, BRWA).9 This agency functions as an official data and information 
provider to its members and partner organisations and, most notably, to the 
Indonesian state apparatus. AMAN signed a MoU with the National Land Agency 
(Badan Pertanahan Nasional) in 2011 which officially stated that “indigenous” maps 
would be integrated into governmental data. Samdhana, JKPP and AMAN joined 
forces to foster the participatory mapping and the Ancestral Domain Registration 
Body. Samdhana, thereby, provides assistance in two ways: It funds the mapping 
activities of AMAN members through the REDD Preparedness Project, and Fellows 
also give practical technical support in the field.  
                                                        
9 Further partners are the Indonesian non-governmental organisations Telapak, Sawit Watch and 
Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan (KpSHK). 
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The Partnership supports the participatory mapping projects financially. Funds do not 
go directly to AMAN but to its partner JKPP, which is implementing the mapping. It 
is interesting that this endorsement of actors who originally countered development is 
not contradictive for the Partnership. This could be due to the fact that mapping 
activists changed their oppositional position to a more approachable one after the fall 
of Suharto, which is in line with the Partnership’s concept of “applying pressure from 
without”. Thus, one aim of the Partnership is to accelerate the process of registering 
customary maps with the National Land Agency, because the MoU between AMAN 
and the latter has apparently not yet led to a concrete outcome producing common 
maps. Therefore, the organisation also provides special advisers who help AMAN, 
JKPP and the Indonesian government to link their respective mapping activities.  
These two examples, REDD+ and participatory mapping, demonstrate that an 
official “discursive” dominance or order of certain topics within civil society 
collaboration does not automatically lead to one-sided meanings or interests, which are 
imposed by donors and implemented by intermediaries. Instead, all the organisations 
rework these universals in their own way. Moreover, the Partnership’s assistance to 
AMAN shows that the intermediary also makes room for the ideas and goals of 
activists. This is due to a shifting positioning of Indonesian NGOs and, not least, of 
the Indonesian government.    
Notions of Indigeneity: Disjuncture within Order 
Although Samdhana and the Partnership officially refer to indigenous peoples’ self-
determination, diverse notions of indigeneity can be identified when looking more 
closely at both the official order of the institutional collaboration, with its policies and 
programmes, and a more informal arena in which practitioners reinterpret official 
policies according to personal values and specific political contexts. 
The Community Focus 
In addition to conservation, Samdhana focuses on “people”, namely “communities”. 
Communities are not defined in the official texts of Samdhana, but project reports 
indicate the image of an organised, small-scale group of people who reside in some 
villages or a whole district. Different terms are applied to them, such as “local peoples’ 
organisations”, “local communities”, “local groups”, “local peoples”, or “community-
based organisations”. Hence, indigenous peoples constitute just one type of 
community among Samdhana’s target groups; but all of them are conceived and 
promoted as caretakers of the environment. Accordingly, the terms “indigenous 
peoples” or masyarakat adat seldom appear in official policies, whereas the terms above 
are used frequently. Samdhana supports what Alcorn (2005: 39) defines as “little 
conservation”, i.e. small in scale, community-based and oriented towards the 
communities’ benefit. Looking closer at the policies of Samdhana’s donors, 
conceptional similarities become apparent. The Climate and Land Use Alliance (2013), 
for example, strives towards “supporting locally-driven innovation”, such as 
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“community forest management”, because “[p]rotecting and enhancing the livelihoods 
and rights of indigenous peoples and rural communities is an essential part of the 
solution”. 
Similar to Samdhana, the Partnership’s community focus in regard to indigenous 
peoples is contextualised within natural resource management, namely “Community 
Based Forest Management” (Partnership 2011a:iii). The organisation transports the 
notion of indigenous peoples as a spatially fixed group as well. Both Samdhana and the 
Partnership refer to the governmental land-use schemes, Hutan Kemasyarakatan 
(Community Forest) and Hutan Desa (Village Forest), as legal instruments for ensuring 
communities’ access to and use of natural resources (Partnership 2011a; Samdhana 
2012).10   
These governmental schemes are based on a definition of community in terms of 
spatial administrative entities, i.e. villages (desa). In this context, the land-use schemes 
officially contradict perceptions which AMAN represents in general. AMAN’s 
understanding of masyarakat adat is based rather on an ancestral origin than on 
administrative regulations. Furthermore, instead of land-use rights, AMAN focuses on 
land ownership that is based on the recognition of customary or adat  rights. However, 
the NGOs promote the governmental schemes on the local level and respondents 
stated that some AMAN members adopt these schemes. 
Another frame shaping the community focus of the Partnership is the PNPM 
Peduli project.11 The project officially aims at “inclusive development”, namely poverty 
reduction and socioeconomic development of “community groups at the grass-roots 
level”. “Poor indigenous peoples” are one of these target groups (PNPM Support 
Facility 2011). AMAN members, however, do not yet participate in the project. 
Forest Inhabitants 
As seen above, Samdhana’s main support of AMAN is currently funded through a 
REDD-related project addressing forest management. Consequently, indigenous 
peoples living in and around forests are officially targeted by Samdhana and AMAN. 
However, forests are not clearly defined within REDD policies, so that their definition 
leaves NGOs room for interpretation and local groups options for the strategic use of 
indigeneity.  
The ecological classification “forest” also plays a major role in the Partnership’s 
objective for supporting indigenous peoples. Indigenous issues entered the 
Partnership’s agenda only after the establishment of its Forest Governance Programme 
in 2007. Therefore, AMAN receives financial and other support mainly in the context 
of improving the management of forested areas. Thus, assistance for indigenous 
peoples living in coastal or urban areas is not provided in terms of indigeneity in the 
official policies of the Partnership. It is interesting that interviewees stated that some 
                                                        
10 The schemes Hutan Kemasyarakatan and Hutan Desa were adopted in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
They guarantee local communities the management of and benefits from forested areas. 
11 PNPM stands for Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Programme for Social 
Empowerment). The term peduli literally means “care”. PNPM Peduli was established in 2011. It is 
managed by the World Bank and funded by various international development agencies.  
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international funders actively took part in integrating forest and, at least, “indigenous” 
issues into the Partnership’s programme. When looking more closely at the contexts 
behind these policies, an interrelation between the Partnership’s focus on forests and 
international political dynamics seems obvious. Environment-oriented projects started 
in 2008, right after the 13th UN Climate Change Conference had been held in Bali in 
December, 2007, where UN member nations decided on direct actions for climate 
mitigation – including the implementation of REDD+.  
Agents for Climate Change and Stakeholders of Democracy 
The focus on REDD in the agenda of both the Partnership and Samdhana indicates 
that an overarching topic officially determines international support for indigenous 
peoples at the moment: climate change. Some of the names of Samdhana’s funding 
organisations, for example, the Climate and Land Use Alliance or the Climate Works 
Foundation, already point to the official dominance of this topic. Such donors endorse 
the thematic symbiosis of combating climate change and people-oriented development 
in policies. The Ford Foundation (2013), which funds the activities of both Samdhana 
and AMAN, intends, for example, to “contribute to mitigating climate change, while 
improving livelihoods of rural populations, particularly indigenous groups and ethnic 
minorities”. Thus, in the case of Samdhana, Indonesian activists together with foreign 
practitioners propagate indigenous knowledge as a contribution to climate change 
mitigation.  
Climate change is also a major issue within the Partnership’s programme. 
Nevertheless, since the organisation is more focused on socioeconomic and political 
development than on conservation, climate change is always contextualised within 
political reform measures towards good governance and democracy. By following their 
so-called “multi-stakeholder approach”, (good) “forest governance” has to be 
accomplished first to achieve climate change mitigation. Based on democratic 
principles such as participation, transparency and equality, the Partnership intends that 
all “stakeholders”, i.e. all relevant parties, are recognised, their rights legally secured 
and their voice given room in the public sphere. Therefore, AMAN, which is seen by 
the Partnership and its donors as the only and legitimated representative of the 
indigenous peoples in Indonesia, receives support as a “stakeholder” from this NGO 
in the context of natural resource management. Whereas Samdhana is officially guided 
by the assumption that indigenous peoples already possess methods to use the 
environment in a sustainable way, the Partnership backs efforts to “make these actors 
sustainable”. According to Samdhana, rural communities, including indigenous 
peoples, exert stewardship over the environment through “traditional knowledge”. 
Fellows even want to learn from these local communities and, thereby, aim at changing 
conventional conservation; they follow the ideological notion of social change “from 
the bottom up”.  
When practitioners from the Partnership told me about assets in regard to 
indigenous peoples, they mainly referred to people’s traditional skills in agriculture, 
which indigenous groups once possessed but lost due to modernisation processes, 
such as industrial agriculture. The Partnership wants to revive this knowledge and 
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these skills and combine it with market-oriented, economic thinking. Following this 
line, traditionally cultivated products could form an economic niche, which people 
could then use for sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. 
Moreover, statements of the Partnership suggest that they understand knowledge and 
skills, first and foremost, in terms of the quality of soil and its improvement, and less 
in human agency in general; they understand customary territories as fertile ground for 
sustainable agriculture.  
Safeguarding 
Benefits for and protection of indigenous peoples are nowadays often expressed as 
“safeguarding” in international policy frameworks for development measures. So-
called “safeguard policies”, thus, form a major official frame through which indigenous 
peoples become integrated into technically-oriented development theory and practice. 
In these policies, the need for the protection of indigenous peoples, to which 
development agencies should adhere, is based on their cultural distinctiveness. These 
actors, therefore, are characterised as a “cultural group” equipped with a special 
“cultural life” that needs to be preserved.  
In the context of the PNPM Peduli Project, the Partnership developed an 
“Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework”, which is stipulated by the World Bank.12 
It defines indigenous peoples as a “social group which has a distinct socio-cultural 
identity” and “socioeconomic benefits from projects have to be in line with the local 
culture” (Partnership 2011b, translation by M.H.S.). Remarkably, the Partnership partly 
integrated the governmental term komunitas adat terpencil (remote adat community) into 
the Framework. AMAN and many Indonesian activists contest this term, as, for them, 
it transports negative connotations of isolation and backwardness. In a disjunctive way, 
AMAN is, nevertheless, interested in continuing its collaboration with the Partnership, 
since the latter offers resources; the negative connotations of adat communities, which 
the latter transports, has no direct effect on the indigenous alliance. Samdhana adopts 
the concept of “safeguarding” as well. In its REDD Preparedness Project, the activities 
of organisations such as AMAN receiving small grants are termed as support that goes 
to groups which need to be safeguarded (The Samdhana Institute 2012).  
These identical notions used in international policy papers as well as in Indonesian 
NGOs’ working papers demonstrate the interrelation of official and unofficial 
collaborative arenas in regard to policies and practices of the NGOs. Ideas travel from 
the official, often internationally formed strategies of conservation and development 
through Indonesian contexts and become adopted by practitioners. On the other hand, 
ideas taken over from international or even Indonesian indigenous activism re-enter 
official discourses. The diffusion of these concepts is, I think, a consequence of the 
informal interactions and communications of actors working in different institutions 
                                                        
12 The Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF) is one of the World Banks’ Social Safeguard 
Policies. These are guidelines for the Bank and borrowers concerning project planning and 
implementation. Borrowers are obliged to formulate a project-related IPPF in order to guarantee 
sustainability within projects by defining stakeholders and stating their participation and benefit 
sharing (World Bank 2013a, 2013b).  
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and organisations. Thus, different ideologies or interpretations can prevail side-by-side 
as governmental and rather critical activists’ concepts. They do not break the discursive 
order of official policies in a disjunctive way, but instead coexist behind the texts 
where different interests are negotiated. This is made possible as practitioners 
strategically adopt dominant international topics to uphold this order so that they can 
gain resources.  
Mobile Lives and Organisational Cultures 
Samdhana’s Fellows and the Partnership’s practitioners are professionals in the fields 
of conservation, development practice and law. Professionalism implies technical 
expertise and know-how of methods and theories based on long-term experience. 
Professionalism in this domain, however, implies more than that, namely a mutual, 
historical understanding of indigenous issues which arise in various political, economic 
and social contexts in Indonesia. This understanding derives from long-lasting joint 
work between Indonesian and foreign practitioners and nationally and locally engaged 
activists, which had already started within the New Order era.  
During that oppressive era, environmentalism was the only channel open to NGOs 
to mobilise people on the local, national and international level to fight for 
democratisation and social change (Gordon 1998; Hirsch and Warren 1998; Okamoto 
2001; Moniaga 2004; Peluso et al. 2008). Thus, many now “professionalised” Fellows 
became engaged with conservation and activism simultaneously, as they intended to 
stop environmental and human exploitation, discrimination or harassment. Similarly, 
leading activists of AMAN and other mass organisations started to commit themselves 
to social change by supporting and establishing “indigenous”, “agrarian” or “peasant” 
movements (Peluso et al. 2008). Significantly, Indonesian and even some of the foreign 
Samdhana Fellows took part in the birth of these movements at the beginning of the 
1990s. They were students, young scientists or members of NGOs at that time. An 
intense exchange between activists from local communities and outsiders who studied 
and lobbied for the grass-roots took place. This resulted in nationwide networks and 
shared visions on how to improve local communities’ living conditions (Afiff and 
Lowe 2007). 
Moreover, studies about traditional land use and conservation in rural areas 
conducted by Indonesian and foreign scholars contributed to the argumentative 
ground of activism. It fuelled or even formed issues as Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management, participatory mapping and indigeneity, which, nowadays, are 
part of the official, political discourse. This discursive order was complemented with 
elements from the international indigenous movement through networking and 
coalition-building by Indonesian activists (Afiff and Lowe 2007; Peluso et al. 2008; see 
also the chapter by Steinebach in this volume). Up to the present day, shared lines of 
argumentation, which I have partly outlined above, are jointly advocated by what 
Peluso et al. in reference to Hajer call “discourse coalitions” (2008:379). Hence, a 
discursive professionalism has developed among practitioners, activists from mass 
organisations, such as AMAN, and within affiliated communities (see the chapter by 
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Grumblies in this volume). It connects the actors both personally and institutionally in 
the official as well as unofficial arenas of co-operation.  
From an analytical stance, mobility constitutes itself as a crucial element for these 
interrelational processes; however, it does so, I argue, in more than one dimension. 
Following Urry’s (2007) concept of mobilities, my findings reveal that the social 
mobility of individuals also becomes a crucial element for coalitions and providing 
indigenous actors with financial and political resources from national and international 
organisations.  
Most of the practitioners and activists literally “passed through” many institutions 
in the course of their personal career. They worked for national NGOs, international 
donors and/or research institutes, often on a project basis. Consequently, some people 
had been working simultaneously for AMAN and the Partnership, or Samdhana and 
the Partnership. In this way, the actors developed professional ties on an institutional 
level, which are essential for the intermediaries and especially for AMAN as a mass 
organisation until the present day. In addition to their changing employment, 
Indonesian activists and foreign professionals also developed personal relationships 
that developed into complete interpersonal networks. Driven by common interests and 
goals, friendships evolved with “the categories of friend and workmate cross[ing] from 
one to another” (Elliott and Urry 2010:57).  
At the same time, the various engagements of experts in different localities led to a 
geographical mobility which contributed to a multi-sited understanding of local 
situations. Indonesian activists, who had become more and more professionalised over 
time, could thereby uphold connections to local, rather unprofessional activism. 
Foreign practitioners, on the other hand, became sensitised to local needs, and thus, in 
a way, “activists” within their professional, technically oriented environment. These 
processes, I argue, nurtured the ideological ground of social justice, which, nowadays, 
binds Samdhana internally and also externally with AMAN. Moreover, these shared 
arenas of interaction bridge actors with different approaches, such as the Partnership 
and AMAN. The professionalisation through mobility and personal ties is, in turn, 
crucial for the functioning of AMAN, since activists need such know-how to 
manoeuvre in the international development scene, which requires project 
management or fund-raising. 
With the establishment of Samdhana, some of these personal and professional ties 
were gathered together and combined. Moreover, common visions are framed through 
the organisation. This can be traced within Samdhana’s organisational culture. In this 
regard, the Fellows’ similar mobile ways of life characterise organisational procedures: 
As their engagement for Samdhana as “advisers” or “mentors” is voluntarily 
conducted in addition to their main occupation, many of the practitioners are working 
in different places to realise Samdhana’s and other projects in, for example, 
conservation, community development or mapping. They literally hop from one place 
to the other, while their families and homes are often based in Jakarta, Bogor or even 
in another country. Those who work full-time for Samdhana, similarly travel within 
Indonesia or abroad, meet or skype with Fellows, partner organisations or donors in 
other countries to run the organisation.  
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Friendship as a result of social mobility is, therefore, part of Samdhana’s organisational 
culture. Besides the bonding effect on a personal level, actors also use these ties 
strategically in the institution in which they work, but rather in an informal way. While 
“friends” from donor organisations hold fellowship, befriended AMAN activists 
become advisers for projects within the Small Grants Programme. Even Fellows 
employed at state institutions are Samdhana members. Hence, plans for collaboration 
are often discussed in an informal way, based on mutual trust. In this way, the interests 
of funders and AMAN can be negotiated, while AMAN is given space for interests and 
ideas, which leads to a mutual adjustment of official programmes and policies.  
Concluding Remarks 
It becomes clear that the coalition-building of NGOs for indigenous peoples in 
Indonesia is determined by an interplay of processes between official and unofficial 
arenas of interaction. The examples of Samdhana and the Partnership illustrate 
different forms of “intermediaries” and contest the image that they are more or less 
just implementing their donors’ goals, as some critical constructivists within the 
Anthropology of Development assume (e.g. Petras 1999; Crawford 2003). The 
Partnership seems to be dominated by international, normative ideas at first sight. 
However, by looking more closely at both its policies and activities, it becomes evident 
that the organisation, in fact, supports concepts and issues derived from the 
indigenous and other social movements. Samdhana already demonstrates its rather 
“unconventional, activist approach” in the official arena of policies. Samdhana, 
nevertheless, adopts overarching issues such as climate change and REDD in a similar 
way to the Partnership. This shows that Samdhana is also part of the discursive order 
or “knowledge regime” into which NGOs are embedded. However, the presence of 
this order does not lead to a levelling or homogenisation of meaning and action. 
Instead, individuals make room for manoeuvring through interaction in an informal 
way under the surface of policies. Therefore, different interests of actors ranging from 
socioeconomic development over nature conservation to land rights are simultaneously 
advocated and negotiated between donors, NGOs and the indigenous peoples’ 
movement. 
Supporters of indigenous peoples and some of their representatives have 
established a space which constitutes a distinct social milieu of professionalism, 
knowledge and personal commitment between official and unofficial domains. This 
space encompasses international “professional” arenas, the indigenous peoples’ 
movement and even governmental institutions. In fact, it produces disjuncture; 
however, not so much in regard to the order of international development, but rather 
in terms of the dichotomic image of international development imperialism and 
oppositional social movements, as some constructivists such as Escobar (1992, 2012) 
or Veltmeyer (2005) assume. AMAN undertakes strategic endeavours by engaging with 
international development to acquire resources, which is a “disjunctive” behaviour as, 
officially, it may not always be in line with AMAN’s own ideology.    
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The interaction between individuals from development work and activism leads to a 
mobility of concepts within the official arena of co-operation and produces different 
notions of indigeneity. Thus, the notions do not simply resemble international 
concepts, but rather contain meanings which derive from distinct social contexts of 
these individuals. Such reworked ideas travel informally along personal ties of 
friendship or “fellowship” and shared experience. They are, therefore, very dynamic in 
meaning, but can also become normative through strategic advocacy of “discourse 
professionals”, entering dominant discourses. 
Thus, the space of non-governmental support for indigenous peoples in Indonesia 
emerges as an unrestrained melting pot of interests, strategies, arenas, and interaction, 








How Indigenous are the Balinese?   





Bali is an untypical case of indigeneity and the indigenous movement in Indonesia. The 
“autochthonous” (asli) Balinese, who understand themselves as Hindu Balinese, are not 
a minority but a dominant majority within their province. This dominant majority has 
decisively shaped the inter-cultural and -religious co-habitation of the inhabitants – 
among them an increasing number of non-Hindu – on the island. Only a handful of 
villages are members of the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago or 
AMAN, and many of the communities seem to be only half-hearted members. 
Membership obviously depends more on single, highly motivated actors, most of them 
well-educated and interested in economic and partly social modernisation according to 
their own visions; none of them belongs to a title-holding stratum of society. Actually, 
the majority of the Hindu Balinese do not feel “indigenous” in the internationalist 
sense of the word, but strongly support Balinese adat (“customs and traditions”) and, 
in this respect, understand themselves as masyarakat adat (literally “people whose life is 
governed by traditions”). In Bali, adat is intrinsically linked to agama (religion), an issue 
AMAN carefully circumnavigates. It is, therefore, the aim of this chapter to explore 
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why Bali, as a stronghold of adat, does not apparently need AMAN to attain self-
determination and national as well as international recognition, as most other member 
communities outside of Bali hope to gain through the support of this organisation.  
After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, the politics of decentralisation and 
regionalisation – the latter conferred power especially to the district level (kabupaten) 
(and less to the provinces) – constituted a turning point in the significance of adat and 
masyarakat adat  within society and the nation as a whole (Henley and Davidson 2007). 
While one of the main goals of decentralisation and regionalisation was the promotion 
of democratisation by delegating responsibility and power to institutions and bodies in 
the provinces, the social, political and economic conditions of many masyarakat adat 
started to change considerably (Schulte Nordholt and Klinken 2007; Holtzappel 2009). 
This chapter, therefore, examines the special case of Bali, the significance of 
Balinese adat in the political social and context of the province and its relation to dinas, 
the administrative governmental organisation of village life. I will investigate why some 
communities have at least formally joined AMAN and with what expectations. I will 
start by briefly outlining the provincial regulation Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Bali 
nomor 2001 (Perda 03/2001) and the way in which regional autonomy was 
implemented by taking Hindu Balinese adat as a basis of its constitution (see 
Janamijaya et al. 2003). I will then show how people view the relationship between 
“being Balinese” and “being Indonesian” and try to establish a kind of division of 
labour and with what consequences between their own adat organisation and AMAN, 
each of them with its particular goals. 
Adat as the Regulatory Principle  
The post-Suharto Balinese Provincial Regulation, Perda 03/2001, contains a couple of 
crucial elements that reflect the Hindu Balinese’s attempt to establish a province 
regulation that takes their particular adat as a starting point (Ramstedt 2009).  
As the Perda introduction shows, the desa adat was renamed desa pakraman. Thus, a 
Sanskrit word (kraman), which had already been used in old-Balinese inscriptions, 
replaced the more recent expression of Arabic origin, adat (Ramstedt 2009:350-351; 
Picard 2011:120-121). The desa pakraman is described as the unity of masyarakat hukum 
adat, that is, a customary legal community. According to Perda 03/2001, the desa 
pakraman has developed over centuries and possesses an original autonomy (otonomi 
asli) that has provided the basis for the living and the prosperity of its inhabitants. By 
calling the Balinese villagers “umat Hindu” (congregation of agama Hindu or the Hindu 
people), the desa pakraman – the only type of village mentioned in the regulation – is 
defined as a community sharing the same religion. The characteristics of the Balinese 
village are: the Three Village Temple system (kahyangan tiga or kahyangan desa) and a 
village territory (palemahan). The villagers (warga desa pakraman) are also seen as those 
who have an inner and outer attachment to the temples and the ceremonies carried out 
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there. Furthermore, awig-awig or village regulations,1  are based on the Hindu Balinese 
concept of Tri Hita Karana (“Three Causes of Wellbeing”)2 and are part of the village 
properties. The village assembly, paruman desa, is a further constituent. This is the 
legislative body that takes decisions based on discussion and consultations; it is 
orchestrated by the pengurus or (a number of) prajuru, village officials with different 
tasks. The latter are elected or appointed by the village community according to its 
awig-awig. Such a village assembly is complemented – in a bottom-up way – by the 
paruman alit on the sub-district level (kecamatan), by the paruman madya on the district 
level and, finally, by the paruman agung on the provincial level. The paruman agung or the 
Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman consists of the council of village prajuru and is the 
highest adat body of the province.3  
Furthermore, Perda 03/2001 officially acknowledges the function of a village adat 
police or security force (pecalang) that had formerly performed only in the context of 
temple festivals and ceremonies. Pecalang, as the Balinese adat police, complements (or 
sometimes even challenges) the dinas police or the official state police. The 2001 
regulation also spells out that the desa pakraman is seen as the fundamental actor for the 
protection (pengayoman), empowerment (pemberdayaan) and preservation (pelestarian) of 
Balinese adat and culture (budaya) and the values associated with them, especially for 
the sake of Bali’s identity (jati diri).  
 
I would like to briefly comment on the way in which adat has been used in this 
regulation. Bali and Balinese culture had been the most important tourist destination of 
Indonesia for decades and, therefore, a major source of income for the central 
government. The Balinese struggled with the New Order government in order to 
regain control over their island, their culture and their lives. Perda 03/2001 also 
mirrors the fact that the Hindu Balinese had perceived themselves (and, in fact, had 
been) a powerless religious and cultural minority within the centralised state. 
Additionally, they had been exposed to almost unrestricted external cultural influence 
through international tourism which also resulted in a touristification of society (Picard 
1996; Schulte Nordholt 2007). Simultaneously, distinctiveness and cultural identity 
(kebalian) became more and more important issues which finally resulted in the ajeg 
                                                        
1 Perda 03/2001 states that the awig-awig may not contradict religion (agama), the five national 
principles as formulated in the Pancasila, the National Constitution, and the basic rights it grants 
(Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), or human rights. It would need further discussion to discover whether 
individual awig-awig contain discriminations in one form or another (for example, due to religion or 
cultural origin). 
2 Tri Hita Karana outlines the balance of three different relationships people should follow: the 
relationship between the village and God (parhyangan), the relationship between the members of the 
desa pakraman (pawongan) and the relationship of the villagers with their natural environment 
(palemahan) (for more details, see Ramstedt 2009:344-350). This concept has become more influential 
since the 1980s, not least in political matters, such as the Balinese’s protest against huge tourism 
projects promoted by the central government and carried out without consulting the provincial 
authorities in the 1990s (see Warren 2007). 
3 The individual village assemblies are institutionalised and merged under the umbrella of majelis 
(forum, council), majelis utama on the province level, majelis madya on the district level and majelis alit 
on the sub-district level. 
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Bali, the political and cultural conservative movement which arose after the Bali 
bombings in the 2000s (Schulte Nordholt 2007). 
 
Compared with the situation during the New Order era, Perda 03/2001 steers in the 
opposite direction: It apparently aims at creating a province based on one single form 
of adat, the adat of the Hindu Balinese.4 Thus, the regulation creates a new form of 
cultural citizenship – being Hindu Balinese, being guided by Hindu Balinese principles 
and living under Hindu Balinese conditions – that seems to be more important than 
national citizenship (see Hauser-Schäublin and Harnish in press).5 Cultural citizenship 
– in Bali equalled with provincial citizenship by being a member first and foremost of a 
particular village – privileges one segment of society (the Hindu Balinese). Perda 
03/2001 turned a national minority (the Hindu Balinese) into the dominant majority of 
the province and endowed it with special rights – at the expense of other minorities 
(Christian, Buddhist, Chinese, and Muslim Balinese, as well as labour migrants, mostly 
in the service of Bali’s tourist industry, from other parts of Indonesia). In contrast to 
cultural citizenship, national citizenship postulates equality and equal rights for all its 
citizens (whether equality and equal rights are really granted in practice is another 
question). Therefore, Perda 03/2001 has created an inequality among Indonesian 
citizens living in Bali province.  
A closer look at the way in which “the Balinese village” is described in Perda 
03/2001 reveals particularities that do not necessarily fit with what is historically 
documented. The regulation mirrors a vision of “the Balinese village” that resonates 
some of Dutch colonial fantasies, such as an egalitarian and democratic “village 
republic” (Korn 1984). This image, in fact, neglects that – though in changing 
combinations and in varying degrees – most of the villages had been at some time 
bound in religious, economic and political networks culminating in principalities and 
kingdoms. There were large areas of land owned by kings and also by royal temples 
which had been worked by villagers in corvée. Although most of the disputes which 
arose in a village were solved by the villagers themselves, many cases – especially in 
conflicts over land and water between villages – were brought to the attention of 
regional lords or even kings, who, as a rule, had the institution of a kerta, a tribunal, at 
their palaces. In this jurisdiction, Brahmana priests played an important role. 
Conversely, offenders of royal regulations were brought directly to this court and 
sentenced. Apart from the integration of villages into such overarching polities, 
Balinese society was a stratified society, ranking from the nobility down to slaves.     
Furthermore, in many villages, even if they were not (or no longer) part of a 
principality, the village organisation (krama desa) was (and still is) based on the principle 
of seniority and open only to married men who were born in that village. In some 
places, the most important offices were inherited within particular families who were in 
a definitely more powerful position than others.  
                                                        
4 It has to be noted that the regulation, though in general emphasising the more or less unchanged 
nature of adat, also suggests that Balinese culture should not close itself to “the influence of other 
positive cultural values”. 
5 Perda 03/2001 mentions in one paragraph that the national culture (kebudayaan nasional) should be 
cultivated, preserved and developed as well. 
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With regard to their location, many villages were not fixed entities but quite a lot of 
fluctuations took place in the course of centuries. Families or whole settlements moved 
in and out due to changing political, social, economic, and ecological conditions. 
Battles between principalities, invading newcomers (“pirates”) and conflicts between 
and within villages contributed to in and out fluxes. Village boundaries often changed, 
according to the (power) relationships within and between the villages and the 
outcome of disputes.  
The question of village boundaries is one of the most sensitive subjects in the 
Provincial Regulation since it raises the distinction between desa dinas (the official 
administrative village) and desa adat (the customary village), a differentiation the Dutch 
had introduced as part of the restructuring of their colony. The goal was to keep the 
domain of Balinese religion and customs, which they wanted to preserve in its original 
condition, separate from the domain of politics and administration of the colonial 
government. Thus, two types of villages were created, sometimes even with different 
territorial boundaries. This division was taken over by the Indonesian state after 
Independence (Warren 2007). Characteristically, Perda 03/2001 does not even 
mention the administrative village. Today, disputes over boundaries are one of the 
reasons why some villages want to abolish the distinction by giving priority to desa 
adat/pakraman. In many other cases, the incongruence of the dinas and adat boundaries 
lead to the splitting up of villages (pemekaran).6 
This brief review of some results of historical research in comparison to desa 
pakraman as described in Perda 03/2001 shows that the latter operates with an idealised 
picture of “the Balinese village”, an image that emphasises continuity, immutability and 
stability. Moreover, it also suggests that Balinese society was based on equality and was 
a fundamentally democratic social organisation. 
Adat between Self-Determination and National Loyalty 
Apart from the cultural, social and political privileges the desa pakraman, but even more 
the districts enjoy, there is also an economic advantage from which these units benefit: 
They receive a substantial share of the redistribution of taxes (see Review Regulasi 
n.d.). According to the Surat Keputusan Gubernur no. 65/2001, the percentage the 
eight kabupaten and the province capital, Denpasar, receive together is higher (60%) 
than the share of the province (40%; Review Regulasi n.d.). Moreover, every desa 
pakraman receives an annual contribution from the provincial government. In sum: 
The position of the adat villages within the province and the economic and political 
empowerment they have reached since the end of the New Order regime has increased 
remarkably. There is probably not much left on the agenda of promotion, participation 
and autonomy the desa pakraman could wish to get. The postulates AMAN set up in its 
first congress all seem to be fulfilled. So what kind of support does Bali – or rather the 
                                                        
6 In the interviews I had with AMAN representatives in Bali in 2012, the number of desa pakraman in 
Bali was given as 1,458. In an official announcement issued in November 2012, the number was 
given as 1,480. In 2003, 1,399 desa pakraman were listed (Janamijaya et al. 2003); thus, 81 new desa 
pakraman came into being within ten years. 
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villages and representatives who are members of AMAN – expect from this well-
established nationwide organisation?  
As the records of the first congress of AMAN illustrate – and many informants 
also told me – one of the influential founding members was I Nyoman Sueta from 
Catur (Bangli) (AMAN 1999).7 Under the New Order, the Balinese had already gained 
experience in formulating and using adat as a means to position and defend themselves 
against the national government (see Ramstedt  2012:10). One of the key contests of 
power between the Balinese and the central government, which also gained worldwide 
attention, was fought over the Bali Nirvana Resort project near the temple of Tanah 
Lot in the 1990s (Warren 1998, 2007). The Balinese representative, therefore, was 
probably an important actor in the constitution of AMAN in 1999. 
The Hindu Balinese inhabitants of the province could be considered as a single 
masyarakat adat in the way they are described in Perda 03/2001. The AMAN definition 
is almost congruent with it: The Hindu Balinese share a genealogical origin, they live in 
a defined geographical area, have a joint system of (Hindu) values and ideology, as well 
as a similar economic, social and political organisation; in sum, a shared culture. Yet, 
Bali, or rather the collective of the desa pakraman (the Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman as 
an overarching body), is not a member of AMAN but individual settlements are. Seven 
registered members from Bali were on the AMAN list in 2012 (AMAN 2012d). These 
are: desa adat/pakraman Antap Dlod Sema (Tabanan); Catur (Bangli); Mayungan 
Let/desa Antapan (Tabanan); dusun/banjar Pengubengan Kauh–Kerobokan, Kuta 
(Badung); desa adat Les (Buleleng); banjar Bendesa, desa adat/pakraman Penarukan 
(Buleleng); banjar adat Banjar Jawa, desa pakraman Kota Singaraja. The list reveals that 
the Balinese communities are heterogeneous in several respects. First of all, these 
member units are not all desa pakraman but some are only neighbourhoods, banjar. The 
choice of the villages seems to be random, as well as the size of the settlements, their 
location in the province, and the districts. Not all kabupaten are even represented: 
Gianyar, Jembrana, Karangasem, and Klungkung are missing.  
Almost without exception, these banjar and villages have become AMAN members 
because of the individual actors who were already engaged in other social networks 
and, therefore, took the initiative.8 All of these actors, local representatives of AMAN, 
had an academic education. Several of them have been members of AMAN since its 
inception and are experienced in the politics of “culture” or adat and in dealing with 
NGOs. In almost all cases, these individuals – all male and most of them below 50 – 
raised the issue of AMAN membership in the banjar or village assembly and convinced 
their fellow villagers to agree to a corporate AMAN membership. Many of the 
activities the local AMAN representatives have taken up reflect their personal ideas 
and goals. There are no special forums in the villages where AMAN issues are 
discussed and decisions made, thus, leaving quite a large range of action to the 
                                                        
7 Together with I Nyoman Resiyasa, (the late) I Nyoman Sueta became one of the first two 
representatives of Bali in the National Council of AMAN. 
8 For reasons of protection, I will keep the identity and the local origin of my interlocutors 
anonymous in cases where their statements may create conflicts. 
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individual AMAN members. These activists are well interlinked and frequently 
communicate with each other. 
When AMAN came into being, there had been many more Balinese villages or 
neighbourhoods, about 40, which became members of AMAN, as one of my 
interlocutors pointed out. Since everyone had had their own ideas about what and how 
things should be done, he said, it had been difficult to reach any agreement or 
conclusion. As a consequence, many villages quit AMAN. With seven left, the 
discussion of core issues is apparently easier than before.9  
I Made Suarnata from banjar Pengubengan Kauh, Kerobokan (Kuta), referred to 
the fact that Balinese villages are not uniform and, therefore, have different issues on 
the agenda. The structure and the size of villages are in some cases so complex and 
unwieldy that they can be considered neither as a single unit, nor are they able to act as 
such. Desa adat Kerobokan, for example, consists of 50 banjar. How can the assemblies 
of 50 neighbourhoods be convinced that they should join a voluntary association such 
as AMAN? Their interests may be too divergent. Moreover, this desa pakraman is not 
linked to a desa dinas with an elected village head. Since Kerobokan is part of Bali’s 
most important tourist strip, Kuta, Kerobokan has the status of a kelurahan (a higher 
administrative unit that is part of the district of Kuta). The lurah, the leader of a 
kelurahan, is not elected by the people but is a civil servant, that is, an office holder 
appointed by the administration. He, therefore, carries out national or provincial 
policies and not, first and foremost, the wishes of the villagers. 
Another example is Banjar Jawa in the city of Singaraja, the home of another of 
AMAN’s representatives. Banjar Jawa is a banjar pakraman (that is, not an 
administrative neighbourhood) that belongs to the kecamatan of Buleleng.10 The 
kecamatan Buleleng consists of 30 desa dinas or kelurahan; from the perspective of adat, it 
comprises 21 desa pakraman. Desa pakraman Buleleng is part of the town of Singaraja 
(the administrative capital of Buleleng) and Banjar Jawa is one of the desa pakraman’s 14 
banjar pakraman.11 However, at the same time Banjar Jawa is administratively a 
kelurahan. Thus, the pattern or structure of the kecamatan, and even more the kabupaten, 
is intricate with cross-cutting units and structures of desa dinas/kelurahan and desa 
pakraman. Furthermore, some villages and banjar or dusun have either a Hindu Balinese 
or Muslim majority, which creates a further element of heterogeneity. Viewed together 
from the perspective of adat and dinas, a complicated picture emerges that turns Banjar 
Jawa into a multilayered entity with corresponding structures and authorities. These 
                                                        
9 These seven AMAN officials are also networking with many actors in other villages. Therefore, 
many other places are indirectly involved in AMAN discussions. 
10 Together with eight further sub-districts, the kecamatan of Buleleng constitutes the district 
(kabupaten) Buleleng.  
11 The name of Banjar Jawa might suggest a settlement of Muslim from Java. In fact, there is a small 
Muslim community living there which has its own cemetery. Yet, the majority are Hindu-Balinese. 
According to oral histories, Banjar Jawa was founded when a king of Majapahit sent an elephant as a 
present to the Balinese king. Those Javanese who had brought the elephant to Bali, remained there 
and founded a settlement, Banjar Jawa. Many of the original inhabitants later moved to a Muslim 
settlement, kampong Mumbul. 
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multiple classifications create cross-cutting units, each with particular boundaries. 
Apart from adat communities, there are also those of religion, agama (see below).  
It is evident that the divergence between adat and dinas, on the one hand, and the 
different administrative level (desa dinas and kelurahan) with either elected or appointed 
office holders, on the other hand, does not promote the consolidation and the sharing 
of the goals of the Balinese of either agama. Several Balinese adat representatives 
emphasised that this situation calls for two different types of loyalties, each directed to 
different institutions and their centres, as well as their different goals. I Made Nurbawa 
put it in a nutshell when he said: “I have two citizenships: I am a citizen of Indonesia 
and a citizen of Bali” (“Saya statusnya dua kewarganegaranya: saya sebagai warga Negara Adat 
Bali dan sebagai warga Negara Indonesia”). “But when should I (or can I) be”, he 
continued, “a national citizen and when a Balinese adat citizen?”  
The respondents expressed in several interviews that the gap between desa dinas and 
desa adat (or pakraman) has grown wider since otonomi daerah (regional autonomy); at the 
same time, the exigency to live up to both has become more difficult. The respondents 
stressed that they did not challenge national citizenship, the national constitution, state 
law, or national unity. They saw it as a framework within which they tried to 
accommodate or find a niche where they could achieve their Balineseness and 
autonomy.12 Most of my interlocutors pleaded for a reunification of both types of 
villages or, rather, for a restoration of the pre-colonial conditions, though some 
conceded that it would be difficult to say what consequences this would have for the 
villagers concerning adat and dinas.  
Division of Labour between Majelis Desa Pakraman and AMAN 
This issue, whether desa dinas and desa adat should be merged, is, as all interlocutors 
underlined, an exclusively inner-Balinese problem. They referred to otonomi daerah when 
asked about such matters and the role of AMAN; they said that a division of labour 
exists. The Majelis Desa Pakraman, the council or forum of all desa pakraman, is 
responsible for inner-Balinese questions. Its tasks consist, as described in Perda 
03/2001, of the promotion and protection of adat; this forum should also assist in the 
organisation of religious ceremonies (upacara keagamaan) when needed.13 The inner-
Balinese disputes related to adat, which an individual village is unable to solve, are 
reported to this forum as a counselling and decision-making body. The case is usually 
firstly brought to the sub-district level. If no solution can be achieved, the case is 
handed over to the next higher section until it reaches the highest level, the Majelis 
Utama Desa Pakraman of the province. The Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman is the 
official partner of the governor in adat matters. During meetings, the governor 
                                                        
12 Some said that the desa pakraman should also receive judiciary rights according to adat law. Others 
saw this as rather problematic, since such judgements based on adat law could contradict national law. 
However, they agreed that a village should have a justice of the peace (hakim perdamaian).  
13 Several of the respondents underlined that AMAN pushed the Balinese to create an adat 
organisation that encompasses the individual villages. The institution of Majelis Desa Pakraman (as 
outlined in Perda 03/2001) is also said to be the result of AMAN and other Balinese activists.  
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announces the latest political decisions concerning adat, especially the amount of 
money (redistribution of taxes) destined for the adat communities.14 Majelis Utama 
Desa Pakraman also receives annual financial aid from the provincial government: 1 
billion Rp./year for Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman (province), 100 million Rp./year 
for Majelis Madya Desa Pakraman (district) and 50 million Rp./year for the Majelis 
Alit Desa Pakraman (sub-district) (Metrobali March 15, 2013).  
 
The task of this institution to decide in matters of adat in such a way that the parties 
concerned are ready to accept its decision is not an easy one. The intra-village conflicts 
over pemekaran (splitting up) are sensitive issues which are difficult to solve. The forum 
failed, for example, to achieve reconciliation or to restore peace in the case of banjar 
adat Tamblingan which wanted to split from desa pakraman Munduk. The major 
problem is that the council’s decision is understood by both parties as biased, either by 
pleading for the status quo or for splitting.  
Ironically, the attempts of smaller units to split off from a desa pakraman are one of 
the consequences of otonomi daerah and the quest to receive a bigger share of the taxes. 
As briefly mentioned, the Provincial Government redistributes a certain amount of the 
taxes among the almost 1,500 desa pakraman. This money is then divided among the 
banjar adat, the neighbourhoods. The temptation to get the full sum allocated to a 
village with the official status of a desa pakraman seems to be a common motif of banjar 
adat for pemekaran (Bali Post January 3, 2013).15 Such internal matters, though 
intrinsically linked to the many ways in which adat has become a fundamental issue 
even in everyday life, are kept within the province, although it clearly transgresses the 
boundaries between adat and dinas; even parliamentarians get involved in such 
problematic cases as well.16 Two Balinese AMAN representatives who live in the same 
desa pakraman, Les, though in different banjar pakraman, know about the challenge 
associated with this division since this single desa pakraman is divided into two desa 
dinas. Should the desa pakraman also split into two and follow the path of the separate 
desa dinas? Or should the two desa dinas merge? There are proponents of both solutions.  
Nevertheless, the problem of which social unit should be eligible for AMAN 
membership has not yet been solved. Should each Hindu Balinese banjar or desa 
pakraman have the opportunity of becoming an individual member of AMAN? What 
implications would it have on AMAN if more than 1,480 desa pakraman (not to 
mention their sub-units, the banjar) became individual members?  
                                                        
14 For example, the Governor of Bali announced at a meeting with the Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman 
at the governor’s office in November, 2012, that each of the 1,480 desa pakraman will receive 100 
million Rupiah in 2013 (Berita dewata 2012). 
15 In March, 2013 (the election of the Governor takes place in 2013), the Governor even promised 
200 million Rupiah per adat village for 2013 (Metrobali March 15, 2013). 
16 Another problem, though clearly linked to the adat/dinas division of villages, are territorial 
boundaries (since the territory of a desa dinas may differ from the boundaries of a desa pakraman) and 
the implementation of otonomi daerah. This may cause problems for some villages that rely on the 
traditional use of resources (such as well) sometimes located on the territory of a neighbouring 
village. 
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As I Made Rimbawa, a former judge and the AMAN representative of kabupaten 
Buleleng, explained, the current contingency of membership should be replaced by 
more evident and convincing criteria for membership. The villages and their 
inhabitants, especially in north Bali, cannot be considered as displaying a homogenous 
culture. Many villages are culturally mixed with Balinese of Chinese descent, Muslim 
and Christians (Muslim and Christian Balinese, Arabs as well as migrant workers) living 
there. The Chinese do not practice separatism by living only among themselves, as one 
interlocutor emphasised. Probably due to their economic function – as traders, 
shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, and other business men, but also truck drivers – they live 
in a rather dispersed way. Therefore, they do not aim at setting up their own desa 
pakraman.17 My interlocutor contrasted the ethnic Chinese, most of whom practice Tri 
Dharma or Kong Hu Cu (Confucian) rituals, with Muslims who prefer living together 
in separate units. There are Muslim settlements (all of them with the administrative 
status of kelurahan) in the town of Singaraja18 (and beyond), such as Kampung Bugis, 
Kampung Anyar, Kampung Baru, and Kelurahan Banjar Bali. Some villages in 
Buleleng, especially in the kecamatan Sukasada and Gerokgak, have a Muslim majority. I 
Made Rimbawa pointed out that Buleleng has always been a region of cultural plurality 
and had to accommodate the fact that adat does not mean the same for all these 
different communities.  
Similar to the Hindu Balinese, some of the traditional Muslim villages also have 
their own territory, their own customs and their own places of worship (seen as 
equivalent to the Hindu Three Temple System) as well as their own burial place. Some 
of the Muslim villages have also pleaded to the provincial government to become 
recognised as desa pakraman (Rieger in press); to my knowledge, the decision is still 
pending. In this multi-religious context, the question of adat and whether it can be 
limited to Hindu Balinese adat as defined in Perda 03/2001 arises.  
Three Categories of Balinese Adat and Culture 
To acknowledge this cultural plurality, local AMAN leaders summoned a meeting 
(musyawarah) with village adat representatives from the district of Buleleng. As a result 
of these discussions, they proposed the creation of three categories of Balinese culture 
as represented in the district. Each category should become a collective member of 
AMAN. These three categories were: Bali Pesisir, Bali Mula and Bali Apanage 
(Laporan Hasil MUSDA AMAN 2011). Bali Pesisir subsumes the Balinese who are 
living along the north coast. All these villages have been interacting with the outside 
world for centuries due to their location on the trading route to the Spice Islands. 
Many of them have adapted elements from merchants, sailors, savants, and saints from 
other Indonesian islands and far beyond (see Hauser-Schäublin and Ardika 2008). 
                                                        
17 As a respondent explicated, the Chinese do not have a particular adat organisation but have a 
funeral organisation (organisasi kematian) called Bukit Suci (Pure Hill), which unites the Chinese 
independent of their residence. 
18 Singaraja is divided into 18 kelurahan and 1 desa dinas (Desa Baktiseraga), 
http://ciptakarya.pu.go.id/profil/profil/timur/bali/singaraja.pdf. <June 24, 2013>. 
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Among the Bali Pesisir, there are also mixed Hindu-Muslim as well as Muslim villages. 
Some local AMAN representatives have so far already proposed four Muslim villages 
(Kampung Singaraja, Pegayaman, Kampung Bugis, and Kampung Kajanan), all 
belonging to the Bali Pesisir category, for membership of AMAN. 
The category of Bali Mula (sometimes also called Bali Aga, though the 
interpretation and assessment of both terms vary) contains a number of villages which 
the Dutch had originally classified as pre-Hindu or even animistic (see Hauser-
Schäublin 2004). These are mainly villages in the mountain area that had not been 
under the continuous influence (or dominance) of the Hindu courts (and their priests) 
in the south. They, therefore, practiced rituals (such as burying a corpse instead of 
cremating it) that differed from those in the southern plains. After a consultative 
meeting in Singaraja in 2011, the AMAN representatives listed seven villages as Bali 
Mula (Laporan Hasil MUSDA AMAN 2011). 
The category of Bali Apanage consists of the “main-stream” Balinese culture. Many 
noble immigrants from south Bali are living in such “Apanage villages” in Buleleng. 
Many of these families are affiliated in one or the other way to royal courts and 
Brahmana priests; today, many of them hold important positions in these villages.  
The AMAN leaders from Buleleng have submitted a request for acknowledgement 
of the three categories of Balinese culture and accepting them as members of the 
organisation to the headquarters of AMAN. An answer has not yet arrived (in July 
2012). 
The tripartite categorisation of “the Hindu Balinese” reminds one of Geertz’s 
classification of three socio-cultural or religious streams (aliran) in Java: He 
distinguished the court-oriented, refined priyai from the syncretic abangan tradition of 
the peasantry and the santri of the pious Muslim worldview (Geertz 1960, but see also 
Latif 2008). Without discussing whether this classification is “correct” or not, we have 
to note that this adaptation to Bali is understandable in the attempt to acknowledge 
plurality with regard to possible AMAN membership and to overcome 
homogenization and limitation to the Hindu Balinese. Nevertheless, it will be difficult 
to anticipate the consequences of these new distinctions which, as such, emphasise 
difference by eclipsing similarities and interconnectedness. In fact, the distinction 
especially between “Bali Mula/Aga” and “Apanage” becomes increasingly blurred by 
intra Hindu Balinese reformation resulting in standardisation – and by Perda 03/2001, 
which defines “the Hindu Balinese village” (see above and Hauser-Schäublin and 
Harnish in press).  
Additionally, the progressing economic development (mainly tourism) and 
urbanisation of Bali and its corresponding lifestyles also raise the question, to what 
extent does adat still determine everyday life, especially of job holders and city dwellers.  
All of my interlocutors were aware of the difficulty of defining adat without mixing 
it with agama (see Hauser-Schäublin 2011). The latter, religion, is consequently avoided 
by AMAN as an organisation. It focuses exclusively on adat and, in fact, has managed 
to unite Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and any other followers of ritual practices and 
beliefs throughout the archipelago by arguing on behalf of adat. In the case of Bali, 
local adat, as described in Perda 03/2001, is intrinsically linked to agama Hindu (see also 
Warren 2007). The amalgamation of adat and agama for the non-Hindu Balinese are 
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experienced even in their everyday life. It is, therefore, no surprise that Muslim village 
representatives wrote “keagamaan” or “religi” into the AMAN list when asked about 
their local particularities. By contrast, the Hindu Balinese filled in dance performances 
and the like (Laporan Hasil MUSDA AMAN 2011). Thus, the question I asked my 
interlocutors was, if the Balinese speak of their adat – as Bali Hindu or Hindu Bali – do 
they not anticipate that it is inseparably interlinked with agama?  
Most of my respondents denied that adat Bali also implies agama Hindu. One of 
them added the term budaya (culture) to emphasise the neutrality when he spoke of 
“budaya adat Bali-Hindu”. On further enquiry, he added that Balinese citizens of the 
Muslim creed are already included in this term; he made a distinction between “budaya 
Hindu” and “budaya adat Bali Hindu”. The former implied a Hindu culture, the latter a 
“culture of Bali Hindu adat”. Concerning the name of their religion, he said, he would 
have preferred “Agama Bali” as the official denomination, but since the national state 
requires that each citizen follows a world religion, the government would not have 
accepted this name (Picard 2004, 2011).19 Therefore, the affiliation with Hinduism as a 
world religion was chosen and accepted as a name. Today, many Balinese ask 
themselves whether “Agama Hindu” should not to be changed to “Agama Hindu Bali” 
to emphasise the localised aspect of this religion (Picard 2011). The interlocutor 
concluded that it is the spirit of Hinduism that enlivens Balinese adat: Perda 03/2001 
already makes the interconnection between adat and agama (especially in the definition 
of the tasks of Majelis Desa Pakraman) explicit. The same interlocutor added that 
another forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama), in which he is also involved, is 
taking care of harmonious relations between communities of different religions. 
In sum, as has become evident, adat cannot be treated as an independent category 
but is interlinked with agama – and also with politics. In the province of Bali, the Hindu 
Balinese are the dominant majority, as acknowledged and reinforced by the Provincial 
Regulation (Perda 03/2001). All other non-Hindu Balinese – clearly minorities – have 
become second-class citizens in their own province. This seems to exceed by far the 
expectations and goals the AMAN founders had in 1999.  
However, one of my interlocutors still regretted that local AMAN’s efforts and 
goals did not sufficiently acknowledge the expectations and claims of Balinese activists, 
particularly to get a bigger share of taxes from the central government for the benefit 
of Bali and its culture. He expects the elaboration of more explicit policies from 
AMAN and, therefore, welcomed the founding (in 2012) of Forum Perjuangan Hak 
Bali (Forum for the Fight for Balinese Rights, FPHB; see Joewono 2012). One of the 
main actors is the secretary of Majelis Madya Desa Pakraman in Denpasar.20 
What are the Balinese AMAN activists’ further expectations concerning AMAN as 
a nationwide organisation? 
                                                        
19 Balinese Hinduism was recognised as one of the national religions by the government in 1958. 
20 This forum seems to be founded as a reaction to the Permendagri No. 32/2011 (Peraturan Menteri 
Dalam Negeri Nomor 32, 2011 Tentang Pedoman Pemberian Hibah Dan Bantuan Sosial Yang 
Bersumber Dari Anggaran Pendapatan Dan Belanja Daerah). This regulation of the Ministry of the 
Interior outlines (and redefines) the relationship between the central government and the provinces 
concerning the redistribution of taxes destined as support and social assistance in the provinces. 
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One respondent pointed out that a formalized link between Majelis Desa Pakraman 
(which, ultimately, is an institution set up by the province) and AMAN does not yet 
exist. A closer cooperation could create more synergy. Since Bali is a province with a 
high percentage of foreigners living there (work migrants, tourists, investors, business 
people, etc.), one respondent expressed the hope that the Hindu Balinese will get 
support from AMAN as a national organisation. AMAN could or should assist the 
Hindu Balinese in their own endeavour to facilitate the adaptation of foreigners to 
Balinese culture: The foreigners should learn more about Balinese culture and behave 
in an appropriate way. This field is seen as a possible interface between AMAN and 
Majelis Desa Pakraman.  
Addressing the Future: “Bali Goes Global” 
An overview of the activities and goals of the Balinese AMAN representatives shows 
that they predominantly understand AMAN as a national organisation with excellent 
international networks and donor organisations. They appreciate the direct contact and 
the exchange of ideas with other AMAN members from different provinces during 
national meetings. For them, AMAN is seen as a two-way bridge from the local to the 
national and the global perspective. One of the representatives, who is also member of 
the UNESCO Board supervising the Balinese UNESCO World Heritage (listed in 
2012), emphasised that Balinese culture is now propagated worldwide. The Balinese 
World Heritage bears the title: “Cultural Landscape of Bali Province: the Subak System 
as a Manifestation of the Tri Hita Karana Philosophy” (Cultural Landscape 2012). In 
the nomination text, the Balinese subak or wet rice irrigation system is featured as a 
social and material expression of the Hindu Balinese “philosophical concept” of Tri 
Hita Karana, which brings together the realms of the spirit, the human world and 
nature” (ibidem). Described as (an unchanging) spiritual-ecological irrigation model 
and practice, this important aspect of Balinese culture is understood as an exemplar for 
the world community: “Balinese culture goes global”, as another respondent called it.  
My Balinese interlocutors, almost without an exception, saw the strength of 
AMAN in shaping the future of their villages and Bali as a province. They realised that 
the preservation of adat is not enough for a viable future. Several of the representatives 
are running social, economic and ecological development projects or NGOs, some of 
them with considerable success: I Made Suarnata, the AMAN representative from 
Pengubenang (Kerobokan), is very active in the environmental NGO Yayasan Wisnu. 
He and the AMAN representatives from Les and Catur are involved in a number of 
different projects, all of them with a strong environmental component, such as 
ecowisata (ecotourism), agrowisata (agrotourism), aquawisata (the rehabilitation of 
coral reefs for snorkelers) or the production of certified bio coffee. The idea of 
sustainable economic and social development is prevalent in their expectations for the 
future. They all aim at empowering the villagers and assisting them in gaining new 
sources of income by cultivating, at the same time, the “spirit of adat” in the sense of 
Tri Hita Karana.  
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The Yayasan Wisnu also has special programmes for “capacity building” in the villages 
on its agenda; capacity building should create the prerequisite for the implementation 
of sustainable projects on the local level. Some of the programmes, which are also 
promoted by AMAN, are ideologically supported (transfer of knowledge) and even 
subsidised by international NGOs with whom AMAN has been successfully 
cooperating for many years (see chapter by Sanmukri). All of my interlocutors were 
hoping to get more involved in international networks and organisations through 
AMAN for the sake of their projects. They were all aware of the fact that the label 
“indigenous people” AMAN used in the English translation of masyarakat adat is an 
advantage in getting interlinked with international organisations and supporters of 
“indigenous peoples”. If the translation of masyarakat adat were “peoples of traditions” 
(or similar), this would be much more difficult. I Dewa Nyoman Suardana from 
Penuktukan (Buleleng) reminded that the change of name from desa adat in desa 
pakraman is, from an international perspective, a disadvantage. While adat has become 
an established concept which has been translated with “indigenous”, pakraman does 
not fill the same slot. “There are hukum adat, indigenous rights, but no hukum pakraman, 
pakraman rights; there are indigenous land rights but no pakraman land rights; this 
makes no sense”, he concluded. He has already written and talked about this issue in 
different media and pleaded for a reintroduction of the term desa adat. 
The electronic media – email, internet platforms and mobile phones – play a crucial 
role among the activists in their communication within Bali and beyond. The social 
media, such as Facebook, are used for the exchange of information and opinion-
making. Some of the representatives frequently comment on matters of adat and 
politics in these media. I Made Nurbawa from Belatung (Tabanan), who is working in 
the regional Broadcasting Commission of Indonesia and is especially experienced in 
communication matters, highlighted the importance of fast communication in today’s 
networks . He pointed to the way in which traditional adat leaders – those who are in 
office due to particular adat regulations within individual villages – communicate with 
each other: It focuses on personal face-to-face interactions, mainly during official 
village meetings, rather than electronic media. In most desa pakraman, a man enters the 
village association – the krama desa – only when he is married. The krama desa is based 
on the principle of seniority21 and a man gradually steps up in the krama desa hierarchy 
the older he gets until he reaches one of the most important positions – unless he is a 
widower or all his sons are married.22 In fact, the adat leaders in most of the villages – 
at least those who are not elected but are in office through the gradual promotion in 
the krama desa – are elderly men and, therefore, still belong to the generation who is 
not familiar with the use of electronic communications media. Communication with 
adat leaders in the villages throughout the province is, therefore, difficult. Furthermore, 
senior members of the krama desa are not necessarily those who are well informed 
about encompassing issues discussed in provincial, national or international networks.  
                                                        
21 As has already been mentioned, the most important adat offices in some villages are tied to 
particular families and are passed on patrilineally. 
22 In this respect, some local variations exist; but in general, a man has to step down from the krama 
desa when his sons are married and have children. 





Modern technology plays an important role in today’s organisation of AMAN Bali, as well as 
of adat temple ceremonies (here, doing the accounts in the temple Bale Agung in Catur 
village after its sumptuous renovation and elaborate rituals).  
Photo: Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin 2012 
By contrast, a local AMAN representative is independent from the otherwise binding 
rules of adat of his village if he wants to start some special activities and cooperation 
with NGOs. One of my interlocutors praised AMAN membership and the freedom it 
provides when he said: “I attended AMAN meetings when I was still a very young man 
and I can continue far beyond my 60s; I can stay and be active as long as I want.” 
Another respondent praised the democratic principle of AMAN because everyone can 
be elected as a representative: “There [in contrast to the national parliament] I really 
see people on the council who are like me, ordinary people.”  
Nevertheless, some of the representatives who were very much in favour of 
AMAN’s democratic principles got caught up in contradictions. One of them lamented 
that some NGOs at an AMAN congress in Pontianak (Kalimantan), KMAN III 2007 
pleaded for an equal participation of women in AMAN matters. My interlocutor 
argued that adat, politics and decision-making is the domain of men according to 
Balinese adat. Yet, adat and its values should be protected; gender equality and 
women’s rights, therefore, run contrary to Balinese adat. In spite of his (and others’) 
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opposition, the AMAN congress decided to give women the same rights as men; 
AMAN’s provincial representatives have to consist of one man and one woman.23 
This interlocutor apparently did not think that the democratisation he had 
welcomed in matters of krama desa membership and adat leadership also contradicted 
village adat. Adat rights and human rights – indigenous groups have received 
international support thanks to the UN Human Rights Convention and subsequent 
declarations – are, at least in some points, incongruent (see also Bourchier 2007:125; 
Warren 2007:198). However, as several respondents remarked, democratisation and 
development imply “social transformation”. One interlocutor emphasised that social 
transformation will be necessary for Balinese villages so that they may confidently look 
ahead and not only back to the past and its traditions. Some also mentioned 
“multicultural” coexistence and tolerance when asked about what they understood by 
social transformation. One representative added that it is only recently that people 
have started to categorise themselves and others according to agama, thus highlighting 
differences and eclipsing commonalities. Here, social transformation means to bring 




                                                        
23 In Bali, the female AMAN representative of Bali province is the wife of a male AMAN 
representative of a kabupaten. 
 
 
Whose Adat is it?  





During my fieldwork in Toraja in 2009/20101, the adat elders of noble descent with 
whom I discussed the ongoing nomination process of Toraja as World Heritage 
surprised me with their enthusiastic engagement with the politics of indigeneity: Most 
of them were active in the local branch of the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara 
(AMAN, Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago).2 Indigeneity is generally 
understood – whether it be in the field of politics and international law or in 
anthropological research – as being at least partly opposed to a state, as a socially, 
economically and politically marginal or marginalised position in the context of a 
                                                        
1 I conducted a total of ten months of fieldwork in Indonesia (from October to November 2008, 
from September 2009 to April 2010 and again in May 2011) as a researcher with the Brigitta Hauser-
Schäublin led project “Transcultural authorship, copyright and film. The case of funeral rituals among 
the Toraja in Sulawesi, Indonesia”. The project was part of the German Research Council (DFG) 
funded Interdisciplinary Research Unit “The Constitution of Cultural Property” at Göttingen 
University. I would like to thank Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin, Stefanie Steinebach and Jovan Maud for 
their comments and criticism of earlier versions of this paper. 
2 By equating indigeneity with masyarakat adat in the Toraja case-study, I follow my interview partners 
who used the terms interchangeably.  
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nation state.3 However, my interview partners were not marginal. They represented the 
government in Toraja: the acting Regent, a former Vice-Regent, the Regional Secretary, 
a retired high officer from the State Ministry of National Development Planning in 
Jakarta, heads of local government offices, and so on. They all came from the ruling 
families of the 32 adat districts which make up the Toraja highlands and many of them 
held high church positions. Why were mostly very well educated, influential and 
affluent noble Torajans, firmly integrated in powerful institutions, so eager to claim an 
indigenous identity? Their explanations – adat lay at the core of indigeneity and they, as 
members of the ruling local elite, had the greatest command over adat – stirred up my 
interest in exploring the deployment of adat in claims of indigeneity in a stratified 
society. Indigeneity may be the only empowering subject position, the only place of 
recognition possible to inhabit, for groups like the Batin Sembilan (see the chapter by 
Steinebach in this volume), the Orang Rimba (Steinebach 2012) or the Wana (see the 
chapter by Grumblies in this volume). Toraja noble elders, however, have greater 
agency in their engagements with the national government, an agency which they 
happily employed in the past and still do. Why would people who are part of the local 
or regional – or in some cases even of the national – elite want to claim an identity that 
seems to make them marginal by definition? 
Indigeneity as a Relational Identity 
As several writers have pointed out, the meaning of indigeneity is not based on 
essential qualities or inherent properties, but emerges in a process of differentiation, 
that is, in relation to what is understood as not indigenous in distinct historical social 
formations (see Cadena and Starn 2007b:4; Li 2000:151; Niezen 2004:70; Merlan 
2009:304-5).4 Even the vague attempts at criterial definitions in the sphere of 
international law by Martínez Cobo (1983) or Daes (1996) rely partly on a relational 
understanding as the processes of settlement and of marginalisation encompass “the 
indigenous” and its “other”.  
While I share the constructionist approach, I also endorse Li’s warning against 
interpretations that “seem to suggest that maximizing, goal-oriented actors switch or 
cross boundaries in pursuit of their ends, approaching questions of identity in 
consumer terms, as a matter of optimal selection” (2000:150). Instead, she argues that 
a group’s self-identification is rather “a positioning which draws upon historically 
sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meanings, and emerges through 
particular patterns of engagement and struggle” (2000:151). While the patterns and 
formations that enable the emergence of a certain articulation of indigeneity are ever 
                                                        
3 Definitions in international law and in the UNESCO Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People have deliberately been vague and non-binding, giving priority to self-identification (see the 
chapters by Göcke and Cabrera in this volume). They all stress, however, that indigenous people are 
not hegemonic (Martínez Cobo 1983:379). 
4 This statement cuts short a long and controversial discussion about the “nature” of indigeneity. See 
Kenrick and Lewis (2004) and Mackey (2005) for an (at least strategically) essentialist understanding. 
Kuper (2003; 2005:204-218) staunchly rejects even the idea of indigeneity. 
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changing, indigeneity generally describes the relationship between a marginalised, 
culturally distinctive group and a somehow culturally unmarked hegemonic other. 
Emerging Indigeneity in Indonesia 
The Indonesian term for indigenous community is masyarakat adat, which means 
literally adat-based community. This term is confusing, since in public understanding, it 
is taken for granted that every Indonesian “has” adat, which is seen as the basis for 
one’s ethnic identification. As Indonesians are not faced with a hegemonic settler 
population and each ethnic identification – be it marginalised or hegemonic – is based 
on adat, adat cannot be immediately equated with marginality or indigeneity. As Tsing 
summarised: “Indigeneity is not a self-evident category in Indonesia. Almost everyone 
is ‘indigenous’ in the sense of deriving from original stocks; Indonesia is not a white 
settler state” (2007:34). No claims to rights, resources and political participation can be 
based on adat alone.  
The conceptual equation of masyarakat adat with indigeneity emerged from specific 
social formations: the experience of economic, political, social, and religious 
marginalisation which many groups – mostly ones living in sparsely populated, 
resource rich areas like rainforests – have suffered during the developmentalist New 
Order regime (see chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in this volume). As so-called suku 
terasing (isolated tribes) and later as komunitas adat terpencil (remote adat communities), 
they were the target of heavy social engineering programmes aimed at “modernising” 
them and turning them into proper citizens: “By working to assimilate these people 
into normative Indonesian standards and grouping them into discipline-oriented 
villages, the program provided a striking and inexpensive model of how development 
was to operate at a national scale” (Tsing 1999:171; see also Duncan 2004). Forests 
inhabited by nomadic groups were opened up for resource exploitation, thus robbing 
these groups of their livelihoods. Such resource conflicts led to the foundation of local 
NGOs which, in turn, attracted the attention of international NGOs with an ecological 
agenda. Although ecological issues were very often not at the core of the conflicts, 
ecology was one of the few public spaces in Suharto’s repressive New Order regime 
where social protest was possible (Tsing 2007:37). Adat emerged as the most promising 
common political term in the ongoing discussions and struggles. It was neutral enough 
by its common usage in Indonesia not to stir suspicion; it bore the possibility of 
positioning local juridical norms and rights against the national laws, and it could easily 
be brought into dialogue with transnational activism, such as the indigeneity 
movement. During the first clandestine nationwide meeting of representatives of these 
groups and NGOs engaged in their struggle in Rantepao in 1993, the umbrella term 
masyarakat adat was chosen (Moniaga 2004), a term most groups had used for 
themselves instead of the derogatory komunitas adat terpencil.5 
                                                        
5 See Acciaioli (2007) and Moniaga (2004, 2007) for an analysis of the emergence of masyarakat adat as 
a political category in Indonesia. 
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While the term adat has not acquired political or juridical implications during the New 
Order, the term masyarakat adat implies the experience of marginalisation by the nation 
state and is associated with political and juridical claims. The political implications of 
the terminology are made clear by the comment the representative of Indonesia made 
in the UN General Assembly immediately after the adoption of UNDRIP: “Given the 
fact that Indonesia’s entire population at the time of colonization remained unchanged, 
the rights in the Declaration accorded exclusively to indigenous people and did not 
apply in the context of Indonesia. Indonesia would continue to promote the collective 
rights of indigenous peoples” (sic!) (UN 2007). While he – just like Tsing – concedes 
that all Indonesians are “deriving from original stocks”, there is a fine difference: For 
the Indonesian state, it is only marginalisation by white settlers that transforms 
minorities of “original stocks” into indigenous people. 
As numerous studies have shown, adat can take on various meanings and be 
deployed for different purposes (Davidson and Henley 2007; for central Sulawesi, see 
Li 2007b). In the context of indigeneity, adat also opens up various possibilities from 
claiming land rights (Steinebach in this volume) to the pacification of a region after 
violent conflicts (Müller in this volume). The deep involvement of Torajan activists of 
indigeneity with the structures of the nation state, with indigeneity’s “other”, thus gives 
rise to promising questions about the uses of indigeneity in a stratified society. 
In my reading of the noble Torajans’ activism, indigeneity is an emergent form of 
negotiating relationships with others – with institutions and actors beyond the state 
level, with the national government (never as monolithic as implied by the singular 
noun), with the imagined community of Indonesia as a multi-ethnic society, with 
regional neighbours like the Bugis and the Makassar, and also – and maybe most 
importantly – with Torajans of non-noble descent. What kind of agency vis-à-vis these 
institutions and actors is engendered by the employment of adat as indigeneity which 
an agency based on shared citizenship, religious or political affiliation or democratic 
representation does not grant?  
Outline of Toraja 
The region of Toraja is located in the highlands of South Sulawesi. The fragmentation 
craze of decentralisation led to a split of the former district Kabupaten Tana Toraja 
into the regencies Toraja Utara (North Toraja) and Tana Toraja in 2008.6 The 
population numbers almost 430,000 people, overwhelmingly Torajans, but also Bugis, 
Makassar and Javanese. Due to migration of mostly landless Toraja since the 1970s, an 
even larger number of Torajans live outside Toraja.7 In 2005, 88.7% of the Toraja 
                                                        
6 When I talk about “Toraja”, I refer to these two regencies. 
7 The homepage of the former regency of Tana Toraja mentioned more than 600,000 migrants in 
2007 (Kabupaten Tanah Toraja 2007). 
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population were Christians (56.5% Protestants and 32.2% Catholics), 7.3% were 
Muslims and 4.0% were Hindus (BPSKTT 2007:102).8 
Toraja was a stratified society with a ruling nobility, free commoners and slaves in 
pre-colonial times. The local articulations and the flexibility of this stratification varied 
widely between adat districts.9 Within the nobility, status was primarily dependent on a 
person’s descent from the clan’s tongkonan, the ancestral house. The older the tongkonan 
was, the higher the status of the noble clan (see Waterson 2003; 2009:123-200). The 
lavish funeral ceremonies, of which the length, elaborateness and grandeur depended 
on one’s rank, were the central social arena for claiming, reproducing, enhancing, and 
contesting status. The claim to high status was open to contestation and a source for 
intense competition among the nobility. Gender is a largely unmarked category in 
Toraja. While there is a gendered division of labour, it does not result in fixed 
hierarchies (Waterson 2009:242). The main axis of social inequality in Toraja runs 
along the lines of stratification, not gender. 
In contrast to the centralised Islamic kingdoms of the Bugis and Makassar in the 
lowlands, the highlands were never politically united in pre-colonial times (Waterson 
2009:25).10 The relationship between lowlanders and highlanders was based on 
warfare, trade and marriage. Noble highland leaders sold a large number of people of 
lower descent as slaves to Bugis traders. It is estimated that up to 10-15% of the 
population were sold (Waterson 2009:82). Noble marriages and trade notwithstanding, 
the relationship between Torajans and Bugis was uneven: Torajans, who refused to 
take on Islam but held on to aluk to dolo, were seen as inferior unbelievers, their 
political structures lacking in complexity and sophistication. Bugis frequently raided the 
highlands and took Torajans of all ranks as slaves.  
The highlands came under Dutch colonial rule in 1906. For administrative reasons, 
the Dutch divided the region into 32 adat districts, each headed by a noble leader. The 
internal fragmentation as such and the differences in adat between these 32 districts are 
central to the Torajans’ understanding of themselves as an ethnic group. The Calvinist 
Dutch Reformed Mission set up the first mission post in 1913 in order to create a 
buffer against the lowland Islamic neighbours by Christianizing the upland “heathens”. 
The Christian mission was unsuccessful during colonial times, but conversions sped up 
rapidly after independence.11 The idea of the people living in the highlands as indeed 
being “a people” slowly developed under the influence of the converging forces of 
strategic political considerations of the ruling noble leaders, linguistic research by the 
missionaries, a self-conscious religious differentiation from the Islamic lowlanders, and 
colonial administrative measures (Roth 2004). The inhabitants of the highlands finally 
fully identified (themselves) as Torajans in the 1930s (Bigalke 2005:149-179). 
                                                        
8 The 4 % Hindu are probably mostly followers of the local religion aluk to dolo, which gradually lost 
its appeal after independence. It was successfully registered as a variant of Hinduism at the 
Indonesian Department of Religion in 1969 (Waterson 2009:356). 
9 For an excellent discussion of the intricacies of Toraja stratification see Nooy-Palm (1979:43-57). 
10 The name “Toraja” stems linguistically from the Bugis expression to riaja – “the people living 
upstream”, and does not refer to shared cultural features but to a geographical location.  
11 A detailed analysis of the historical context of conversions and the consequences of the mission for 
the local religion aluk to dolo is provided by Waterson (2009:297-430). 
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Today, the council of the noble leaders of the 32 adat districts, the kobongan kalua, is the 
highest political adat institution in Toraja, while the two regional parliaments (DPR-D) 
are the highest political institutions in terms of the nation state. The political landscape 
of Toraja is thus characterised by legal pluralism and by intense centrifugal and 
centripetal forces that are constantly in flux. 
The highland economy is predominantly based on wet rice cultivation, cash crops, 
such as spices or the famous Toraja coffee, and tourism. Ownership of land is 
extremely uneven. This dates back to the times of the slave trade when some members 
of the nobility  
 
had amassed huge acreages of rice lands seized from rivals or those too weak to 
resist. The coming of the Dutch, while it halted these destructive processes, also 
had the effect of confirming and consolidating patterns of ownership as they 
were at the moment of takeover.  
 
(Waterson 2009:82)  
Landlessness, as has been said before, is one of the prime reasons for migration. The 
coffee plantations and big hotels are, with only a few exceptions, owned exclusively by 
Torajans or at least by holdings with prominent Toraja participation (Aditjondro 
2010:66-76). Toraja has no history of resource conflicts with the state or state-
supported companies.  
The region was included in Indonesia’s Second Tourism Development Plan from 
1974-1978 and saw an amazing increase in the numbers of domestic and foreign 
tourists from the late-1960s until the mid-1990s. Since 1994, visitor numbers have 
dropped sharply from more than 261,000 to only about 32,000 in 2005 (BPSKTT 
2007:212-213) and are hardly recovering at all, a fact of great concern for the regional 
and local administration and the Torajans working in the tourist business.  
The position of the Toraja nobility in colonial times was challenged by the formal 
abolition of slavery and other rank-related rights through the Dutch administration, 
although the Dutch still relied heavily on the nobility as their local counterparts (see 
also the chapter by Thufail in this volume). Christian theology which posits that all 
men are equal before the Lord (although with a Calvinist twist in Toraja) threatened 
noble hegemony as well, as did the postcolonial state with its democratic constitution. 
In the post-Suharto years, the nobility succeeded in expanding their adat-based political 
hegemony into the sphere of representative democracy and state administration: High 
positions, such as heads of government offices, have always been held by noble 
Torajans, but the new policy of putra-daerah (“children of the region”), which gives 
preference to local candidates, has further consolidated the access of noble Torajans to 
high positions – often to the distress of Torajans of non-noble descent.  
Stratification has been of high significance in many regions of Toraja up to the 
present day, but the meritocratic orientation of the migrant population poses new 
threats to the adat-based privileges of high-ranking Torajans. Toraja migrants of lower 
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descent are now able to amass riches outside the highlands. They wish to transform 
this wealth into social capital via big houses and grand funeral ceremonies, or into 
powerful political positions such as the regent. Contestations of rank and status, 
therefore, do not only occur on a horizontal axis between competing noble families, 
but also on a vertical axis. Stories abound concerning successful Torajans of slave or 
commoner descent whose ambitions in the field of politics or ritual are stymied by the 
firm grip the nobility still has on adat regulations and by the influence the noble leaders 
command over the voting behaviour of the descendants of their former slaves. While I 
cannot judge the empirical basis of these stories, their existence and the excitement 
with which they are told point to the intense contestations under which the system of 
rank finds itself.  
Although adat is a given in research on Indonesia and a cornerstone of Toraja 
identity today, Torajans have only “had” adat for about 100 years. In pre-colonial 
times, aluk to dolo was an encompassing system regulating the relationships among 
humans, between humans and their natural environment, and between humans and the 
deities and ancestors (see Waterson 2009:297-351). In contrast to religion (agama), aluk 
to dolo was unseparable from other aspects of life. One of the most important tasks of 
the missionaries was, therefore, to carefully filter Toraja (ritual) life and belief in search 
of incompatibilities with Christianity, since “heathen” magical beliefs lurked 
everywhere. All rituals bordering too closely on or even trespassing over the line 
between “just culture” and “magic” were not allowed for Christian Torajans. This 
process gradually led to an almost complete loss of all “magical” rituals aimed at 
enhancing fertility, while the funeral rites, of which only some aspects were forbidden 
and some re-interpreted, were continued. The mission process, thus, not only brought 
the concept of a separable sphere of agama as “religion” to the highlands, it also 
instilled the idea of a complementary secular sphere of adat. 
After this glimpse into basic features of Toraja life, I will scrutinize the historical 
trajectory of adat in different fields: the mission process, the development of tourism in 
the 1970s, the UNESCO World Heritage nomination and, finally, AMA Toraya.  
Adat and Tourism 
Communal ancestral houses and lavish rituals had been seen as proof of the 
backwardness and irrational wastefulness of outer island inhabitants from the 
perspective of modernisation and development in the 1950s and 1960s (Adams 
2006:101). Against this backdrop, some ethnic groups ranked higher than others: With 
Javanese court culture in the centre, cultural sophistication was seen as gradually 
declining in concentric circles, positioning outer island inhabitants at the fringes of and 
nomadic rainforest-dwellers beyond the limits of cultural worthiness. TV coverage of a 
Toraja funeral ceremony in 1978 which had cost US$ 225,000 stirred debates about 
whether these rituals were proof of the vitality of “traditional cultures” or rather a 
symbol of the lack of economic reason of the highland population (Volkman  
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Pana, a hamlet which is not officially recognised as a “tourist object”, boasts of the global 
tourist attention it nevertheless attracts.                Photo: Karin Klenke 2008 
 
1984b:191). It was the economic promise of tourism which brought new recognition 
to these “backward” structures and practices. 
Tourism loomed large in the modernisation scheme of the New Order regime, as it 
was hoped that it would not only attract an international public and, thus, foreign 
money, but also national visitors for the sake of postcolonial nation-building. Since 
cultural tourism relied on what is called today “traditional cultural expressions”, an 
understanding of adat in the form of seni (arts) and budaya (culture) was supported. 
Kipp called the resulting effect of these efforts “showcase cultures” (1996:108), de-
contextualised and often reformulated or invented little gems of folklore which had to 
be visually consumable, as most tourists do not speak Indonesian or local languages. 
As one of the regions included in the Second Tourism Development Plan in the 
1970s, Toraja was to be developed into a cultural destination. Many Torajans were 
excited about the recognition their cultural expressions attracted and published 
booklets, brochures and books which focus on Toraja culture in this folklorised sense. 
One example is “Dances in Toraja” by Beatrice Bulo (1989), who served – among 
other influential positions in the civil service – as the head of the local Department for 
Tourism and Culture. The book starts with forewords written by several high-ranking 
government officials at the regional and local level. The Governor, Mr. Amiruddin, 
writes: 
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I have the pleasure in contributing this brief foreword to the publication of 
“Dances in Toraja”, the product of a creative mind of a native writer in her 
attempt to participate in developing preserving (sic!) the local culture which is a 
source and foundation of national culture. This coincides with the Indonesian 
government’s policy on intensifying the tourism sector. At the time when 
national development, which includes the tourism sector, is being intensified 
the role of textbooks on culture and tourism is becoming more important and 
should be effectively utilized. As the Governor of the Province of South 
Sulawesi it is my earnest hope that the publication of this book will encourage 
and challenge other native writers to explore and expose the local culture of 




As elsewhere in New Order Indonesia, everyday life in Toraja had to be carefully 
reflected as to which of its aspects could be transformed into a “culture of spectacle” 
(Acciaioli 1985). Death rituals were marketed as archaic and exotic remnants from the 
past and are even today an indispensable part of every highland tour package. 
Elaborately carved tongkonan of the nobility became an icon of Toraja-ness and 
disseminated into Makassar architectural style and even onto the 5000 Rp banknote.12 
Tourist attention was, however, not given to humble slave funerals or plain and 
uncarved tongkonan of Torajans of lower descent. While adat, of course, encompasses 
the life of all Torajans, it surfaced as purely noble budaya (culture) and seni (arts) in the 
field of tourism. Toraja adat elders were quick to grasp the advantages of tourism for 
their own endeavours. Old feuds and competitions could be fought anew in the field 
of tourism.  
When tourism development accelerated in the 1980s, the Northern nobility under the 
leadership of the adat district Kete Ke’su’ succeeded in securing “tourist object” status 
almost exclusively for Northern sites (Adams 2005). The sites certified attracted 
government money, tourism development projects and visitors.13 Luxury hotels sprang 
up, mostly built by noble Torajans from within or outside of Toraja. 
The state’s interest in tourist revenues did not always coincide with the interest of 
the nobility in promoting their status via tourism. The Regent of Toraja, a Bugis, issued 
a statute in 1985 that for touristic purposes, all Torajans living on the main roads had 
to decorate their houses with carvings. The call to carve houses irrespective of the rank 
                                                        
12 The importance of tourism in and for Toraja has been reflected in a number of anthropological 
analyses. The early development of tourism is discussed by Volkman (1982; 1984a; 1984b; 1987). For 
an intricate study of the mutually constitutive fields of tourism and “culture” in Toraja, and the 
Indonesian state as an important actor in shaping the local understanding of Toraja culture, see 
Adams (2006). 
13 Money provided by the state and foreign NGOs went into the renovation of noble tongkonan, while 
60% of the entrance fees to officially registered tourist objects go to the noble clan which is 
responsible for the oldest tongkonan in the hamlet. 
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of the inhabitants transformed carvings from a marker of social status into a mere 
decoration or a marker of an encompassing Toraja identity and was fiercely protested 
against by noble Torajans (Adams 2006:107). Noble tourist culture was contested from 
below as well: Tour guides of lower descent resented the teachings of noble adat elders 
about the meaning of carving motives – mostly related to highland flora and fauna – as 
an expression of rank and suggested instead that they were proof of the Torajans’ early 
environmentally conscious attitude (Adams 2006:98-9). 
Tourism development started at a time when the central government still had a 
firm and defining grip on the outer islands. Entering the national public sphere via 
budaya and seni, therefore, helped to counter the image of the backward mountain 
dwellers living in communal houses and wasting money on useless rituals: Torajans had 
something valuable to offer to the young nation, even if it were external actors – the 
tourists – who attributed this value to Toraja culture. Tourism also helped to redefine 
the hierarchical relationship vis-à-vis the historically hegemonic Bugis: When Joop 
Ave, then Minister of Culture and Education in Jakarta, called Toraja the touristic 
“prima donna” of South Sulawesi and declared that Makassar was the entry port to 
Toraja, he summed up the symbolic impact of Toraja tourist hegemony in South 
Sulawesi (Adams 1997:163). 
While not intended by the state, budaya and seni relied on selected and isolated 
elements of adat, which are a privilege of the nobility. It brought the greater share of 
recognition, money and status to the upper stratum of Toraja society and opened new 
realms of agency for noble Torajans. Their networks and entanglements connected 
Jakarta, Makassar and Toraja and encompassed the spheres of adat, state 
administration, private business, and early NGOs. Involvement in tourism 
development, a long experience with the tourist gaze (and the acute awareness of and 
pride in the constant and intense anthropological attention they attracted and still 
attract) have deeply shaped noble Toraja reflections and understandings of themselves. 
The idea that adat contains something like budaya (culture) or seni (arts) evolved from 
these encounters with institutions and people that looked for “culture” in what was 
once aluk to dolo and later adat to Torajans. 
Adat and the World Heritage Nomination 
The UNESCO World Heritage nomination, the early history of which is insightfully 
told by Adams (2010), grew out of the historical rivalry between the adat districts of 
Kete Ke’su’ in the North and Sangalla in the South, which dates back to mythological 
times. The noble clan of Kete Ke’su’ started the initiative in the early-1990s in order to 
secure their status. One family member, a skilled carver and heritage educator, worked 
in the Department for Monument Preservation in Makassar; and a distant family 
member was the right-hand man of Joop Ave, the Minister for Culture and Tourism – 
a happy coincidence which made the project promising. In the mid-1990s, the 
Indonesian government put Kete Ke’su’ on the tentative UNESCO World Heritage 
list. In 2001, an ICOMOS delegation saw Kete Ke’su’ authentic and outstanding 
enough to become a World Heritage Site (ICOMOS 2001:87-90). After some 
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backlashes, the nomination was reformulated as Cultural Landscape, encompassing 
several sites including Kete Ke’su’. In 2005, the Department of Culture and Tourism 
produced a nomination document, which has not yet been submitted to UNESCO. 
The material structures which constitute the “Tana Toraja Traditional Settlement” 
are the richly carved tongkonan with the accompanying rice barns (alang), ceremonial 
grounds (rante) with menhirs (simbuang) commemorating noble burials, and hanging 
graves (liang) or rock graves with wooden effigies (tau-tau). As in the field of tourism, 
the structures nominated for consideration as UNESCO World Heritage are 
exclusively a materialisation of Toraja noble rank. 
According to UNESCO (2008), the outstanding value of a site is based on 
authenticity and integrity, which, in turn, are guaranteed by customs, knowledge, 
economic uses, and spiritual practices. The continued existence of a “traditional way of 
life” is, therefore, a prerequisite for a successful nomination. The seemingly disparate 
elements of the Toraja nomination are bound together by adat. Although not named 
specifically – as UNESCO World Heritage does by definition exclude intangible 
phenomena – adat is clearly the thread that weaves the material structures into a thick 
fabric of culture which fulfils the UNESCO criteria of authenticity and integrity (see 
also ICOMOS 2005). In contrast to the folklorised and de-contextualised adat as budaya 
and seni in the realm of tourism, adat in the World Heritage context appears as a 
holistic entity which guarantees the authenticity of the sites by its timeless character 
and the integrity of the traditional lifestyle. The nomination document stresses 
accordingly: “Tana Toraja Traditional Settlement is a living tradition. It is a heritage 
that has been handed over from generation to generation for at least 700 years or even 
longer back to prehistoric time” (Department of Culture and Tourism 2005:27). 
The authenticity and integrity of adat was enthusiastically endorsed by the adat 
elders from the nominated sites. They explained the rightful nomination of their own 
site with their strict adherence to adat and never hesitated to cast serious doubt on the 
authenticity of the neighbouring district’s material structures or lifestyle. Local adat, my 
interview partners said, not only proved its strength and authenticity by the 
preservation of tongkonan, but also by adherence to social stratification. In order to 
contest the authenticity of Kete Ke’su’s, an adat elder from a rivalling district pointed 
out to me that the nobility in Kete Ke’su’ had actually begun to eat together with their 
slaves and thus their nomination could not be justified. Kete Ke’su’ elders, in turn, 
tried to cast doubt on the integrity of another site by questioning the rank of its ruling 
family: 
In the South, it has become very difficult to determine if their esolon 114 is still 
actually true. Like the person you have been talking about: His father definitely 
was esolon 1, but is it true that he himself is still esolon 1? We don’t know …. That 
is because there are some who say “My father was esolon 1 so I must be esolon 1 
as well”. But you cannot take that for granted! It also depends on your deeds, 
on your thinking, on your character and the like.  
(Interview Bapak T., December 2nd 2009) 
                                                        
14 Esolon is the Indonesian term for the ranks of civil servants, with esolon 1 being the highest rank. 
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Kete Ke’su’s nomination and the exclusion of others were in turn defended by an adat 
elder from a neighbouring district: 
Further to the North, in Tondon-Maranthe and Sa’dan-Balusu, everything is 
already modern, because commoners and slaves are now allowed to slaughter as 
many buffaloes as they please during funerals. The people do not adhere to the 
rulings of the nobility anymore. Kete Ke’su’ as the centre of Toraja, however, 
still follows the adat. ^ 
(Interview Bapak Viktor, February 9th 2010) 
In contrast to the field of tourism, adat in the context of World Heritage is not de-
contextualised and folklorised as “culture” and “arts”. While in everyday life, adat is 
understood to be flexible and, hence, able to deal with and integrate transformations 
and new challenges, in the context of the UNESCO nomination, it emerges as a 
holistic, unchanging and timeless foundation of Toraja life. 
With UNESCO, a powerful institutional player from beyond the confines of the 
nation state had entered the field in which Torajans negotiate relationships. To secure 
“outstanding universal value for humankind” – the definition of a World Heritage site 
– for one’s own district would be an extremely powerful argument in any local status 
competition. It would also symbolically reverse the ethnical hierarchies in South 
Sulawesi. No one, my interview partners frequently mentioned gleefully, had ever 
considered Bugis culture worthy of international recognition! The same held true for 
the position of Toraja in the ethnic mosaic of Indonesia: Borobudur, the world-famous 
monument with UNESCO World Heritage status, was definitely beautiful, Bapak 
Viktor told me. However, it was also dead, because there was no thriving community 
which would fill it with life. It was just like a dusty museum, not based on living adat. 
While the adherence to adat, to ancestral houses and elaborate ceremonies had once 
been a sign of backwardness in the development-oriented nation, it now propelled 
Toraja to the forefront of international cultural politics. However, Torajans were still 
painfully dependent on the state for submitting the UNESCO nomination. 
UNESCO’s insistence on authenticity and integrity (2008:21) also offered a 
powerful argumentative resource for social stratification. The material structures to be 
nominated relied existentially on stratification and any substantial change would 
endanger the authenticity and integrity of the sites. The idea of adat as a guarantee for 
authenticity and integrity, therefore, emerged from a specific formation of state, local 
actors and UNESCO as a transnational player. It consolidated the nobility’s hegemonic 
position with new arguments of authenticity and integrity and, thereby, moved it from 
the political field into the realm of culture and heritage. Somehow, stratification 
became an authentic and interesting cultural feature in need of protection by 
UNESCO. 
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Adat and AMAN 
As mentioned at the beginning, many of the adat elders I knew from the World 
Heritage nomination and as representatives of different government offices were active 
in AMAN. Bapak Palimbong, the head of AMA Toraya (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat 
Toraya)15, had already taken part in the legendary first meeting and demonstration of 
masyarakat adat in Jakarta in 1999. At that time, he was in charge of the arts section at 
the local Department of Culture and Tourism. The late Bapak Sombolinggi, a high 
noble Toraja elder and head of the NGO Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia 
(WALHI, Friends of the Earth Indonesia), which had facilitated the first meeting of 
masyarakat adat in Rantepao in 1993, had invited him to join the meeting in Jakarta. 
Bapak Palimbong found the motto of the demonstration – “If the state does not 
acknowledge us, we will not acknowledge the state” – too extreme, but realised the 
importance of the movement. Based on his initiative, AMA Toraya was founded in 
2000, six months after the first AMAN congress in Jakarta. Bapak Palimbong became 
Vice Regent of Toraja in 2000.16 Toraja noble elders quickly became involved in 
AMAN on different levels (see Tyson 2010). Membership in AMAN, however, is a 
contested issue in Toraja, as nobles from competing adat districts claim to be the only 
officially recognised AMAN representative and try to prevent others from gaining 
access to the structures and resources.17 While some Torajans of high noble descent 
hold prominent positions in the AMAN headquarters and in indigenous peoples’ 
organisations on the national and international level,18 Bapak Palimbong and his group 
are quite reserved when it comes to the sometimes radical stance of the national 
headquarters of AMAN. However, they are regular participants in the seminars and 
workshops that are offered on the international level funded by UNDP (United 
Nations Development Programme) or AIPP (Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact) in 
Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia (see chapter by Sanmukri in this volume). They attend 
seminars in ecological agriculture, take part in gender training workshops or send their 
sons and daughters to seminars for future indigenous leaders (mengkader pemuda/pemudi 
adat) in order to prepare them for a possible leadership role in their respective adat 
district. 
                                                        
15 “Toraya” is the Torajan word for Toraja. 
16 His term ended in 2005. 
17 AMAN membership is not based on a representative system, which means that several groups 
from one masyarakat adat or ethnic group can register with AMAN. See Acciaioli (2007:299-303) for 
further explanations. 
18 Ibu Den Upa Rombelayuk, the wife of the late Bapak Sombolinggi, who facilitated the first 
meeting of masyarakat adat groups in Toraja in 1993, was one of the heads of the founding board of 
AMAN and head of AMAN’s committee for indigenous women. Their two daughters both worked 
for AMAN and are now transnational activists with the Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact (AIPP).  
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The late Bapak C.L. Palimbong, head of AMA-Toraya until his death in 2010 
delivers the opening speech at the official ceremony for AMA-Toraya’s 11th 
birthday                          Photo: Karin Klenke 2010  
 
The intertwined structures and personnel of AMAN and the local administration 
brought almost instant success to local AMAN endeavours:  
 In 2001, the DPR-D officially recognised the kobongan kalua, the representative 
body of the 32 adat districts as the most important self-governing body in Toraja. 
 Also in 2001, the DPR-D passed the “back to lembang” regulation: the re-
organisation of territories at the village level into lembang, pre-colonial units based on 
adat. The lembang regulation has detailed guidelines which – among other aspects – state 
that only members of the highest social strata may be elected as heads of lembang 
(kepala lembang). While this was (somehow paradoxically) seen as a step furthering 
democracy on the grass-root level, the effects were not completely positive, as de Jong 
describes: “The key positions in the lembang administration are filled only by members 
from the highest class, and they make decisions which are largely in the interests of this 
class. As the lembang representative body includes the same people as the adat 
committee, it becomes difficult to function as a controlling committee that represents 
the best interests of all layers of society. In fact, the interests of the executive and the 
legislative are largely intermingled, paralysing the controlling function of the legislative 
committee” (2009:279). 
 In letter No. 222/II of 2005, the Regent formally recognised the 32 adat districts 
and the legitimacy of their representation by the noble adat leaders in the kobongan 
kalua. He further obliged himself to consult with the kobongan kalua before he granted 
any concessions for the exploitation of natural resources and officially recognised the 
masyarakat adat of Toraja as the most important partner for the state administration in 
governing and developing the regency. 
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Some AMAN members pursue personal interests in the field of folklore: The late 
Bapak Palimbong was an ardent collector of Toraja culture in a folklorised sense and 
the founder of the Yayasan Torajalogi (Society for Torajalogy). He made an – as he 
called it – inventory of Toraja arts (kesenian) and published four books: one on Toraja 
carving motifs, one on the legend of Lakipadada, a third one on Toraja proverbs, and 
the last one on the tongkonan as a political institution. His dream was to create a huge 
outdoor living history museum, where visitors could watch people pursue an authentic 
Toraja lifestyle without electricity and the amenities of modern life. 
Bapak Palimbong’s numerous activities notwithstanding, the most important 
AMAN activities within Toraja were the return to traditional political structures and 
the (re)consolidation of noble hegemony. On March 20, 2010, I witnessed the Hari 
Kebangkitan AMA Toraya ke11, the festivities for the 11th anniversary of the founding of 
AMA Toraya. The perfectly choreographed event took place at the tongkonan of the 
regional secretary of Kabupaten Toraja Utara, who was Bapak Palimbong’s deputy in 
AMA Toraya. The event was exclusively for the heads of the adat districts with their 
delegations and the sub-district head (camat) from the sub-districts (kecamatan). State 
and adat leaders often came from the same noble family, but were sometimes even one 
and the same person. Many candidates who ran for the position of regent in 2010 were 
present as well. Bapak Dalipang, the acting-regent of Toraja Utara held a speech, as did 
Ibu Den Upa Rombelayuk, who was introduced as a Toraja delegate from the AMAN 
headquarters. In his speech, Bapak Palimbong stressed that the masyarakat adat in 
Toraja is the nobility, because they know, guarantee and pass on the adat. The rest of 
the Torajans are masyarakat kecil (“little people”), as he called them. This might be true, 
as no “ordinary” Torajans I talked to had ever heard of AMA Toraya before and found 
it to be a typical noble project. 
In the context of indigeneity, adat does not surface as budaya or seni, such as in 
tourism (except for Bapak Palimbong), or as a timeless and unchanging way of life, 
such as in the World Heritage nomination. It is now the outspoken claim to local 
political hegemony. How did indigeneity emerge as a promising political identity for 
the Toraja elite? In my interpretation, decentralisation and democratisation have not 
only loosened the grip of the central government on outer island politics. When local 
politics became the hotspot of decision-making and economic potentials, being 
associated with the state alone did not offer great advantages. Positioning oneself 
additionally in a strategic opposition to the state opened possibilities to directly ally 
with transnational institutions and tap the political, economic, legal, and educational 
resources they offer. While Toraja elders depended on the state for a successful World 
Heritage nomination, they are now free to interact with institutions like UNDP or 
AIPP without interference from the central government. As the example has shown, 
this does not imply a rejection of the state, as most of the local protagonists are 
intimately engaged with state structures. 
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Conclusion 
As the examples have shown, adat has been framed in very different ways in Toraja, 
but the framing has tended to privilege the same stratum of Toraja society. Toraja 
nobility has had the defining power over adat, from a de-contextualized and folklorised 
adat as arts and culture, the timeless authenticity of adat in the World Heritage context 
and now adat as traditional political structures in the local indigeneity movement. 
Processes of exclusion and inclusion have been largely the same in all three fields of 
inquiry. The social formations which once gave rise to the idea of adat as budaya in the 
context of tourism in the early 1970s have almost been turned upside down in the 
context of indigeneity: The firm grip of the central state has been loosened and power 
and money have been transferred from the centre to the former periphery. In Toraja, 
the changing political landscape on the national and international level has transformed 
adat from a marker of localized backwardness and lack of sophistication into a signifier 
of global connectedness and modernity. 
While Toraja is an interesting example of a creative and selective local engagement 
with a global discourse, it is also a frustrating example for actors who are committed to 
democracy, participation and the strengthening of civil society. Sangaji (2007) reports 
similar stories from Central Sulawesi, where the power vacuums created by rapid 
decentralisation have been occupied by people who strategically position themselves as  
 
 
The acting district head of North Toraja, Bapak Y.S. Dalipang, is ushered to his seat at the 
official ceremony to celebrate the 11th anniversary of the founding of AMAN. 
       Photo: Karin Klenke 2010 
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indigenous. Torajans undoubtedly count as indigenous according to the AMAN’s 
definition of masyarakat adat: “Komunitas masyarakat adat are groups that possess a 
genealogy in a specific geographical area, as well as a distinct system of values and 
norms, that have command over land and natural resources and that live their lives in 
accordance with norms and institutions of their adat” (AMAN 2012e, translated by 
K.K; see the chapter by Arizona and Cahyadi in this volume). Sangaji points to the 
weaknesses of the vague AMAN – and indeed all – definitions of indigeneity, that 
allow a usurpation of the idea and the movement by people with aims opposing the 
AMAN endeavour:  
 
By foregrounding distinctiveness (ketersendirian) and making no reference to 
progressive values such as justice and democracy, it suggests that the movement 
may not be concerned with social stratification within adat communities 
themselves. This glossing allows for the resurrection of feudal elements, which 




As the evolving historical trajectory of the uses of adat in Toraja has shown, the 
nobility was able to bring to bear adat in the context of very different transnational 
discourses because of its polyvalent character. By aligning their cause with the state – 
be it in matters of tourism, World Heritage or indigeneity as a special articulation of 
non-radical regionalism – noble Torajans were successful in securing state support for 
causes that also stabilised their hegemony within stratified Toraja society. Adat has 
proven to be a perfect mediator for the respective interests of state, nobility and 
international discourses. Its new emergence as masyarakat adat or indigeneity is due to a 
specific constellation of these three actors: a central state that has given away power to 
the periphery, a ruling nobility in search of new legitimizing discourses and 
transnational institutions that focus these peripheries as sites of promising democratic 
political projects. 
Indigeneity is generally credited with having the potential to re-define or ideally 
even reverse the relationship between centre and periphery. The Toraja case, however, 
points to a more complex situation. Toraja actors in the field of indigeneity skilfully 
use the state as a resource to articulate their political claims vis-à-vis Torajans of lower 
descent. Inequality is re-inscribed in a space in which it is not assumed to exist 
according to a nostalgic concept of indigeneity: within Toraja society itself. Far from 
enabling “the subaltern to speak”, indigeneity in the Toraja case serves as a means to 
again silence those who find it difficult to make political claims. Several writers have 
pointed out that the idea of indigeneity is also a sentimental reflection of – or relational 
to – the uneasiness of the West with modernity (Niezen 2004:70). Anthropology 
should not fall prey to this romanticised notion, but needs to keep on asking the same 
old questions: Who is speaking? Who are the locals in “local”? And who is included in 





Keraton in the Politics of  Adat 
 
Fadjar I. Thufail 
Introduction 
An incident in West Jakarta District involving a group of thugs unravels the fraught 
relationship between the royal families of Javanese keratons and the public,1 exposing 
contentious issues over cultural property, political connection and symbolic status. The 
incident discloses an overlooked connection between the aristocracy and economy and 
sheds light on the challenges the aristocrats confront to rethink how noble culture and 
adat encounter the encroachment of capital and the state into the palace realm. In 
other words, the incident with the thugs depicts the predicament that the keraton and 
its noblemen must negotiate in order to sustain and assert the cultural sovereignty of 
the palace despite the continuous pressures from the state and capital to curtail the 
political role of the keraton. 
Indonesians often talk about thugs and thuggery, or premanisme.2 Thugs are 
extrajudicial actors, some recruited by the police to help monitor the criminal world, 
and others employed by politicians and businessmen as bodyguards to protect them 
from political rivals or business competitors. The security apparatus compensates the 
                                                        
1 In this essay, I use keraton (palace) as a generic category to refer to kesultanan (sultanate) and kerajaan 
(kingdom). 
2 Preman comes from vrijman (Dutch), literally meaning “free men”. Preman refers to people involved 
in petty crimes or organised crime, including robbery, extortion, mugging, or debt-collecting.  
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preman by allowing them to exert control over a specific territory and extort 
“protection money” from local businesses, creating reciprocal relationships between 
the thugs and the state apparatus and between the thugs and the local business owners. 
Therefore, no-one is surprised if the police rarely crack down on the protection 
businesses run by the thugs. 
However, an incident in early 2013 unsettled the comfortable alliance of thugs and 
state apparatus. The West Jakarta District Police arrested forty thugs from a 
construction site in West Jakarta. Hired by the contractor to watch the construction 
site, the thugs tried to force the company to raise their service fee, a request that the 
company quickly turned down. The company complained that they had paid more 
than 5 million rupiah (USD 550) to the thugs. The company reported the extortion to 
the police who reacted swiftly to arrest the thugs after a small scuffle over police 
presence at the construction site. The event would have passed unnoticed had the 
media not disclosed that Hercules was among the forty thugs arrested by the police. 
Hercules Rozario Marshal, nicknamed Hercules (about 50 years old), is one of the 
most feared criminal “godfathers” in Jakarta. Before coming to West Jakarta, he 
controlled Tanah Abang, a dangerous district in Central Jakarta densely populated by 
drug-dealers, drug-users, gamblers, and prostitutes. From Tanah Abang, Hercules had 
run many businesses to provide “security” guards, debt-collectors and even hit-men 
for anyone who wanted to eliminate their enemies. In 1997, Muhammad Yusuf Muhi, a 
competitor in the crime business, managed to push him out of Tanah Abang. Hercules 
had moved and, since then, he has controlled West Jakarta District. 
The Hercules affair attracted public attention not only because it was the first time 
the police had put him behind bars, but also because people immediately learned that 
Hercules held an honorary noble title (gelar bangsawan) from Kasunanan palace of 
Surakarta. Hercules received the honorary title in 2012, conferred by KGPH 
Tedjowulan in his claimed capacity as Sunan Pakubuwono XIII.3 As an honorary noble 
title holder, Hercules was assigned the honorary name, KR Yudhopranoto.4 While the 
arrest confirms Hercules’ involvement in many illicit businesses, at the same time, it 
has exposed his connections to the military and Javanese aristocrats. 
KGPH Tedjowulan, a colonel in the Armed Forces, knew Hercules, a native of 
East Timor, when the prince was on military assignment in East Timor in the 1970s. 
During the military operation in East Timor, the military entrusted Hercules with 
guarding ammunition storage. Hercules was wounded in the war against the Fretilin 
guerrillas and was brought to Jakarta to undergo amputation of his right hand. Since 
                                                        
3 KGPH stands for Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Haryo, the highest title of Kasunanan noblemen after 
the king. The title KGPH is reserved only for direct male descendants of the king. When Hercules 
received his title, the Surakarta’s Kasunanan palace was divided into KGPH Tedjowulan and KGPH 
Hangabehi factions, both claiming to be the legitimate Sunan Pakubuwono XIII. KGPH Hangabehi 
occupied the palace in Surakarta, while KGPH Tedjowulan was ousted and had to “rule” from 
outside the palace. 
4 KR stands for Kanjeng Raden, this is the lowest rank of male honorary titles from Surakarta’s 
Kasunanan palace. 
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then, he has lived in Jakarta, and soon turned into an important figure in the criminal 
world of Jakarta.   
Hercules’ controversial honorary noble title is the story of an ambiguous and 
contentious encounter between the Javanese palaces and the outside public. It is also 
about the desire of the monarchs to hold on to their role as the custodians of culture, 
tradition and adat in the modern era. Awarding and receiving an honorary noble title is, 
therefore, a practical event, identical to what Sherry Ortner (1999) calls a “serious 
game”. Ortner says that people  
 
do not just enact either material necessity or cultural scripts but live life with 
(often intense) purpose and intention; [...] social and cultural contexts [...] frame 
not only the resources [people] start with but the intentions and purposes they 
bring to the games of life; that social life is precisely social, a matter of 
relationship – of cooperation and competition, of solidarity and exploitation, of 
allying and betraying.  
 
(Ortner 1999:23)  
As a “serious game”, the event of giving and receiving an honorary noble title draws 
attention to a transactional encounter that shapes the relationship between the palace, 
the economy, and the definition of and access to cultural property in the politics of 
adat. At the same time, it also relates the narrative of the desire and intention of the 
aristocrats when they want to reclaim and fulfil their declining status as the custodians 
of culture and adat. 
The “serious game” of an honorary noble title award endows the efforts pursued 
by the royal families with symbolic value to maintain and reinstate the cultural and 
political sovereignty of the keraton, at a time when the keraton is threatened by state 
politics and capital encroaching into the realm of the monarchy. There are three 
settings that frame the “game”. Firstly, it demonstrates how the royal families of the 
Javanese palaces reach out to people not genealogically related to the royal families. 
Secondly, it differentiates noble titles into the titles that remain owned exclusively by 
the royal family and the titles that can be accessed by the public, albeit in a limited 
manner. The encroachment leads to a parcelling out of the adat into symbolic and 
material elements, and into elements that can be distributed to the public and those 
that should remain exclusively retained by the monarch as their traditional custodian. 
Thirdly, it indicates an ambiguous desire and intention of the aristocrats in responding 
to the encroachment of state politics and capital into the most private realm of the adat 
norm of the palace. 
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The Palace and the Encounters 
The relationships between the keraton and the state and between the keraton and the 
public have often been contentious ones. Before the Dutch instituted the colonial 
government in the Netherlands East Indies in the late-18th century, the rajas and the 
sultans were able to maintain independent sovereignties and often waged war against 
each other to secure important sea or land trade routes. The Vereenigde Oost Indische 
Compagnie (VOC; Dutch East India Company), which arrived in the 17th century, was 
soon involved in fierce competition against the rajas and the sultans over access to 
cloves, nutmeg and spices. The decline of the VOC in the 18th century and its 
transformation into the Dutch colonial government brought the Netherlands East 
Indies under the direct control of the Dutch government. The Dutch soon created 
new bureaucratic institutions to manage and secure colonial interests in the colony, and 
the new institutions required numerous people to fulfil clerical work (Sutherland 1979).  
The institutionalization of the colonial bureaucracy caught the aristocrats in an 
ambiguous position. On the one hand, they were reluctant to join the colonial 
bureaucracy, since it would mean that they conceded to colonial power and colonial 
authority. At the same time, the aristocrats must find ways to sustain their symbolic 
status and cultural sovereignty when the colonial government challenged the keraton’s 
formerly independent control over cultural and economic resources. This ambiguous 
situation continued until the late-1940s when the Dutch colonial government gradually 
lost their political control over the Netherlands East Indies. 
After Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, the sovereign status of the rajas 
and the sultans remained a contentious issue in the postcolonial political structure. In 
the early-20th century, the Dutch colonial government created a self-governance 
domain (zelfbesturend gebiet or swapraja) to force the rajas and the sultans into a quasi-
contract transaction with the Dutch. However, after independence, the nationalist and 
the socialist factions in the republican government opposed the swapraja domain, 
arguing that maintaining the swapraja would mean acknowledging the independent 
jurisdiction and regulation of the keratons over territories under their direct control. At 
the same time, the volatile political situation sent a clear signal that the republican 
government should avoid interfering with the swapraja domain since it would confront 
the sovereignty of the rajas and the sultans. The existence of the swapraja domain had, 
therefore, undermined the political authority of the republican government and 
become a target of attack from officials who condemned the colonial inherited system 
of having violated republican consensus. 
International political pressure and the struggle for independence in the 1940s 
hardly prevented the Dutch from launching a massive military campaign to regain its 
control over the Netherlands East Indies and disrupted the process of consolidating 
political power in the new state. Lack of a mutually recognised transfer of authority 
created an uncertain period that lasted from 1945 until 1949. Amid the confusion, the 
Dutch created the Federation of Kings (Dewan Raja-raja) in September 1946 to assure 
that the rajas and the sultans hold on to the contracts they had signed with the colonial 
government, and, in so doing, they acknowledged Dutch control. The Federation of 
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Kings, however, only lasted a few years; Law No. 44 enacted in 1950 by the republican 
government abolished the Federation of Kings (Ardhana 2005:52-54). 
The political and economic contracts between the monarchs and the Dutch 
colonial government that culminated in the abolishment of the Federation of Kings 
had accentuated the ambiguous stance of the noblemen toward the revolutionary 
cause, especially with regard to the economic and political interests of the rajas and the 
sultans. The leftist faction of the republicans particularly denounced the support that 
the keratons received from the Dutch to nurture their elite cultures. Dutch patronage 
produced an elite circle disconnected from the people who fought for independence in 
the revolutionary war. The leftists pointed out that the aristocrats had enjoyed a special 
social status that opposed the principle of social equality that the postcolonial 
Indonesian state hoped to fulfil. 
The postcolonial government failed to resolve the ambiguous status of the 
monarchies. The nationalist and socialist factions in the government together with the 
political parties (PKI, PNI, PSII, Murba, Sobsi, Perbesi, Partai Buruh, Pemuda 
Muslimin Indonesia, Pemuda Banteng, Mahasiswa Demokrat, and Sarbupri) insisted 
that the monarchy system should be abolished. These groups formed a coalition called 
the Anti-Swapraja movement (De Locomotief 1954). They argued that the monarchy 
system propagated a stratified status system that classified people according to their 
hereditary rank, and it was contrary to the democratic system that they would like to 
institute. The republicans’ argument regarding the incompatibility of the monarchy 
with the democratic ideal of equal opportunity reflected a distrust the republicans had 
(and still have) about the loyalty of the rajas and the sultans to the newly independent 
state.  
The heightened tension, starting in 1945, between the republican government and 
the monarchies had affected the royal families in different ways. The period of 1945-
1950 was crucial to understanding the role of the palace and the royal families in 
modern Indonesia. The Javanese palaces in Surakarta (Kasunanan and 
Mangkunegaran) and Yogyakarta (Kasultanan and Pakualaman) reacted differently to 
Sukarno’s proclamation of independence and to the Dutch attempt to restore their 
colonial power. In Surakarta, the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran keratons struggled 
hard to restore their symbolic status and political influence, but were immediately 
confronted by socialists and republicans who disliked the idea of recuperating the 
autonomous status of the keratons. Besides, the relationship between the anti-colonial, 
revolutionary fighters and the Surakarta noblemen during the late colonial period had 
always been contentious. During the revolutionary war, the revolutionary laskars 
(freedom fighters) received little support from Surakarta’s Kasunanan aristocrats, who 
were uncertain whether the Dutch would be able to restore their control over the 
former Netherlands East Indies territory. On the contrary, the Kasultanan and the 
Pakualaman keratons in Yogyakarta responded diligently to the proclamation by 
affirming their loyalty to the new republican government and declaring that the 
Kasultanan and the Pakualaman territories belonged to the Indonesian state. Sri Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX of the Yogyakarta Sultanate along with KGPAA Pakualam VIII 
of Pakualaman palace drafted a historic statement declaring their loyalty to the 
republican government (de Rosari 2011:64-65). Prince GBPH Prabukusumo, the son 
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of Hamengkubowono IX, describes the Sultan’s decision as a very emotional gesture 
since it means that the Sultan “has surrendered his dignity and his pride as a king and 
became a subject of the nation-state”.5 On September 5, 1945, Sultan 
Hamengkubowono and KGPAA Pakualam VIII enunciated a decree instructing 
Yogyakarta people to obey the republican government and the Indonesian state. 
Sukarno responded in favour of the statement, and the state announced Law No. 3 in 
1950 to grant a legal recognition of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Special 
Autonomy Status). This special status later provoked an emotional controversy when 
the post-1998 regime wanted to abolish it under the pretext that the automatic 
appointment of the Sultan as a governor and the Pakualam as a vice-governor runs 
against the democratic electoral system. The debate over the special status is also a 
“serious game” because it shapes the normative construction of the legal existence of 
the keratons and, at the same time, affects the dignity of the aristocrats. 
The anti-swapraja movement in the late-1940s and early-1950s proved to be a 
decisive moment that shaped the encounter between keraton, royal families and the 
state with consequences up to the present. Small palaces faced far-reaching 
consequences of the encounter. There were palaces that had to immediately relinquish 
their territorial control to the local governments and, in so doing, also lost political 
privilege. These small palaces have lost their lands and buildings, appropriated legally 
by the state or illegally by squatters. In Buton Sultanate (South-eastern Sulawesi 
Province), for example, what remains after the 1950s is no more than a few dilapidated 
buildings and a small plot of land once part of a larger palace compound. The anti-
swapraja movement and its political and administrative consequences drove the 
aristocrats to rethink and re-evaluate their political role and symbolic position as the 
custodians of adat. 
When the New Order military regime (1967-1998) managed to seize power in 1967 
and secure its political consolidation of the postcolonial Indonesian state in the early-
1970s, rajas and sultans were soon confronted with a difficult option: They had to 
negotiate with the new military regime over an appropriate way to keep the keraton 
existing. Otherwise, they could have no other choice than terminating court rituals and 
activities, discharging palace employees and closing down palace offices. However, 
there was a limited number of keratons that had the power and resources to negotiate 
with the military regime. Large keratons in Java (Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Cirebon) and 
Bali are examples of such keratons, while Buton Sultanate represents the palaces that 
failed to consolidate resources required to continue their symbolic functions and 
cultural sovereignties. However, regardless of whether they were large or small keratons, 
they had, firstly, to accept the political sovereignty of the new military regime and its 
ideology of a negara kesatuan (united state). 
The historical fact that the keratons were able to exercise sovereignty despite the 
Dutch surveillance alerted the postcolonial regimes about the alleged capacity of the 
monarchies to undermine the negara kesatuan. The anti-swapraja movement in the 1940s 
until the 1960s was an effort by the Sukarno administration to pacify the political 
                                                        
5 Interview with Prince GBPH Prabukusumo, March 20, 2013. 
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influence of the keratons. In the New Order period, Suharto’s military regime followed 
the attempt to mitigate the keratons’ political power by enacting Law No. 8 on Mass 
Organisations (Organisasi Kemasyarakatan) in 1985. The law defines the keraton as a 
cultural institution (organisasi kebudayaan), and the administration and activity of the 
keraton is subject to regulation stipulated in the law. Law No. 8/1985 classifies the 
keraton in the same category as the religious Islamic organisation of Nahdlatul Ulama, 
the environmental organisation of Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI), or the other 
social or non-governmental organisations. In classifying the keraton as a “cultural mass 
organisation”, the New Order regime managed to draw a clear boundary between the 
political role and the cultural sovereignty of the keraton. Law No. 8/1985 was a 
normative strategy deployed by the New Order regime to reduce the political reach of 
the keraton. Other strategies included the full support granted to cultural activities and 
court rituals, and the adoption of Javanese court norms in the political discourse of the 
state (Pemberton 1994).  
Another important legal move introduced by the New Order regime was the 
inclusion of the keraton into the discourse of cultural heritage, as stipulated in Law No. 
5/1992 on the Protection of Cultural Monuments (Perlindungan Cagar Budaya). The law 
limits public access to the keraton by designating some sites or buildings in the palace 
compound as protected historical monuments. It prevents anyone, including the royal 
families, from changing anything or using the buildings for purposes other than 
activities endorsed by the Cultural Office (Dinas Kebudayaan) or the Office for 
Preservation and Protection of Historical and Ancient Monuments (Balai Pelestarian and 
Perlindungan Sejarah dan Purbakala). The enactment of Law No. 5/1992 directly 
encroaches upon the sovereignty of the palace, since the raja or the sultan no longer has 
unlimited access to their properties. 
Laws No. 8/1985 and No. 5/1992 delineate the encounters of the keraton with the 
New Order state and with the public. In other words, the “serious game” takes place 
only within the normative space allowed by the laws, framing the palace as a cultural 
instead of a political actor, especially through Law No. 5/1985, which discourages the 
palace from exercising its political role. If the Dutch colonial government required the 
assistance of the keraton to secure its political control, the postcolonial state was hardly 
interested in acquiring political support from the keraton. On the other hand, however, 
it was feared that the abolishment of the monarchy system would provoke strong 
resistance and might incite radical separatist movements. Framing the role of the 
keraton within the discourse of culture is the most critical option in the “serious game”. 
It allows the monarchy to exist but, at the same time, restricts the political influence of 
the keraton. 
The appeasement of the keraton opened up different room for manoeuvre. Because 
the New Order regime distrusted the aristocrats, the keraton had to rely on the 
individual initiative of a king, a prince or a princess to deal with the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the state. It, therefore, depended on the network, intention, experience, 
and willingness of the individuals to reach and negotiate with the state bureaucracy. 
The rajas or sultans with long experience dealing with the state bureaucracy faced less 
difficulty in reaching the state than did those with little or no experience, or those with 
a history of opposition against the political regime. The rajas or sultans drew on their 
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personal networks to co-operate with the state apparatus; some aristocrats joined 
political parties, ran as local or national legislators, or occupied bureaucratic posts in 
local or national state offices. The limitation imposed on the keraton to exercise 
political authority holds the state to be responsible for helping advance cultural 
activities. The support the keraton received from the state in the cultural sphere allowed 
the aristocrats to focus more on or expand existing cultural activities. Palace rituals 
flourished during the New Order period, and the Javanese and Balinese palaces 
became the most important sites for cultural tourism. Awarding an honorary noble title 
to people not genealogically related to the royal blood started to become more 
common during this time. 
Buton Sultanate and the Keraton Festival 
When the swapraja domain in Buton was abolished in 1951, the Buton Sultanate also 
ended. Sultan La Ode Muhamad Falihi, the 38th Sultan of Buton and the last sultan 
(ruling 1937-1960), appointed no caretaker of the sultanate, so that the Buton Sultanate 
slowly faded away. The adat council also ceased to function and members of the adat 
council grew older without anyone to replace them. Sultan Falihi’s son, La Ode 
Manarfa, the strongest candidate to replace his father should the sultanate continue, 
never tried to revive the sultanate. Instead, he pursued a political career. He was 
elected as a member of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 
1967, and he was the spokesperson of the provincial parliament (DPRD-GR) in 1971. 
He joined the People Representative Assembly (DPR) in 1972 and again from 1982 
until 1987. Manarfa held many Certificates of Acknowledgement (Piagam Penghargaan) 
that he obtained from the Golkar party, the Parliament, several ministries, and the 
National Defence Institute. All these distinctions demonstrated his close connection to 
the Golkar ruling party and the military. He passed away in 2009. 
Butonese adat regulates that an adat council (siolimbona) elects a king and, therefore, 
kingship is not inherited. Because the adat council had ceased to function since the 
1960s, the sultan’s seat remained empty after Sultan Falihi’s death. Everything was 
quiet until 2010, when the Forum Komunikasi dan Informasi Keraton se-Nusantara 
(FKIKN), or the Forum for Communication and Information of Archipelago Keratons, 
selected Buton keraton to host the 8th Festival Keraton Nusantara (FKN), or the 
Festival of Archipelago Keratons, in 2012. The selection alerted government officials 
in Buton City and South-eastern Sulawesi Province to find someone who could 
represent Buton Sultanate, as the sultan’s seat was empty. Butonese aristocrats were 
also anxious and embarrassed to acknowledge that the keraton lacked a sultan, and 
choosing a new sultan would be a very difficult process because the adat council was 
inactive and, therefore, could not perform its duty.  
However, in 2011, people claiming to be Butonese adat leaders gathered to revive 
the Buton Sultanate, and their first step was to reactivate the adat council (siolimbona). A 
few months later, the new adat council gathered to hold a ritual for the election of a 
sultan. They eventually appointed La Ode Muhammad Ja’far, La Ode Manarfa’s 
nephew, as the new Sultan of Buton. The inauguration ritual of the new sultan took 
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place on May 19, 2012, at batu popaua, the most sacred spot in the palace compound. 
The election and inauguration of La Ode Muhammad Ja’far as the new sultan of Buton 
remained controversial. Some Butonese aristocrats refused to acknowledge the sultan, 
claiming that since the adat council was illegitimate, its decision was, therefore, an 
unlawful violation of adat. However, the majority of the aristocrats had chosen to 
remain passive and made no effort to resist the newly appointed sultan.  
 
 
Delegates from Banten Sultanate at the Nusantara Keraton Festival in Buton, 2012. 
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The biggest challenge came from the local government. When La Ode Muhammad 
Ja’far was inaugurated at the batu popaua, there were no officials of the city government 
attending the ceremony. The city government, in fact, went further to issue a certificate 
acknowledging La Ode Ja’far Hibali, the cousin of La Ode Muhammad Ja’far, as the 
Sultan of Buton. This government move irritated La Ode Muhammad Ja’far and other 
aristocrats who alleged that the government had interfered too deeply in adat matters. 
Even though La Ode Ja’far Hibali was related to La Ode Muhammad Ja’far, his 
manoeuvre annoyed the Butonese royal family. Since then, the Butonese public has 
talked about the quarrel as a conflict between the “adat sultan” (sultan adat) and the 
“certificate sultan” (sultan piagam). 
The conflict between the two sultans peaked at the 2012 FKN. The two sultans, La 
Ode Muhammad Ja’far and La Ode Ja’far Hibali, attended the Festival Keraton 
Nusantara activities and the presence of the two sultans at the event confused other 
kings and embarrassed the Butonese royal family. The Sultan of Aceh wondered: “I do 
not know which one is the Sultan of Buton.” The son of the former secretary of Buton 
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Sultanate also remarked: “This incident is a slap in our face (tamparan ke muka). Buton 
Sultanate should be ashamed that this incident was taking place in front of kings from 
all over the country.” La Ode Muhammad Ja’far’s faction reacted fervently to the 
presence of La Ode Ja’far Hibali. At a ceremony before the street parade commenced, 
the kapitalao (prime minister) of La Ode Muhammad Ja’far went berserk, drawing out 
his sword and warning people that they should obey the decision of the adat council. In 
Butonese adat, the kapitalao’s gesture of drawing his sword was a very strong statement 
that no-one was allowed to question the sultan. In the past, if the kapitalao brandished 
his sword before the public, he should behead someone to prove that the statement he 
had made was a serious one. 
The incident between the two Sultans of Buton at the FKN illustrated how 
practice shapes the legitimacy of access to adat. A sultan should reiterate his access to 
the legitimacy continuously through gestures, appearances and transactions, in short, 
through “serious games”. If the legitimacy was questioned, the sultan must reclaim it 
back through gestures, performances and transactions. At the Festival Keraton 
Nusantara, the competition over legitimate access to adat between the government 
official and Sultan La Ode Muhammad Ja’far also took place on the stage. During the 
opening ceremony at the Baubau City Hall, the Governor of South-eastern Sulawesi 
appeared on the stage dressed in traditional clothing specifically designed to honour 
prominent guests. By comparison, the sultan wore a simple traditional costume for 
receiving ordinary guests. Butonese aristocrats sensed this gesture was to reflect the 
governor’s attempt to overpower the sultan and the sultanate. Dressed in a more 
prestigious costume than the sultan’s, the governor was making the statement that he 
was more important than the sultan and he was the real host of the event. 
The state has been the source of legitimacy for past and present sultans of Buton 
and, at the same time, the Butonese aristocrats have to compete with local politicians 
for access to state resources. The Butonese aristocrats have encountered similar 
experiences that the other sultans or rajas have also faced, especially the sultans and the 
rajas who no longer have palaces and symbolic resources but want to revive the status 
they used to hold.6 On the other hand, however, larger keratons, mostly in Java and 
Bali, resort to cultural resources they possess to negotiate with the state. 
Twin Suns Hanging over Kasunanan Palace 
The phrase “twin suns” (matahari kembar) refers to the conflict between two kings 
(sunan) of Surakarta’s Kasunanan palace, Central Java Province. The conflict broke out 
when Sunan Pakubuwana XII died on June 11, 2004, without leaving behind or 
appointing a successor. The keraton’s adat rules that the successor of a king is the son 
of a queen (prameswari), preferably her oldest son. However, Sunan Pakubuwana XII 
did not appoint any of his eight wives as the queen. No-one knew why the Sunan 
                                                        
6 See Klinken (2007) for a list of keratons that have sought to revive their symbolic status and political 
power. 















Pakubuwana XII decided to have no queen,7 but this situation left a serious and 
emotional consequence when Pakubuwana XII’s death revealed an enduring anxiety 
over what political and cultural sovereignty would mean for the Kasunanan palace.  
Internal conflicts often take place in Central Javanese keratons, despite the fact that 
all Javanese kings of Kasunanan, Mangkunegaran, Kasultanan, and Pakualaman palaces 
descend from Sultan Agung, the first Sultan of the Mataram kingdom. The current 
keratons originated in the 1755 Giyanti Agreement when the Dutch VOC divided the 
Mataram kingdom into the Surakarta and Yogyakarta palaces. Internal conflicts in each 
palace further split the Surakarta palace into the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran 
keratons, and the Yogyakarta palace was divided into the Kasultanan and Pakualaman 
keratons. While frictions and rivalries shape the relationship between the Surakarta’s 
Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran palaces, only minor tensions exist between the 








Illustration of the kinship relations at Surakarta’s Kasunanan Palace described below. 
 
Succession has also often been the source of internal conflict in the keraton, even 
though, in some cases, when a sultan did not appointed anyone to be the crown prince, 
the situation did not escalate into a conflict. An example of this was when Sunan 
Pakubuwono X, Sunan Pakubowono XII’s predecessor, did not select a queen; the 
sultan’s death provoked no dispute over who had the legitimate rights to be crowned 
as a new king (Moedjanto 2002). However, after Sunan Pakubuwana XII had passed 
away, the situation turned ugly. KGPH Hangabehi claimed that he was the rightful 
successor to the throne. He argued that since he was the oldest son of the late king’s 
first wife, KRAy Pradapaningrum,8 the adat endowed him with the rights to replace the 
Sunan. However, another son from one of the late Sunan’s wives asserted a similar 
claim. KGPH Tedjowulan, the son of KRAy Retnadaningrum, stated that the majority 
of royal families (sentana dalem) and the general public supported him ascending to the 
                                                        
7 When questioned by one of his sons, Sunan Pakubuwana XII never explained why he did not select 
a queen nor appoint a son to be the crown prince. The prince could only guess that the king was not 
convinced that any of his wives had a son that he could trust (Interview with an anonymous prince, 
April 2013). 
8 KRAy stands for Kanjeng Raden Ayu, a title for a Kasunanan noblewoman. 
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throne. On September 30, 2004, KGPH Tedjowulan declared himself as Sunan 
Pakubuwono XIII, a move that soon triggered a reaction from KGPH Hangabehi, 
who also declared himself as Sunan Pakubuwono XIII only ten days after 
Tedjowulan’s declaration. Since then, the Kasunanan keraton has had two kings, each 
claiming to be the legitimate successor of Sunan Pakubuwana XII. 
Despite the continuing dispute over the legitimate Sunan, KGPH Tedjowulan 
worked actively with other rajas and sultans, mostly from Java, Sumatra and 
Kalimantan, to promote Forum Silaturahmi Kerajaan Nusantara (FSKN), the Alliance 
Forum of Archipelago Palaces, and chaired the FSKN from 2009 to 2012. However, 
King Tjokorda Jambe Pamecutan of Bali disputed Tedjowulan’s chairmanship, 
claiming that he, King Tjokorda Jambe Pamecutan, has been the legitimate chairman 
of the FSKN since 2007 when the FSKN was established. The Kasunanan keraton had 
actually sent Prince Gunarso Kusumadiningrat to serve as the General Secretary of the 
FSKN before he was fired in March, 2009, by King Pamecutan over an allegation of a 
fraudulent use of the FSKN name.9  
Despite its initial aim to provide an independent venue for rajas and sultans to co-
operate and work to promote royal culture and adat, the FSKN has relied on the state 
for political support. The first and most important step was when the FSKN held a 
courtesy visit to President Susilo B. Yudhoyono at the Presidential Palace in 2009. 
During the meeting, the FSKN Chairman, Tjokorda Jambe Pamecutan, assured the 
President and the government officials that the FSKN had no intention of creating 
negara dalam negara (a state within the state) or of pursuing political interests, but simply 
wanted to advance existing cultural activities. The President’s statement at the meeting 
made it clear that the government supported the FSKN because the forum was a 
cultural, not a political, forum. The FSKN Chairman’s and the President’s statements 
hinted at a veiled distrust that had existed between the state and the keratons since 
colonial times. The end of the authoritarian New Order regime had changed nothing 
and the state remained anxious that the noblemen could have persisted with their 
political objective. KGPH Tedjowulan’s active involvement in the FSKN shows how 
the Kasunanan keraton of Surakarta tries to reach out to the state and to other keratons. 
In addition to the FSKN, there are actually two other associations or networks created 
by the noblemen: the Asosiasi Keraton dan Kerajaan Nusantara (AKKN) and the Forum 
Komunikasi dan Informasi Keraton se-Nusantara (FKIKN). The Kasunanan keraton also 
supports the activities of the FKIKN. Whereas KGPH Tedjowulan was a central 
figure in the FSKN, KGPH Hangabehi’s faction, especially GKR Koes Moertiyah and 
her husband KGPH Edy Wirabhumi, plays an indispensable role in the FKIKN. This 
shows that the dualism of leadership inside the Kasunanan palace, the “twin suns”, 
                                                        
9 Gatra Magazine (24/03/2009) reported that a scandal broke out in 2009 allegedly involving King 
Pamecutan and the FSKN. Several renowned artists and 258 royal family members from keratons all 
over Indonesia gathered in Jakarta to prepare an excursion trip to Europe to meet European royal 
families. When they had arrived in Jakarta, they realised that they had been cheated. The delegates 
reported they had paid 3 million rupiah each to the king to participate in the trip. King Pamecutan 
denied his involvement in the scandal and accused the Surakarta prince of having misused the FSKN 
by sending the invitation letters to the rajas and the sultans on behalf of the FSKN.  
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The author in front of a house of a prince in Kasunanan Palace in Surakarta. 
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The FKIKN was founded during the first of the bi-annual Festival Keraton Nusantara 
(FKN) in 1995. The Central Javanese keratons of Kasunanan, Kasultanan, 
Mangkunegaran, and Pakualaman initiated the first festival, and were soon joined by 
the Cirebon palaces (West Java Province). When the festival participants consisted of 
fifteen palaces, they decided to establish the FKIKN, stating that the forum would 
function mostly as a communication forum among its members. Since then, GKR 
Koes Moertiyah and her husband have played a decisive role in the activities of this 
association. They designate their private office at the Kasunanan keraton as the FKIKN 
secretariat. Until the latest festival held in Buton in 2012, GKR Koes Moertiyah and 
KGPH Edy Wirabhumi had pushed the FKIKN to set up a working agenda; for 
example, during the 2012 festival in Buton, they urged the FKIKN to prepare a legal 
drafting of the Law on Adat People (Draft Rancangan Undang-undang Masyarakat Adat) 
and advise the People’s Representative Assembly (DPR) to include keraton in the 
normative definition of masyarakat adat (adat community).10  
                                                        
10 The follow-up of the FKIKN meeting still remained unclear at the time this essay was submitted 
for publication. Even though the DPR has held hearings with several rajas and sultans, they came to 
the hearings in their individual capacities, not representing the FKIKN. The academic draft of the 
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Building an alliance with the state and with other palaces through active participation 
in the palace organisations or networks is a “serious game” (see Ortner 1999) that the 
Surakarta’s Kasunanan palace and its noblemen play to craft a space for reclaiming 
cultural sovereignty. The Kasunanan’s “game”, however, does little to attract the 
Yogyakarta palaces (Kasultanan and Pakualaman keratons) to follow, apart from limited 
participation of the Yogyakarta palaces in the cultural performances held during the 
keraton festivals. A high-rank prince of the Kasultanan keraton said that the Kasultanan 
was reluctant to participate actively in the palace organisations or networks, either the 
FSKN or the FKIKN, because he felt that the organisations were more interested in 
pursuing a political agenda than a cultural one.11 Despite the different interests they 
have in the existence of palace organisations or networks, the Surakarta Kasunanan 
and the Yogyakarta Kasultanan are both involved in the “game” to award honorary 
noble titles (gelar bangsawan kehormatan) to outsiders. The keratons resort to the “game” 
to craft room to reclaim and assert their cultural sovereignty as the legitimate 
custodians of adat.  
Becoming Aristocrats 
Awarding honorary noble titles to people not genealogically related to a royal family is 
a common practice in many palaces all over the world. As Sherry Ortner has 
demonstrated (1999), the practical context and implication of a “serious game” 
emerges from the intentions, desires and anxieties of those involved in the game, as 
well as from the engagement of the actors with chances and dispositions opened up by 
the political or economic structure. Therefore, the republican political system of the 
post-New Order Indonesian state reveals the practical contexts that address the 
aristocrats’ concern over the future existence of the palace, either physically or 
symbolically. 
The practice of bestowing an honorary noble title to people other than royal 
descendants of the Mataram kings has existed for a long time. However, in earlier 
times, the honorary titles were awarded only to abdi dalems, a group consisting of palace 
clerks, soldiers and guards, lower ranking administrators such as lurahs and wedanas, and 
court artists and performers. Only later, after 1945, did outsiders with no royal blood 
connection begin to receive the honorary titles. The Surakarta and Yogyakarta keratons 
apply similar criteria to bestow the honorary titles. The receiver of the title should 
express his or her commitment to help to protect Javanese culture, or he or she has 
demonstrated actual work to promote Javanese culture and tradition, such as staging 
art performances or publishing rare, ancient Javanese texts.  
The Hercules’ royal title affair demonstrates the ambiguity of the criteria that the 
keraton applies to select a person to receive the title. Despite the normative criteria that 
the person is supposed to express a good conscience, the Sunan or Sultan retains the 
                                                                                                                                       
law, the one that GKR Koes Moertiyah asked the rajas and the sultans to prepare drawing on their 
palaces’ concerns, has yet to materialise. 
11 Interview with an anonymous prince of Yogyakarta’s Kasultanan palace. 
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final and absolute decision to grant the title. Each year, the court administration 
(Pengageng Parentah Keraton) recommends names of people that meet the criteria to bear 
an honorary title. When the proposed names have passed a careful examination by the 
court administration, the Sunan or Sultan typically accepts the recommendation. Apart 
from this list, the Sunan or Sultan often has his own candidates, and, in this case, the 
court administration has to accept the king’s candidates. When KGPH Tedjowulan 
suggested that Hercules should receive the honorary title, the prince referred to 
Hercules’ merits in supporting the security apparatus during the military operation in 
East Timor. Although Hercules has never demonstrated any public contribution to 
promote Javanese culture, nor assisted the Kasunanan palace, the award of the 
honorary noble title to Hercules was never disputed until the incident in West Jakarta 
attracted public attention. 
In addition to the Hercules affair, some honorary noble titles awarded by 
Surakarta’s Kasunanan keraton have also created public controversies. The honorary 
titles awarded by KGPH Hangabehi are no less controversial. His decision to grant an 
honorary noble title to Julia Perez, a controversial artist, provoked furious reactions. 
Julia Perez is also known for her involvement in sex scandals and her inappropriate 
behaviour. This reputation runs against the image of Javanese culture as a sophisticated 
and refined culture. Similar to Hercules, Julia Perez has never made any effort to 
promote Javanese culture and tradition. Regardless of the negative public image, 
KGPH Hangabehi bestowed a noble title on the artist in 2010 by giving her the name 
Nyi Mas Ayu Yuli Rachmawati. The controversy over the title reached a peak when 
Julia Perez was later found guilty of physical attack against Dewi Perssik, another 
controversial artist, and she was sentenced to a few months in prison. Since the court 
decision came out, the Kasunanan has decided to withdraw the noble title.12 
The “game of becoming aristocrats” is a social practice to mediate the keraton’s 
encounter with the outside realm. The practice foregrounds the transactional element 
of the game and, in so doing, shows how the keratons choose arenas, resources and 
strategies to reclaim their cultural sovereignty that the state has undermined. It 
demonstrates how the aristocrats draw on the desire and intention (Ortner 1999) to 
hold on to their symbolic role when the keraton encounters the state that has 
encroached upon the palace realm. 
The decision made by KGPH Tedjowulan to award the honorary noble title to 
Hercules shows how the cultural practice of granting titles can also serve as a political 
statement. Hercules’ assistance and his close connection to the Indonesian military 
during the occupation of East Timor becomes a more important factor than his later 
involvement in the criminal world. In other words, the game being enacted in the 
Hercules affair sheds light on a potential role of the keraton to make a political 
statement and, in so doing, situates the keraton on the same discursive level as the state 
institutions. On the other hand, KGPH Hangabehi’s decision to bestow a title on the 
                                                        
12 The Hercules and Julia Perez affairs are only two examples among other controversial honorary 
noble title awards granted by the two Sunans. The others include noble titles awarded to the artists 
Syahrini and Ahmad Dhani and to politicians and high-ranking government officials. The decision of 
the Kasunanan to revoke Julia Perez’s title was related to me by a Kasunanan prince. (Interview with 
an anonymous Kasunanan prince).  
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controversial artist Julia Perez draws upon the economic potential of the award. Before 
she was imprisoned and despite her negative image, Julia Perez was a famous public 
figure. Her stage performances and films attracted audiences throughout the country. 
KGPH Hangabehi could have seen this economic potential that the artist could draw 
and, by incorporating her into the inner circle of the cultural elite, the keraton expected 
to enjoy the fame and accompanying economic benefits. This was a rational option to 
resolve the financial problem that the Kasunanan keraton had been facing since the 
internal conflict broke out. Since KGPH Tedjowulan and KGPH Hangabehi each 
announced that they were Sunan Pakubuwono XIII, the Solo city government has 
halted its regular assistance funds (dana bantuan) to the Kasunanan. As the regular 
funds constituted the major part of the keraton’s annual budget, the city’s decision to 
stop the disbursement of the funds affected the regular maintenance activities of the 
keraton and the routine and compulsory cultural ceremonies arranged by the keraton, 
such as the gerebeg maulud ritual and jumenengan ceremonies. This situation required the 
keraton to find alternative sources to compensate the suspended funds. 
Unlike Yogyakarta’s Kasultanan or the neighbouring Mangkunegaran palace that 
still run their businesses or have the means to invest in private companies, many of 
which they obtained during colonial times,13 the Kasunanan palace lost most of its 
businesses in the aftermath of the anti-swapraja movement in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Even though the Kasunanan palace owned a railway company, sugar plantations and 
sugar factories in the early-20th century, the anti-swapraja faction in the government had 
managed to take over the keraton’s ownership of the businesses. As a consequence, the 
keraton’s source of income diminished significantly. This situation requires the keraton 
to be creative in its search for alternative sources, and the awarding of noble titles is 
seen as a viable solution without drastically compromising the adat. A Kasunanan 
prince points out that the noble title award is, in a general sense, a transactional 
practice.14 The Sunan grants the noble title drawing on contextual interests: Firstly, as a 
gesture of honour to individuals proven to be valuable assets promoting Javanese 
culture and, secondly as a response to fulfil people’s need to have a symbolic social 
status. In the first gesture, the Sunan exercises his function as the custodian of 
Javanese culture and adat. In the second gesture, he is in pursuit of viable alternatives 
to secure the continuation of the keraton institution and administration, and the 
maintenance of palace buildings. In other words, in the first gesture, the Sunan is a 
Javanese king. In the second one, he is the manager of Keraton, Inc. 
Epilogue: Toward Keraton, Inc. 
John and Jean Comaroff (2009) write on how the struggle for ethnic recognition in the 
late-20th century has entered a realm where identity, rights and history intermingle with 
capital, state power and affects. The intertwining of identity, capital and power forms 
an “identity economy”, an economy of producing feeling and attachment to a 
                                                        
13 For a rare account of businesses owned by Mangkunegaran palace, see Pringgodigdo (1950). 
14  Interview with an anonymous Kasunanan prince in 2013. 
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particular construct of identity (2009:8-9). They emphasise that the identity economy in 
the late-20th century relies less on an uncritical view of collective consciousness than 
on the ability of ethnic discourse to be construed as an entrepreneurial activity. The 
process of framing something as emotional as an ethnic identity and ethnic attachment 
into entrepreneurial discourse lies at the heart of what John and Jean Comaroff have 
termed Ethnicity, Inc. Ethnicity, Inc., the Comaroffs say, includes practices, materials 
and dispositions toward recognising a different engagement with collective identity and 
collective consciousness, in short, toward “giving affective voice to belonging” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:142). The central element in the Ethnicity, Inc. practice 
is the affective disposition to recognise the significance of belonging and the working 
of the capital, in their case, the venture capital. 
The “serious game” of the encounter of the keraton with the outside realm is also a 
practice where a collective consciousness of becoming an aristocrat intermingles with 
state power, individual disposition and capital. The collective consciousness of 
becoming an aristocrat runs parallel with the interest of the aristocrat to enact a role as 
the custodian of adat, a consciousness comparable to a political move to repossess the 
custodian interest of the indigenous people. Part of the collective consciousness of the 
noblemen emerges from the encounters of royal family members with the state, and 
the other part of the collective consciousness transpires in the co-operation and 
competition among the rajas and the sultans, as reflected in the politics of the FSKN 
and the FKIKN. As Sherry Ortner aptly demonstrates in the “serious game” of high-
altitude mountaineering (1999), the dispositions create a structure of feeling and desire, 
and, at the same time, accentuate the different experiences, interests and desires of the 
individuals. The “serious game” of awarding honorary noble titles illustrates the 
structure of feelings among the Kasunanan or Kasultanan aristocrats, and among the 
factions within the Kasunanan keraton. Surakarta’s Kasunanan invests an improvised 
meaning on the noble titles, locating the practice in the desire to recuperate the 
symbolic role of the keraton as the primary custodian of Javanese adat. On the other 
hand, the Yogyakarta’s Kasultanan dwells on the “serious game” with an interest in 
affirming loyalty from its abdi dalems and to strengthen the patron-client relationship of 
the royal families with their close relatives. In other words, the Kasunanan’s “serious 
game” has drawn on a structure of feeling different from the one framing the 
Kasultanan’s “game”. 
The “serious game” to reclaim access to adat is taking place not only among the 
keratons, but also among the groups of indigenous peoples. The keratons and the 
indigenous groups both draw their claims on the discourse of custodians of culture, 
but they differ in the materials incorporated to frame the notion of custodianship. The 
keratons locate their claim in the arts and written culture, while the indigenous groups 
frame their claim with international legal instruments. It is not surprising if the 
indigenous rights movement is less interested in the expressive dimension in the 
“serious game” of claiming access to adat. 
The encounter between the keraton and the outside realm is a struggle for 
recognition and over ownership of cultural properties. Since the colonial time, the 
keraton has received recognition not only through the political power it exercises, but 
also through the economic capacity of the keraton to shape and mould cultural identity. 
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The encounter of the keraton and the outside realm forges the “economic identity” of 
the keraton by reworking adat and symbolic materials into entrepreneurial activities that 
can be offered to politicians, to people seeking symbolic status, to the state apparatus, 










Francesca Merlan  
Given its aim of exploring the relations between legal and anthropological perspectives 
on indigeneity in Indonesia, the proceedings of the workshop represent the work of 
two participants with particular legal expertise (Göcke, Cabrera), and a majority of 
participants with ethnographic and anthropological expertise and interests (Hauser-
Schäublin, Steinebach, Klenke, Grumblies, Müller, Sanmukri, Thufail). Among the 
authors are also scholars who have been closely involved in the work of the principal 
Indonesian indigenist organisation, AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, 
founded in 1999): Arizona and Cahyadi – who also take what might be generally called 
a legalist perspective, the view of indigenous matters from international and national 
legal viewpoints.  
I was asked to write an Epilogue to the volume, not as an Indonesianist – which I 
am not – but as an anthropological colleague with long-standing interest in the 
development of concepts and practice concerning “indigeneity” as at international, 
national and other levels. My own main field of relevant research has been in Australia, 
a settler colony where many of the issues concerning indigeneity are rather different 
than they are in Indonesia, but perhaps not altogether as different as some may 
imagine.  
In what follows I first very briefly comment on the results of the Workshop as 
represented in these proceedings. Then I discuss some of the issues concerning 
indigeneity in Indonesia that the first summary reveals to be significant. Finally, I offer 
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some comparative remarks situating Indonesia within a broader field of nation-states 
working through the contemporary emergence of indigeneity; and finally, return to 
summaries of the papers in this volume in terms of the themes raised in the first 
sections of this Epilogue.  
Brief Summary 
In summary, the content of these papers seems to me as follows:  those examining 
international and Indonesian law concerning indigeneity (Göcke, Cabrera, Arizona and 
Cahyadi) all fairly clearly presuppose the empirically determinable existence of 
indigenous people/s whom legal frameworks are intended to support and whose 
interests they are meant to advance and protect. Thus we may say they all take an 
“essentialist” view of the category of indigeneity. It is probably significant that among 
this group of contributors are those who have been closely involved with AMAN as 
founder/s and supporters and who may therefore, without any prejudice intended, also 
be considered indigenist advocates.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, those with anthropological bent (Steinebach, Grumblies, 
Müller, Sanmukri, Hauser-Schäublin, Klenke, Thufail) all proceed from a more 
constructionist view of indigeneity. The most influential position of this kind relating 
to Indonesia has, in my opinion, been established principally though not exclusively in 
the recent work of anthropologist Tania Li (2000, 2002a, 2007a, b, 2010). Works in this 
vein explore the complex connections between contemporary processes of indigenous 
identification with other intertwined categories and processes in Indonesia, including 
adat (customary law, with its long history of existence as well as re-organisation and 
systematisation under the Dutch), and various others relating to notions of culture, 
ethnicity, social inequality and stratification, as well as the work of AMAN itself. 
Thus it seems to me that the original concept of the Workshop – to bring together 
legal viewpoints and anthropological ones on indigeneity in Indonesia – has not united 
them as one, but confirmed fairly strong underlying differences in the ways these two 
groups of practitioners position themselves with respect to the Indonesian situation. 
Therefore this Epilogue may serve a useful function by attempting to epitomize the 
elements that go into this difference of viewpoints. AMAN, in particular, continues to 
struggle to gain legal recognition for communities as indigenous, and the question 
becomes poignant: who is gaining such recognition, and who not, and on what bases? 
This Epilogue also seeks to bring this Indonesianist volume into relation with 
comparative commentaries on some of these issues as they are emerging in other parts 
of the world; and finally, to summarise some of the themes from the papers. 
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Indigeneity: Internationalist Phenomenon and Indonesian 
Interpretations  
Most sources, legal and anthropological, have little difficulty agreeing that 
“indigeneity” in its current internationalist acceptation is a recent, post-war 
phenomenon proceeded partly through the general development of multilateral 
organisations in that period, and that has its strongest organisational and advocacy 
framework within the UN system (see Muehlebach 2001, Niezen 2003, Merlan 2009 
on these developments), especially within the broader organisational framework of 
human rights issues. Especially the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
was for years a vital node in the developing “indigeno-scape” (Beckett 1996). 
From there, however, it seems to me that there are differences, as there are within 
this volume, between those who consider indigeneity to be discoverable in essentialist 
terms, versus those who take some kind of constructionist view of it. The former view, 
as with essentialism generally, depends on the notion that there is a set of attributes 
necessary to the identity and function of people as indigenous, which makes them what 
they are.  This set of attributes may be a fixed or variable set, or people may be seen to 
embody only some and not others, but the basic idea remains that people are 
“indigenous” and that it remains for them to be appropriately identified as such, now 
that the category has won some wide recognition. 
The second, constructionist, view – like all views of its kind – rests on the notion 
that the identification of people as indigenous is contingent on the way that the 
variables in terms of which this notion is understood by social actors come together 
with a range of other social variables, rather than being simply understandable as the 
result of inherent qualities possessed by these people themselves. 
A constructionist view of this kind on indigeneity in Indonesia has been most fully 
articulated by Tania Li. She sees indigenous identity as neither “natural or inevitable” 
nor “adopted or imposed” (2000:151), and especially recommends avoiding the pitfall 
of an extreme instrumentalism or tactical focus, but rather thinking in terms of 
“articulation” (as per Hall 1986): the notion of forging of particular connections where 
there is a range of possible connections. Li’s caution concerning avoidance of an 
instrumentalist extreme is important. For with social constructionism comes a concern 
to define agency, and with the latter always the possibility of a move to understanding 
action from an actor-perspective, often as tactical and instrumental, and based on the 
actor’s considerations of how one maximizes advantage under given circumstances. 
While some of the papers do show evidence of such maximisation (e.g., Grumblies 
shows a rapid adoption of indigenist perspectives among Wana), Li (2000:153) notes 
that while a tactical element “may become explicit at times of heightened politicisation 
and mobilization”, particular connections (Hall’s “articulations”) are possible and 
meaningful in that they derive from certain fields of power which cannot be reduced to 
a given momentary possibility of advantage. In other words, extreme instrumentalist 
thinking is usually reductionist, and in any case instrumentalism is only an aspect of 
social process, and does not in itself comprise an adequate understanding of what 
makes it possible and likely for things to go one way or another, and for actors to 
choose some possible forms of action over others. 
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Li’s (2000) thinking about communities’ adoption of indigenist positions developed 
through a comparison of two settings in Sulawesi, one in Lauje, the other in Lindu. In 
both places the main occupation was swidden agriculture, and in both locations there 
were social and economic dimensions of peasantry. Li wishes to explain these different 
outcomes, not in terms of essential differences between them, but in terms of the 
kinds of connections that could be made under particular historical circumstances. The 
first place remained an ordinary-seeming, indeed somewhat fragmented, peasant 
community in which people deal regularly with state functionaries; while in the second 
effloresced an (internationally recognizable) indigenous identity.  
Over time, the Indonesian government has developed (basically) two frames for 
categorizing village communities: as isolated and exotic (terasing, see also further), and 
everybody else. The existence of a system of customary law (adat) is not necessarily a 
feature that clearly or necessarily distinguishes these, as any community (of either kind) 
may be said to be an adat community if it evinces a system of customary law/culture 
(frequently one which may have been documented as such in Dutch colonial times, 
lending it an additional dimension of codification). But in the first mountainous 
location, Lauje, whose people had periodically been participants in coastal labouring 
schemes, and later the subject of (unsuccessful) resettlement, there were few thematic 
foci and (outside) actors of the kind that promoted any focused unification and special 
identification of the area and its people, such as came to feature in Lindu. In the latter 
area, a hydroelectric dam was proposed on Lindu lake around which local and (outside) 
environmentalist opinion and activism coalesced, and in which the locals became able 
to present themselves and some of their cultural assets as unique, as grounded in the 
local landscape, and linked to special, valuable forms of environmental knowledge. 
Thus, against conceivable expectations, over a period of years of activism focused on 
objection to the damming of the lake, the Lindu population – Christian, relatively well-
off in material terms – became able to identify itself, and be accepted as, indigenous. 
Li (2000:169) considers this to be a study in the conditions for articulation, 
including: focusing of events and efforts around competition for resources, which 
served to define group boundaries; the existence of a customary political (adat) 
structure able to represent the local population; the presentation of identity and 
cultural knowledge in terms intelligible to outsiders; and focus upon a particular place 
arising from a conflict in terms of which locals appeared pitted against state forces. All 
of these, runs her argument, were broader conditions or issues with which locally-
adopted actions and positions could articulate. The need to understand possibilities for 
connection, and conditions that may militate against it, in Li’s view should keep us 
from adopting too instrumental or narrow a view of agency and local aspirations, as 
well as too simplistic a view of the determinant force of wider conditions. 
Li’s is a kind of position certain not to please everyone, and perhaps especially 
those who take a more essentialist view of indigeneity: on the one hand her view 
specifically declines a naturalist view of indigenous “being”. On the other hand, it also 
may not please some constructionists, in that she counsels against simply strategic or 
tactical understandings of “becoming” indigenous. More interestingly, the kind of 
contrast she suggests, between those who can, and those who apparently do not, 
conform to terms of indigenous identity broadly (i.e., internationally) understood, may 
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actually represent a contrast which applies to a very large number of people in the 
world whom the UN system at least potentially classifies as indigenous, including many 
in India, Africa, parts of South-East Asia, and so on. For another aspect of indigenous 
classification that has to be kept in mind is that it is, like all identifications, relative – 
and thus depends on an understanding that there are some people who are not 
indigenous, as well as some who are. 
It is partly because the clarity of classification as indigenous is not obvious in the 
Indonesian situation that so many other elements and levels come to play a role in the 
understanding of indigeneity. And this is a place at which it is useful to mention the 
seeming clarity of difference between colonial settler states and others like Indonesia, 
and to follow up with some comparative cases more similar to Indonesia in some 
respects. 
Indigeneity Compared 
Many writers on indigeneity have charted its development from within particular 
international institutional (especially human rights) contexts, and from within the 
institutional and activist circles of particular nation-states. Muehlebach (2001) traces 
the latter back to the Americas, and Merlan (2009) argues for a thrust forward in this 
regard from particularly the Anglo-American settler states (with contributions from 
Scandinavia), and the counter-movement that made it precisely those states that for a 
time refused ratification of UNDRIP (Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples). 
In the settler colonies there appears or is often taken to be a fairly clear distinction 
between settlers and those who were there before – the indigenous peoples – that 
simply does not exist in this form in Indonesia, as well as in many parts of Africa, 
India, and many other parts of Asia and South-East Asia. 
However, in the settler colonies there are certainly complexities in how the 
category “indigenous” may be applied, and especially how governments delimit its 
reference with respects to benefits, programs and projects of the state. An important 
issue has to do with a certain, expectable, lack of clarity about how to define the 
“indigenous” population when the dimensions of time and intersection with in-coming 
settler populations are taken into account. With time, as in every settler colony, there 
has come to be a large number of people who are certainly biological descendants of 
the pre-colonial population, but also of the colonial population.  Typically there is 
contention over state-led as well as vernacular practices and ideas concerning them. To 
such populations, that have almost inevitably suffered from dispossession, 
marginalization and discrimination, recent (especially post-war) liberalizations have 
increasingly allowed for self-identification as part of a set of moves towards normative 
recognition. This has had, as one result, identification of themselves as indigenous (or 
whatever relevant term is nationally or regionally employed) by an increasing number 
of people, some of whom might have earlier tended to minimize, insofar as possible, 
their connections to the indigenous population.  In Australia and elsewhere, there has 
also been a distinct tendency for that self-identification to be total, involving a 
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rejection of the idea of “fractional” or “mixed” identities, that include both indigenous 
and other, perhaps especially “settler”, components. Though gradually there is now an 
emergent celebration of “mixed” ancestry, there has been some resistance to this. 
Certainly, a certain line of reasoning or feeling runs: in the past we were discriminated 
against as if we were “native”, and sometimes – even worse – were regarded as 
combining the worst traits of native and settler populations.  Now, when it is possible, 
we wish declare ourselves entirely “native”. Since, however, identification is an 
interactive process which may involve lack of acceptance and certainly almost always 
involves power differentials; such a self-determined identification is often not accepted 
by the mainstream or dominant community, who say: these are not native people as we 
understand it. They are changed from an earlier condition which made them different 
and, even if we attempted to suppress them in the past, remarkable.   
Both positions, that of the person who wishes to be recognized as “native”, and 
her “other” whose societal position does not lend support to extinguishing the earlier 
population physically but to denying the authenticity of mixture, have something in 
common: they usually do not adequately take account of the fact that none of these 
processes of mutual identification are outside history and interaction. People do 
change culturally, attitudinally, biologically, and in their capacities, through interaction, 
and “miscegenation” is part of that.  In short, both positions tend to adopt a static 
view of what it means to be “native” that harkens back to some early period and 
imagery, and thus is retrograde with respect to the question of what it might mean to 
be “indigenous” today. Note that explicitly socio-biological thinking, reckoning purely 
in terms of biological descent, is politically rather incorrect in the liberal-leaning 
societies today – so that, on the face of it, biological mixed descent cannot overtly be 
taken as any kind of conclusive argument against indigenous status. (One may, for 
these reasons, want to consider the quantitative reckoning of descent fractions by tribal 
councils on many American Indian reservations as other than ”liberal”). Any criteria 
must also be social and these, inevitably, will be complex and fragmentary – not only 
with reference to biological but also cultural factors. 
In short, in the settler colonies (as well as in many other nation-states where large-
scale interaction of originary and later-introduced populations have been hugely 
significant shaping processes) issues of identification in a critical sense must be grasped 
historically and in their particularity.  This is something that overarching classifications 
such as “indigenous” (and even basic colour-based classifications such as “black” and 
“white”) tend to simplify, if not rigidify. Social process historically understood is 
apparently highly bounded by such terms as “indigenous”, but many of the underlying 
societal issues evolve rather than go away. 
But there is an even more problematic aspect of indigenous identification which 
belies what might be assumed to be the certainty of this category in the settler states. It 
also has to do with process. And that is the rather recent, foreign and “top-down” 
nature of this particular form of classification itself, and the processes that gave rise to 
it. Since it has been developed as a category in international organizational contexts, 
and intended as inclusive and restorative, it is hardly surprising that the concept of 
indigeneity as internationally understood, together with the word itself, has limited 
circulation among most ordinary people to whom it might be thought to apply.  
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“Indigenous” people have been used to calling themselves by other terms, such as 
“coloureds” (one thinks of the admixtures neatened up from the dominant-society’s 
perspectives under this term in South Africa), or “Blacks”, or “Aborigines”, or 
“Murris”, or “Métis”, or “Maori”, or by a whole variety of regionally and sometimes 
nationally recognized terms that typically do not involve the spatially and socially 
inclusive, and connective, dimensions of internationalist indigeneity. One might go 
further and say that the dissemination of ideas concerning indigeneity has been largely 
the preserve of governmental, professional, internationally-oriented persons and 
organizations; and that at the social base intended to be represented by this ideal, 
indigeneity still has relatively little traction (some of the papers in this volume have 
shown NGOs and activists in Indonesia to be key vectors of notions of indigeneity). 
Internationalist indigeneity evolved partly in the effort of representatives of pre-
settler populations to by-pass some of the rigidities of state management of their 
situation, and reach for broader international assistance and mechanisms. And while 
these processes have undoubtedly been influential, they have naturally had a couple of 
consequences. First, as noted, the social base of such populations has typically 
remained less than broadly participant in these developments (this may be interestingly 
compared with the fact that over two thousand Indonesian communities have joined 
AMAN). But second, some aspects of the processes have become part of the 
governance functions of the relevant liberal democratic states (one might think here of 
the evolution of such offices as that of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social 
Justice Commissioner in Australia, a branch of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission created in 1992 in direct response to a national enquiry). So in a sense, 
such organizations, though critical of government in part, also belong to the range of 
government structures.  The liberal democratic governments of settler states, in short, 
do not reject the internationalist concept of indigeneity. They accept it – though it 
carries with it conceptual and practical limitations discussed above – as a category 
which does some work within the nation-state towards an articulated goal of 
improving the lot of the country’s most disadvantaged, though how this is to be done 
is conceived in often radically different ways. 
We may now compare that acceptance and integration of indigeneity into 
government with the official position of Indonesia, and more broadly, a whole range 
of nation-states who see the internationalist concept of indigeneity as inapplicable to 
themselves. To a large extent, their rejection is on the basis of a first principle that 
there is no clear distinction to be made between earlier and later populations. As 
Klenke (in this volume) quotes Tsing: 
 
Indigeneity is not a self-evident category in Indonesia. Almost everyone is 
“indigenous” in the sense of deriving from original stocks; Indonesia is not a 
white settler state. 
 
(Tsing 2007:34) 
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As Klenke remarks, Tsing’s statement relates to the position of the Indonesian state 
that it is “only marginalization by white settlers that transforms minorities of ‘original 
stock’ into indigenous people”. While that is certainly the Indonesian state’s position, 
we may also refer back to Li’s (2000) critical anthropological position that there is no 
simple or essential distinction to be made between indigenous people and others 
within the population. In another place Li (2002a:365) has commented that peoples in 
Indonesia have co-mingled, displaced each other, and migrated over centuries. And we 
can also draw in the preceding discussion, which has argued that governments in 
settler states do not fundamentally reject the internationalist concept of indigeneity, but 
that their understandings of it inherently tend to immobilize it rather than infuse it 
with historicity. 
The colonial population in Indonesia was never large and did not lead to a 
continuing distinction of the settler-indigenous kind such as is found in Australia. 
Colonists were a governing power but not a demographically significant category 
internal to Indonesian societies or, eventually, to the internal post-independence state. 
As these papers (and many others) also illuminate, the possible applicability of notions 
of indigeneity have widened in the Indonesian reform era (post-1998) characterized by 
policies of decentralization and calls for greater degrees of local autonomy and broader 
public participation in socio-economic processes. 
The colonial power exerted, of course, significant effects, including by making use 
of kinds of socio-political and religious phenomena to categorize and organize the 
populations they sought to govern. It is within this range of phenomena that much 
debate about the relevance of “indigeneity” has gained traction in the reformasi period, 
particularly with respect to all-important socio-environmental issues and tensions over 
rights in land and land use. A key concept that plays a role in this governmentality is 
adat, which thus naturally emerges as a principal issue in a number of the papers in this 
volume (from an historical and legal perspective, Arizona and Cahyadi; Grumblies; 
Müller; Sanmukri; Hauser-Schäublin; Klenke; Thufail). 
The Arabic-derived word adat has broad reference to cultural norms, values, 
customs and practices found among specific ethnic groups in Indonesia (as elsewhere 
in parts of continental and insular south-east Asia), to an (originally) unwritten 
traditional code regulating social, political, and economical as well as maritime laws.  
Autonomous governance, protection from external encroachments, natural 
resource management and land usage are among the most important features of 
adat in Indonesia.  
  
(Tyson 2011:653) 
Tyson (2011:654) also observes that status is central to the adat world he writes of 
(specifically, Sulawesi), introducing an element of social hierarchy and differentiation 
that has clearly played a large role in contemporary revitalisation of adat in many parts 
of Indonesia (papers by Klenke on Toraja, Thufail on the keraton, or palace). Li (2007b) 
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discusses a variety of deployments and interpretations of adat, including its use by 
political elites as an ethno-political tool of mobilization. However, both hierarchy and 
status differentiation are outside standard internationalist expectations of indigenous 
peoples and societies, which tend to focus on equality and communalism. Indeed it is 
often only in terms of an asserted communalism (if not tribalism, see Li 2000), that 
local populations and villages can confront the powerful interests of resource 
extraction (forests, minerals) and land use (timbering, plantations). 
British and Dutch colonial powers, as (noted by Arizona and Cahyadi note, p.4), 
studied and  contributed to codifying adat in many regions, making these available in 
many cases as Adatrechtbundels (Adat Law Tomes), and even published findings 
declared to be a “discovery” of customary law. Among other things, the existence of 
adat law communities became a means of indirect rule. The authors cite ter Haar (ibid) 
as having seen common origin and shared territory as key dimensions of an adat 
community, thus raising kinds of problems mentioned by (Li 2000) of the multi-ethnic 
and historically layered nature of many forms of local organization, and explored also 
in papers in this volume by Steinebach (this volume, regarding strategic marriage into 
Batin Sembilan, and by Hauser-Schäublin for Bali, where, disregarding other 
differences with other parts of Indonesia for the moment), it has been seen as 
necessary to recognize the “mixed” character of pesisir villages on the northern coast. 
Arizona and Cahyadi further explore the difference between two phrases, 
masyarakat adat and masyarakat hukum adat, the second of which has a somewhat more 
delimiting, officialised resonance and usage, while the first is used by NGOs and 
activists. The phrase masyarakat adat was in fact devised by NGOs in 1993, as a 
translation for the internationalist concept of Indigenous Peoples, and was assumed to 
correspond to a category of people living according to ancestral ways and in fixed 
territories – a correspondence which has proved to be difficult to find on the ground, 
if not illusory (see Li 2007b:571ff). The conflict over usage of masyarakat adat and 
masyarakat hukum adat revolves around the extent to which entities (or communities) as 
subjects of law have been officialised, or not; and, as the authors put it, the extent to 
which concepts have been taken over from colonial into current discourse (the 
addition of Arabic-derived hukum, governance or government, evidently suggests 
colonial regimentation). But at the bottom of such contests over designations and their 
content is the question how communal entities are to be defined, most saliently, from 
the point of view of the state.  With the recent addition of questions of “indigeneity”, 
the question arises how, and which, such entities may be entitled to seek rights or 
provisions as ones applying to indigenous peoples – a notion which, as earlier noted, 
the Indonesian state does not see as having application, while activists, NGOs and 
others contend strongly for such recognition. 
Similar kinds of conflicts about designation and concomitant affordances exist, as 
Hauser-Schäublin illustrates, in the Balinese contrast between desa dinas and desa adat 
(official administrative and customary villages respectively), here fully involving the 
question, not only of their status as entities in relation to the state, but their territorial 
boundaries. In any event, she notes that in Bali the desa adat has been renamed desa 
pakraman, a designation connoting religion, territory, and regulations – overall a notion 
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of a customary legal community, but one that also invokes the notion of a shared 
religion. 
However, none of these alternative designations and complications get past the 
fact that there is no clear, cross-cutting notion of temporal priority of one definable 
category of people over others (such as emerges in settler state settings, even if 
complicated by history in many ways), nor is there a clarity of socio-cultural difference 
setting off such a putative category from others. The many complications result 
precisely from the fact of long-term embeddedness of people and villages in 
landscapes according to local forms of organization and governance. These existed 
both in relation to pre-state formations, in relation to the colonial system, and were to 
varying extent codified as part of the colonial project. 
Probably the Indonesian state categorisations which approach most closely notions 
of indigeneity as understood in international and in other national contexts are those 
discussed most fully by Steinebach (this volume). These are successive terms by which 
some populations were considered suku terasing (isolated tribes), masyarakat terasing 
(isolated communities), and finally as komunitas adat terpencil (remote adat community). 
Many of these groups were mobile, remote and/or forest-dwelling. They were seen by 
the state as in need of development, hence periodically removed or re-settled and 
otherwise subjected to management. Steinebach shows, however, how a spokesperson 
for such a group explicitly identifies himself and others in many ways with majority 
rather than marginalized populations: as having in fact been sedentary and having lived 
lives comparable to others’, fleeing into the forest only to oppose and escape the 
Dutch. The spokesman cited conjures up a local identity which has as many elements 
of the peasantry as of any other category, marked by struggles over land with the state. 
The population referred to, the reader has earlier learned, is also in fact characterized 
by significant Javanese in-marriage, woven into the fabric of the local community. 
Overall, such a depiction in relation to the question of the indigenous, or other, 
identity of such a population seems most satisfactorily illuminated by Li’s notions of 
the kinds of connections that can be made under complex historical circumstances, not 
least contemporary ones of resource competition, state decentralization, and reshaping 
of local political structures, rather than by any simple designation. 
Kinds of complexity in relation to indigeneity have been treated in many other 
situations in the world, with respect to a broad swathe of nation-states and even large 
parts of continents. Lutz (2007) notes a general African position that all Africans are to 
treated similarly, and not singled out for special treatment. Certain African countries 
(e.g. Botswana) have specified in their constitutions that no such distinctions of race or 
ethnicity will be made. A range of anthropologists (e.g. Geschiere 2005, Leonhardt 
2006) have raised questions of the potentially disruptive effects of internationalist 
identifications of indigenous peoples as having special status, especially in African 
contexts in which equal treatment of people as citizens is only weakly established 
practice, and there are many visible tendencies towards preferential treatment of some, 
and disregard or worse of others, on the basis of race, ethnicity, tribalism, and/or 
“autochthony” (see further).  
More particularly, studies of some cases have shown how the application of 
indigenous concepts yields ambiguous results. In many African contexts, there is a 
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continual negotiation of the relative status of those considered linked to the land over 
the long term, “sons of the soil” or autochthones, versus those who arrive later from 
other locations and are seen, sometimes over generations, as recent arrivals or 
migrants. Kopytoff (1987) has argued that African societies tend to produce 
themselves at internal frontiers so constituted. And indeed, this distinction was 
inscribed colonially in Francophone Africa as one between autochthones and allogènes (see 
Geschiere 2009). 
Pelican (2009) illustrates through a case study of Mbororo of Cameroon how such 
local discourses of autochthony and internationalist ones of indigeneity yield distinctly 
different results. Mbororo, who belong to the ethnic category Fulbe, and are Muslim, 
were originally mobile pastoralists. They have migrated southwards in considerable 
numbers to reside among Grasslands-dwelling farmers by whom they are considered 
temporally secondary, or allogènes.  Though Mbororo have become sedentary, their 
outsiders status as “northerners” has been perpetuated over time, so that symbolically 
they are identified as migrant, and as a pastoral people. Partly, however, because of 
their original pastoralism and its assumed connotations, the Mbororo were able to 
achieve international recognition as indigenous. Their (original) pastoralism, 
nevertheless, conflicts with a dimension of supposed temporal priority of indigenous 
peoples, for they are, as noted, locally perceived as migrant and it is well understood 
that they arrived in this area subsequent to those of the category of resident farmer 
autochthones. The symbolic force of Mbororo as pastoral evidently here has trumped 
what Malkki (1992) terms the “sedentary metaphysic”, the valuation of being 
recognized as in place, implying priority and superior belonging. Their preferential 
identification as indigenous has, as Pelican (2009) illustrates, exacerbated relations with 
their sedentary neighbours at certain times. The Cameroonian state, though it has 
introduced a notion of indigenous peoples into its constitution, has not implemented 
any particular measures on their behalf, so that they have not materially benefited from 
this identification. 
The potential difficulties of identification of particular groups as indigenous in 
African contexts was foreshadowed by an African Group’s (2007) aide memoire to the 
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in the run-up to UN adoption of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This memoire specified some 
African members’ reservations about the legal and constitutional implications of 
indigenous identification for issues concerning land and resources, distinct political and 
economic institutions, national and territorial integrity, and sustainability of state 
responsibility for the monitoring of land and resources (see Oldham and Frank 2008). 
For another African context, Tanzania, Igoe (2006) has raised some questions 
comparable to those raised relating to Mbororo. Shah (2010) for southern India has 
critically analysed local appropriations of discourses of indigeneity as important to the 
combined perpetuation and transformation, as well as intensification, of class 
differences. Baviskar (2007) critically discusses the early uptake of indigenist discourses 
in the context of the Indian Narmada dam controversy by those opposing it, but the 
later transformation of indigenist into Hindutva (Hindu rightist) activism. 
This brief consideration of concerns about indigenous identification and the 
relation between international processes and those at other levels could be extended. It 
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serves here to signal a series of critical, practical and moral qualifications concerning 
indigenous identification: anthropologists’ awareness of how locally pre-existing 
discourses may be contradictory or incompatible with internationalist precepts; states’ 
concerns about its implications for some of their functions and relations to citizenries; 
its possible implications for internal contention within groups seeking indigenist 
identification, as well as between them and others.  
Returning to Indonesia, Li (2002a) has written about the moral implications and 
responsibilities incumbent upon anthropologists, activists and others in advancing 
indigenous claims over those of others. She sketches how, three years after the fall of 
the Suharto government, a large number of internal refugees had been created in 
various parts of Indonesia – Papua, Timor, Maluku, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Sumatra – 
partly as a result of greater freedom on the part of some to unilaterally claim superior 
rights of belonging in particular locales, and resulting victimization of those seen as 
migrants. Focusing on the instance of Dayak murder and expulsion of Madurese, in 
particular, in West Kalimantan, Li raises the question whether ethnic territorialisation 
may be exacerbated by indigenous rights activism. What seems to provide security for 
some, who indeed may have been oppressed over a long term, may create radical, life-
threatening insecurity for others. Though it may not be altogether fashionable to 
compliment colonialists, Li regards it as a virtue of the colonial period that in making a 
tri-partite distinction among Europeans, Foreign Orientals (Chinese, Indians and 
Arabs), and Natives, it nevertheless did not make invidious distinctions among 
“Natives” that would have given some priority over others, but instead developed this 
as a category within which all were regarded as equally native, and which served as a 
frame for an ideal of common citizenship upon independence. This resonates with the 
official positions of some African states which recognize the perilous weakness of 
mechanisms of common citizenship, and the dangers of politicizing distinctions based 
on notions of priority or exclusive attachment in light of continuing deficits of social 
justice and pluralist recognition.  
Summary of the Papers  
The introduction to this volume by Hauser-Schäublin briefly sketched the emergence 
of indigenist mobilisation in Indonesia, the forms of imagination which shape 
internationalist imaginings as against some of the issues of the multiple deployments of 
adat and concepts of autochthony, as well as oppression and disadvantage, which 
configure indigenism in Indonesia. This introduction, like much of the material it cites, 
gives a sense of the complexities involved in the identification of an indigenous sphere, 
and the multi-vocality of many of the concepts – such as adat – typically deployed in 
the effort to do so. 
The next several papers deal with indigenism in the framework of international law. 
Göcke argues that indigenous peoples have been regarded as subjects of international 
law and holders of sovereignty for centuries, and assumes that they have rights to self-
determination, while conceding the ambiguities inherent in the phrase.  In my 
(admittedly anthropology-centric) point of view, the paper stands in tension with the 
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constructivist perspective outlined in this Epilogue, and with some of the further 
implications of such a perspective. 
Cabrera argues that there have been two kinds of approaches to indigenist 
identification under international law: a human rights approach (emphasizing needs for 
protection of often-marginalized peoples) and a second, functional approach which 
centres on indigenous peoples’ participation, and though it their contributions to 
attaining international goals in areas of environmental protection, traditional 
knowledge, cultural diversity, economic development and international governance 
generally.  
Arizona and Cahyadi’s is a paper which highlights some of the way-points in the 
development of indigenous activism in Indonesia, the emergence of AMAN (Aliansi 
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), and most recently, and both the passage of new laws 
protective of indigenous rights (RUU PPHMHA) and their shortcomings. Arizona and 
Cahyadi see shortcomings as consisting in the constraints imposed by traditional elites, 
as well as the “conceptual imprisonment” reflected in recent regulations. They 
advocate the need to transcend this. 
Turning to the more anthropological papers, Steinebach contributes to the 
depiction of the historically changing, multi-faceted and complex position of people 
she writes about, whom some might seek to classify as indigenous. Generally known as 
Batin Sembilan (“nine tribes”, and exponents of a deep, regional and politically 
relevant ‘tribal genealogy’), they were previously qualified as kubu (hiding, isolated), 
later as kommunitas adat terpencil (traditional remote community). They generally evince 
an anti-colonial positioning, characteristics of a landed peasantry, as well as being 
integrated into market production and aspiration and hoping to gain further access to 
land for oil palm development. As noted above, this case well illustrates the 
complexities of which Li writes, discussed above. 
Grumblies writes of Wana, a relatively isolated but nevertheless cash-cropping 
population who retain cosmological understandings of the region as having been 
inhabited by ancestral taw Baraka (powerful people). Over a relatively short period of 
time these people were contacted by exponents of indigenous identification and 
developed some enthusiasm for pursuit of the possibilities such identification would 
enable. At the same time, these developments created some distrust between older and 
newer leaders as these new constellations for mobilisation developed. Seeing Wana 
enthusiasm for participation in indigenist mobilisation as grounded in long-term 
injustice in economic and other terms, Grumblies also notes a reluctance on the part of 
some who fear that new forms of relationship and empowerment will render them 
ineligible for reward by the taw Baraka (powerful people) whose return some still 
anticipate. 
Müller discusses contestation over the desirability of strengthening of adat in 
Tobelo, North Halmahera, a predominantly Protestant district. In view of a recent 
history of violent conflict, some movement in favour of adat has emerged, as well as 
some strength of opposition to doing so, and to the measures proposed. Questions 
that preoccupy the contestants are: what form/s of adat, according to proponents, are 
to be strengthened? And what would be the implications for others? One of the crucial 
objects of contestation is the symbolic unity of adat as grounded in Hibua Lamo, a 
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notion of an ideal-material constellation of ten communities living in four regions of 
the district.  Activists, largely located near Tobelo town, are led by a district head who 
is, at the same time, an advocate for the renewal and extension of unifying adat and a 
member of North Halmahera parliament. Their advocacy for regional unity of adat, is 
framed in terms of the maintenance, indeed renewal, of culture and traditional 
performance; but not only this. Some also see in this unity a potential for overcoming 
religious differences that contributed to earlier conflict (embodied in the metaphor of 
Hibua Lamo as a common “big house”), and were motivated by this hope. This 
version of adat has unifying aspirations which are variously cultural, political and 
religious in character, even as both politics and religion are seen by some of them as 
contentious and to be kept at arm’s length. It also implies a certain internal hierarchy, 
with shadowy internal historical subdivisions, which are the subject of some criticism.  
The opponents of the “Tobelo version” of adat emphasize and demand instead respect 
for the particularity of communities. There is a certain town- or Tobelo-centrism to 
the whole contention over the redevelopment of adat here. This is perhaps most 
conspicuously epitomized by the Hibua Lamo “big house” being located in a 
concentrated physical form, that is as a structure, in Tobelo town. Critics of the Tobelo 
version of adat see the wearing of traditional costumes as more demotic and equalizing. 
Overall, then, Müller’s paper exemplifies struggles in the renewal of adat and its 
implications.  
Moving to an organisational frame, Sanmukri explores how NGO activity supports 
the emergence of a recognizable indigenous sphere. She examines the relations of an 
NGO, Samdhana, to AMAN, as these emerge through Samdhana’s sectoral activities: 
principally ones to do with environmentalism and natural resource management.  She 
argues that development organisations overtly operate in terms of very general and 
widely, including internationally, promulgated discursive concepts of participation, 
empowerment, etc., and measures to achieve these aims: official discourses and 
practices. But beneath the surface are a multiplicity of other-than-official discursive 
and practical tactics and aims, which have been characterized by strong orientations 
towards support for an indigenous constituency in the post-Suharto period. Within an 
organisation such as Samdhana are many national workers of activist formation and 
connection who operationalize the overt official programs in a variety of ways, 
introducing activist connections, dispositions, aims and modes of operation into their 
activities. At the same time, however, they are exposed to official discourses and 
practices, and may internalize some of these. Such organisations as Samdhana and 
AMAN bring together development workers and activists with diverse backgrounds 
and connections, some of whom are mobile between and among work venues; and 
there is some transfer of ways of thinking and operating among them. The paper 
mentions a persisting tension in the activities and relations between NGOs and 
AMAN: the assumption that indigenous communities are characterized by sustainable 
environmental practice, qualified however by a sense that there is a need to restore and 
revive these very practices. The paper provides some insight into how an indigenous 
sphere emerges in practice, despite the numerous complexities and ambiguities that 
continue to surround its identification as such. 
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Bali, with its considerable self-consciousness of distinctive Hindu culture and practice 
(and also, earlier political marginalisation within the centralized Indonesian state), 
might seem like an obvious locale in which indigenous identity would be rapidly taken 
up at scale. But Hauser-Schäublin shows that this is hardly the case. There have been 
numerous recent modifications of notions of Balinese communal and provincial 
regulation, the latter (PERDA, Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Bali nomor 2001) practically 
underwriting a shared form of Hindu Balinese cultural citizenship, and creating the 
possibility, as Hauser-Schäublin suggests, of large-scale masyarakat adat community/ies. 
Yet few Balinese communities belong to AMAN, the major Indonesian indigenous 
organization; and the number of participating communities has in fact declined over 
recent years. Though Bali is largely Hindu, and Perda 03/2001 explicitly recognises 
this, the question of agama (religion) in its relation to adat does not seem to be a central 
issue in the apparent lack of Balinese uptake of AMAN and its activities. Though 
AMAN leaders have recognized kinds of Balinese pluralism, making distinctions 
among Bali Pesisir, Bali Mula and Bali Apanage communities (respectively, north coast 
with its multi-ethnic populations, Bali Aga or “animist” communities, and 
“mainstream” communities), AMAN simply does not appear to speak to some of the 
main concerns of Balinese, including deriving greater benefit from the central 
government, and furthering external connections and tourist potentials, among others. 
Nevertheless, AMAN seems to have some uptake, due to its offering a kind of 
positioning to some outside existing village socio-political structures. Insofar as it does, 
some AMAN representatives become caught up in some of the discussions which play 
out Indonesia-wide with respect to contemporary organizational representation and 
participation: how compatible is representation by women with adat on the one hand, 
and with democratization and social transformation on the other? 
The last two papers by Klenke and Thufail have in common that they deal with 
issues of social stratification in the context of indigenism. Klenke asks why Torajan 
elites were eager to claim indigenous identity. She answers this by neatly showing how 
possibilities of decentralization, tourism, and World Heritage nomination have all been 
folded into the reconsolidation by Torajan elites of noble hegemony as their particular 
version of revitalizing adat, and of assuming an indigenous identity, thus reinscribing 
social stratification and inequality “in a space in which it is assumed not to exist” 
(Klenke p.20), namely, among indigenous peoples. 
Thufail, adopting from Ortner (1999) the figure of the “serious game” -- here of 
becoming aristocrats -- shows how particular notions of adat are reworked to support 
the material and symbolic position of the nobility and the keraton, the palace, with 
illustrative examples from Java and other parts of Indonesia. While Indonesia’s nobility 
had a somewhat ambiguous status under the Dutch, and had to treat with the New 
Order to sustain the keraton, the recent period has opened up for them the possibility, 
and the necessity, of reaching out to a wider public not genealogically related to royal 
families, to shore up the position of the keraton materially and socially. Thufail 
effectively illustrates this by discussing the extension of noble titles to palace outsiders, 
including some of dubious reputation but a certain popular standing.  
In short, the last two papers focus on stratification in Indonesian societies, a bit of 
a renegade topic here in that “indigenous peoples” are generally understood as non-
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hierarchical, but an important dimension of the uptake of indigenist possibilities in 
Indonesia. The papers illustrate how adat is adapted to the purpose of sustaining 
hierarchical institutions in the hands of controlling persons whose positions are 
nonetheless unsettled and the nature of their political role considerably undermined by 
the state. Both state, and wider populace, nevertheless evidently continue to have a 
certain sense of investment in the cultural and social priorities of the nobility. 
Together, the papers illustrate a range of articulations in the present period. These 
involve the emergence and negotiation of indigenous identification, claims concerning 
adat, and often the issue of relation between these, in contestations over land, 
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AIPP Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact (umbrella organisation uniting 
46 indigenous (sub-) national organisations in Asia) 
AKKI Asosiasi Kerajaan dan Kesultanan Indonesia (Association of 
Kingdoms and Sultanates of Indonesia) 
AKKN Asosiasi Keraton dan Kerajaan Nusantara (Association of 
Palaces and Kingdoms of the Archipelago) 
AMA Kalbar Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kalimantan Barat (The Indigenous 
Peoples’ Alliance of West Kalimantan) 
AMA Toraya Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Toraya (The Indigenous Peoples’ 
Alliance of Toraya) 
AMAN Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (The Indigenous Peoples’ 
Alliance of the Archipelago) 
BAL Basic Agrarian Law, passed in 1960 
BFL  Basic Forestry Law, passed in 1967 
BI  Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) 
BPD Badan Perwakilan Desa (Village Representative Body, 
mentioned in the Regional Autonomy Law no. 22 of 1999) 
Brimob Brigade Mobil (Mobile [police] Brigade)   
BRWA Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat (Ancestral Domain 
Registration Agency, a co-operation between AMAN, JKPP 
and FWI for the registration of the maps developed in the 
process of community mapping) 
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BT Bahasa Taa (Wana language) 
CBNRM Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
CBO Community-Based Organisation 
DAMANNAS Dewan AMAN Nasional (AMAN’s National Council, the 
Alliance’s highest decision-making body) 
DPR, DPR RI  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (National 
Parliament) 
DPR-D Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (People’s Representative 
Assembly at a local level [province, district or city]) 
DPRD-GR  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Gotong Royong (Gotong-
Royong Regional People’s Representative Assembly) 
FKIKN Forum Komunikasi dan Informasi Keraton se-Nusantara 
(Forum for Communication and Information of Archipelago 
Palaces) 
FKN Festival Keraton Nusantara (Festival of Archipelago Palaces, 
organised by FKIKN) 
FPHB Forum Perjuangan Hak Bali (Forum for the Fight for Balinese 
Rights, formed in 2012) 
FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent (A principle ensuring 
communities’ participation in decision-making processes, 
enshrined in the ILO 169 Convention and in the UNDRIP) 
FSKN Forum Silaturahmi Keraton Nusantara (Friendship Forum of 
the Palaces of the Archipelago)  
G30S Gerakan 30 September (the Movement of September 30, 
1965, which led to President Sukarno’s downfall) 
GBPH Gusti Bendara Pangeran Haryo (royal title in Yogyakarta’s 
Sultanate) 
GKR Gusti Kanjeng Ratu (royal title in the Kasunanan keraton of 
Surakarta) 
GMIH  Gereja Masehi Injili di Halmahera (local branch of the 
Evangelical Church in Halmahera) 
Golkar Partai Golongan Karya (The Party of the Functional Groups) 
HuMa Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum berbasis 
Masyarakat dan Ekologis (Association for Community and 
Ecologically-Based Law Reform) 
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ICRAF International Council for Research in Agroforestry founded in 
1978 
IFAD The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IFC World Bank Group’s development institution “International 
Finance Corporation” 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IPPF Indigenous Peoples’ Planning Framework 
Jagat NTT Jaringan Penggerak Masyarakat Adat Nusa Tenggara Tengah 
(Network of the Indigenous Activists of East Nusa Tenggara) 
JAPHAMA Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat (Indigenous 
Peoples Rights’ Advocacy Network) 
JKPP Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif (Participatory Mapping 
Network) 
KAT Komunitas Adat Terpencil (Remote Adat Community) 
KGPAA Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Ario (royal title in the 
Pakualaman keraton of Yogyakarta) 
KGPH Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Haryo (the highest title of Surakarta 
Kasunanan noblemen after the king. The title KGPH is 
reserved only for direct male descendants of the king) 
KKN  Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism) 
KMAN II Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara ke-dua (Second 
Indigenous Congress organised by AMAN 2003 in Lombok, 
West Nusa Tenggara) 
KMAN III  Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara ke-tiga (Third 
Indigenous Congress organised by AMAN 2007 in Pontianak, 
West Kalimantan) 
KMAN IV Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara ke-empat (Fourth 
Indigenous Congress organised by AMAN 2012 in Tobelo, 
North Maluku) 
KPA Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (Consortium for Agrarian 
Reform) 
KpSHK Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan 
(Consortium for Supporting Community-Based Forest System 
Management) 
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KR Kanjeng Raden (the lowest rank of honorary male titles in 
Surakarta’s Kasunanan palace) 
KRAy  Kanjeng Raden Ayu (title for a Surakarta Kasunanan 
noblewoman) 
LBBT Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (Institute for Community Legal 
Resources Empowerment) 
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute 
of Sciences) 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
MPRS  Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional 
People’s Consultative Assembly) 
Murba  Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Great People’s Consultative 
Party) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
Perda Peraturan Daerah (Regional [provincial] Regulation) 
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) 
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) 
PNPM Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National 
Programme for Community Empowerment, managed by the 
World Bank and funded by Governments of Australia, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, 
and the European Union) 
Polres Polisi Resor (Resort Police, police command at district level) 
PRD Partai Rakyat Demokrat (People’s Democratic Party) 
Prolegnas Program Legislasi Nasional (National Legislation Programme) 
PSII Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian United Islamic 
Party) 
PT. AP  PT. Asiatic Persada 
PT. BDU PT. Bangun Desa Utama 
PT. TPL PT. Toba Pulp Lestari 
PT. TÜV Rheinland RSPO-accredited German assessor which evaluates the 
implementation of the RSPO criteria 
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REDD UN Initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation 
RSPO Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil 
RUU Rancang Undang-Undang (Draft Law) 
RUU PPHMHA  Rancang Undang-Undang tentang Perlindungan dan 
Pengakuan Hak Masyarakat Hukum Adat (The Draft Law on 
the Recognition and the Protection of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples) 
SAD Suku Anak Dalam, self-determined name of a Batin Sembilan 
activist community 
Sarbupri  Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia (Estate 
Workers Union of the Republic of Indonesia) 
Sobsi  Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesia 
Centre of Labour Organisations) 
STN Serikat Tani Nasional (National Peasant Union) 
TAP MPR Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (decree of the 
People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia) 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
VOC  Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India 
Company) 
WALHI Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Friends of the Earth 
Indonesia) 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WWF World Wildlife Fund 
YLBHI Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Legal Aid 
Foundation of Indonesia) 
YMP Yayasan Merah Putih (Red-White Foundation, NGO located 
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7A number of UN conventions and declarations (on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressi-
ons and the World Heritage Conventions) can be understood as instruments of 
international governance to promote democracy and social justice worldwide. 
In Indonesia (as in many other countries), these international agreements have 
encouraged the self-assertion of communities that had been oppressed and de-
prived of their land, especially during the New Order regime (1966-1998).  More 
than 2,000 communities in Indonesia who define themselves as masyarakat adat 
or “indigenous peoples” had already joined the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of 
the Archipelago” (AMAN) by 2013. In their efforts to gain recognition and self-
determination, these communities are supported by international donors and 
international as well as national NGOs by means of development programmes.
In the definition of masyarakat adat, “culture” or adat plays an important role 
in the communities’ self-definition. Based on particular characteristics of their 
adat, the asset of their culture, they try to distinguish themselves from others in 
order to substantiate their claims for the restitution of their traditional rights and 
property (namely land and other natural resources) from the state. The authors 
of this volume investigate how differently structured communities - socially, po-
litically and religiously - and associations reposition themselves vis-à-vis others, 
especially the state, not only by drawing on adat for achieving particular goals, 
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